Dist. 44, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/44/q/bon-sent-I-d44-dubia
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### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

#### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning that solution of the Master's, by which he says that the bringing-in of this similitude has no force, because he begot the Son from his own substance. For it seems that this response is not sufficient. For envy can be considered in regard to one diverse in substance and nature, as the Angel envied man: therefore on this account envy is not excluded from God in regard to a creature.

**I respond:** It must be said that two things concur for envy, namely, the power toward equality, and the exigence of the thing made. For no one envies another unless someone is made equal to him or exceeds him, or unless he fears lest he be equalled. Likewise, an artisan is not called envious except when he does not make a thing according as it exacts, and as he is himself able. And on account of this, since on the side of things there was no exigence, and again in nothing could they be equalled, therefore whatever sort of things he made, envy is not convicted to be in God, even if he made no things at all. But in the Son of God there was a power toward equality and, beyond that, an exigence, on account of this, that he was of the substance of the Father. Hence it is that it is not a like case, as the Master says; and his response is good. For he puts the antecedent for the consequent, not because he means to say that envy could be only or could be in regard to one similar in nature, but on account of the aforesaid ratio of exigence and equality, which were in the generation of the Son, because he was of the substance of the Father.

#### Doubt II.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says, that God could have made such a man, who could neither sin nor wish to sin; and if he had made such a one, *who doubts that he would have been better?* For the contrary seems to be said in Ecclesiasticus thirty-one: *He was able to transgress, and did not transgress*; this is said in praise of a holy man. And Augustine himself says *on Genesis according to the letter*, that *"God judged men to be better, if they served him freely"*. And again, in his book *On the City of God* he says, that *"that substance is better which can sin than the one which cannot"*.

**I respond:** It must be said that *"better"* is said in two ways: either absolutely, or in ordering to an end. If we speak absolutely, the man confirmed in grace is better

than the one able to fall; if [we speak] in the ordering to the end, which indeed consists in attaining it, then it was better to make man in the liberty of being able to sin, but yet the first is better absolutely, while this is better in a qualified sense. And so the word of Augustine, speaking absolutely, has truth.

But what is said about the just man is accidental praise, that is, as regards accidental glory. For it is settled that Christ could not sin, and yet he was most glorious. Similarly is to be understood that word of Augustine *on Genesis*. But as to what is said, that a nature is better which can sin than one which cannot, it must be said that not-being-able-to-sin is from a twofold cause, either because it lacks the will, or [because it lacks] the changeability of the will; and Augustine understands it in the first mode, not the second.

#### Doubt III.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what the Master says, that *God could have made things better than he did*. For this seems not to have truth in all cases, and specially in Christ, whom he seems in no way able to make better, through what is said to the Philippians, chapter two: *He gave him a name, which is above every name*. Likewise, John three: *The Spirit is given to him not by measure*; therefore in no way could God give to Christ more of the Spirit: therefore he could not make him better.

**I respond:** It must be said that the Master speaks of the universe and its parts; and since Christ neither is of the universe nor a part of it, therefore the saying has no place in him. Yet still in Christ it has a doubt. For if whatever the humanity of Christ has is finite, then since God can do beyond every finite thing, he could have done a greater. And again, Christ was made passible and mortal, and could have been made immortal.

And on account of this it must be said that to speak of Christ is to do so in three ways: either as to *the union*, or as to *the grace of the singular person*, or as to *the properties of [his] nature*. If as to the *union*, neither can God give more, nor the creature receive more, because the grace of union on the side of one extreme is of infinite dignity, namely, that man should be God, although on the side of the humanity whatever is there is finite: and so no limitation is placed on the side of God, nor is there infinite capacity on the side of the creature except through the union, namely, because man is united to an infinite good, in such a way that man is God, who is of infinite goodness. — But if we speak as to the grace of the singular person, then I concede that God could give more, but the rational nature could not receive more; not because the soul's capacity for grace is diminished by the conferring of grace, since it is neither diminished nor increased, but consummated and completed; and therefore it is not capable of more. But if we speak *as to the properties of the nature*, then God could both give more out of his goodness, and the rational creature receive [it], as to those things, namely, which are of the body — since he now has more than when he was made — but they could not have been made more fitting to our salvation. For our salvation could never have been so repaired through an incorruptible and immortal substance, as it was repaired through his death and passion. It is plain therefore in what way Christ could have been better, and in what way not.

#### Doubt IV.

Likewise, an objection is raised concerning the Blessed Virgin. For it seems that she could not have been made better, since Anselm *On the Conception of the Virgin* says: *"It was fitting that the conception of that Man should be from a most pure Mother, by a purity than which a greater cannot be understood under God"*: therefore it seems that she could not have been made better, and yet she was a part of the universe. Likewise, she is exalted in glory above all the choirs of Angels: therefore she was made in the highest grace.

**I respond:** It must be said that one can speak of the Blessed Virgin as to three conditions, namely, as to the grace of the conception, as to the grace of justification, and as to the nature. If as to the conception of the offspring, then since she was the Mother of God — than whom nothing more noble can be thought of — and Mother of a most noble Son, she had so great a dignity of goodness,

that no woman could receive more. For if all creatures, however high they might rise in degrees of nobility, were present, all would owe reverence to the Mother of God. — But if we speak as to the grace of *justification*, she had as much as a pure human or rational creature, which was made as she was made, could receive. — If as to the *natural endowments*, she had the best, according to what was fitting for her: yet absolutely speaking she could have received better things, and God could have given them. — And so it is plain that in no created thing does this word of the Master fail to find application: *that the things which God made, he could have made better*. It is also plain that in some he filled and completed the capacity of grace; but in Christ in every way, in his Mother according as a pure rational creature in the female sex is capable, as to those things which pertain to the body, and in the human soul, as to those things which are of grace.

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