Dist. 45, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/45/q/bon-sent-I-d45-a1-q1
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### Article I. *On the divine will according to its quiddity.*
### Question I. *Whether the will is to be posited in God.*

That, however, the will is not to be posited in God, is shown by authority and by reason.

1. *First*, thus: Augustine in the book *On Free Will*: « The will is a rational motion presiding over sense and appetite »; but in God there is no motion, nor sense, nor appetite: therefore neither will.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the book *On the Two Souls*: « The will is a motion of the soul toward pursuing something, or fleeing it »; but in God there is no flight nor pursuit to be posited: therefore neither will.

3. Likewise, by reason: because the will is the power in us most subject to turning — whence the other powers cannot [be turned] toward evil, but the will alone is that from which sin comes; but in God there is no turning whatsoever toward evil: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, the will, by the very fact that it is will, is toward opposites; and because [it is] toward opposites, it is contingent and variable; but in God there falls no contingency nor variety: therefore, etc. *Proof of the first [proposition]:* The will, by the very fact that it is will, is a rational power; but « rational powers are toward opposites », as the Philosopher says: therefore, etc. Likewise, by the very fact that it is will, it is free; and if so, it is not determined to one thing — because then it would not have freedom, as neither do the natural powers [have it]: therefore it is toward opposites, and so variable.

**On the contrary:**

1. To the Ephesians, chapter 1, the Apostle says: *According to the counsel of his will*. And again in the same place: *According to the purpose of his will*; and all of Scripture is full of this name *will* as [predicated] of God: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, the Philosopher in the twelfth [book] concludes that « the will is an action of God himself ».

3. Likewise, by reason it appears [thus], because the will is that in which, among created things, supreme power resides: therefore if the will of itself bespeaks power — because it presides over all things in the kingdom of the soul, and nothing can command it; but God is most powerful, and whatever belongs to power must be attributed to him: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, the will is that in which the highest pleasure or happiness consists — for « blessed is he who has all that he wills »; whence nothing takes delight unless it has a will or something similar to a will — but God is most happy, in whom is all happiness and gladness: therefore, etc.

5. Likewise, the will is that in which justice and equity reside — for justice is nothing other than the rectitude of the will; whence things not having a will are not capable of justice — but God is most just according to every understanding [of justice]: therefore he has a will.

6. Likewise, the will is the power by which supreme generosity is measured — for all generosity

comes from love, but it is plain that love is an act of the will — in God, moreover, supreme generosity is to be posited: therefore also love and will.

### Conclusion.

> **Conclusion.** The will is in God more properly and in a more complete mode than in us, and without any imperfections.

**I respond:** It must be said that the will is to be posited in God, as the four foregoing reasons show, on account of the four conditions — namely, of *power*, of *pleasure*, of *equity*, and of *generosity* — which pertain to the will; and [it is to be posited] more properly in God and in a more complete mode than in us.

For the will in us is [present] by [way of] difference from substance and act, and by distance from [its] end; but in God [it is] by [way of] complete non-difference of these — namely, of substance, of virtue, of act, and of end. And because in us it is [there] by difference from substance and from act, therefore [it is] *presiding* over the others and *variable* according to diverse acts. For on account of [its] difference from substance, in which the other powers too can be rooted, [the will] *presides over* the other powers, such as sense and appetite. On account of [its] difference from act, there is *variability according to the alternation* of affections. But in God there is neither; therefore it neither rules inferior powers, nor undergoes variation according to varying affections. And so, because in us it is [there] by distance from [its] end, thence it is that [the soul] is needy, and therefore in [the will] there is flight and appetite, and there also falls in it sadness, and there falls also malice, because it can be turned aside from the end, since it is not joined to it. In God, however, [the will] is altogether joined to the end; therefore it has neither flight nor appetite, nor sadness nor malice, but altogether gladness and justice.

**Replies to the contrary arguments:**

*Ad 1, 2, 3.* And thus the reply to the first three is plain, because although these conditions — appetite, flight, malice or turnability — are conditions of the created will, yet they are altogether removed from the divine will.

*Ad 4.* To that which is objected, that [the will] is contingent and variable: it must be said that contingency is either in act or in effect. If we speak of contingency in effect, [such contingency] is not only in our own effect, but also in many [things] which are from God. For God does many things which he could not do, with nothing opposing. But if we speak of contingency in act — by which the will at one moment ceases to will something and begins to will [it], at one moment wills something, at another wills the opposite — this [contingency] falls in the human will, because between the human will and [its] act there is a difference; whence it is not always in one act, nor in a uniform act. The divine will, however, on account of the identity of itself with [its] act, cannot vary at all, nor has it any contingency in itself; and therefore all the questions asked become clear.