Dist. 45, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/45/q/bon-sent-I-d45-a1-q2
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### Question II. *Whether God is called all-willing, just as [he is called] all-knowing and all-powerful.*

Secondly, granted that in God a will is to be posited, it is asked whether one is to posit [in him] an all-willing [one] — so that from *will* he should be called *all-willing*, just as from power and knowledge [he is called] *all-powerful* and *all-knowing*. And that he is so [called], is shown as follows:

1. Because God is not called all-powerful on the ground that he can do all things, but because he can do everything that befits his power — for he cannot do evils — but similarly God wills everything that befits his will to will: therefore he ought to be called *all-willing*, just as [he is called] all-powerful.

2. Likewise, as God's *knowing power* stands to the true, so his *affective power* or will stands to the good; but the knowing power or understanding embraces every truth — whence whoever should say that God is ignorant of any truth would constrict and derogate from his understanding — therefore by parallel reasoning, since the understanding is no broader nor more perfect than the will, the will will be with respect to every good: therefore, just as he is called *all-knowing* because he knows every truth, so [he should be called] *all-willing*, because he wills every good.

3. Likewise, just as God is called *the true of every true*, namely from whom every truth has its truth, so he is *the good of every good*, from whom every good has its goodness; but God, in seeing his own truth — since [that truth] is the formal account of all things — knows all things: therefore likewise in loving his own goodness he loves every good. But everything that he loves, he wills: therefore he wills every good, just as he knows every truth, and so forth.

4. Likewise, a good will is one that extends itself to many goods; therefore a better one extends to more, and the best to all, therefore an infinite [will extends] to infinite [things]: therefore as power and knowledge extend to all things and to infinite things, so also the will: therefore by the reason that he is called all-powerful and all-knowing, by the same reason he ought to be called all-willing.

**On the contrary:**

1. In the Psalm: *Whatsoever he willed, he made*; therefore he wills nothing except what he makes; but he can make more, and he cannot [make anything] except by willing: therefore he can will more. But if God could know more, he would not be all-knowing: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, if a man should know something that God does not know, God would not be all-knowing: since therefore a man wills something that God does not will — for example, to commit a theft — therefore God is not all-willing.

3. Likewise, if to be-able-for-evil were a [genuine] ability, God would not be all-powerful, because he cannot do evils; since therefore to will evil is to will, and God does not will evils, God is not *all-willing*. Proof of the minor: evil is not evil except because [it is] voluntary, because, according to Augustine, « sin is voluntary to such a degree » etc., therefore the formal character of will is preserved in [the case of] evil, and likewise the act of will in willing evil; therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, to will evil is either to will, or to nill [not-will]. If [it is] to will, I have my conclusion; if to nill — but to nill evil is good; therefore to will evil is good; therefore if God wills every good, God wills evil, which is false. It remains therefore that to will evil is [genuinely] to will; and God does not will evil: therefore God is not all-willing. — But this argument is sophistical, since the same could be raised about power. — And therefore it is asked, whence is it that to will evil is [genuinely] to will, but to be-able-for-evil is not [an act] of power but of impotence.

Alongside this, an inquiry is raised concerning the comparison of *power*, *wisdom*, and *will* with respect to their objects, as to their range.

### Conclusion.

> **Conclusion.** It is simply denied that God is called *all-willing*, just as he is rightly called *all-knowing* and *all-powerful*.

**I respond:** It must be said that when it is asked whether God is all-willing, this expression can produce a twofold understanding from the fact that the word *every* can produce a distribution either simply or as-of-now. If it produces a distribution simply, as to act and habit, then he is called all-willing because he wills every willable thing; if as-of-now, he is called all-willing because he wills every willed thing. In either sense it is false, and in either sense it is true of power and of knowledge. And therefore it is simply conceded that God is *all-knowing* and *all-powerful*, and it is simply denied that he is *all-willing*.

The understanding of this and the reason are clear. For if we take [the term] simply, God knows every knowable and can do every possible, but he does not will every willable; because the divine will imports an *actual* cause, while power abstracts from the character of actuality and posits the character of cause, but knowledge abstracts from the character of both. Since therefore God is not the actual cause of all things which he can do or will, just as he does not do every willable, so he does not will [every willable]. But since power abstracts from the character of actuality, it is therefore said [to be] not only with respect to things to be done in act, but also with respect to things possible to be done by God. And since knowledge abstracts from the character of both, hence it is that knowledge is not only with respect to things-to-be-done, but also with respect to things-possible — not only by God, but also by others — such as possible evils. This therefore is the reason: that the act of knowledge, namely *to know*, is according to the mode of a *habit*; likewise also [the act] of power, according to the mode of *habit*, [namely] *to be-able*; the will [is] according to the mode of *act*, [namely] *to will*. Therefore knowledge is of all *knowables*, power of all *possibles* which are [the objects] of power, but the will is not of all *willables*. And therefore God cannot know or be-able to do more, but he can will more.

Likewise, if we take a thing as-of-now, with respect to a thing foreseen and with respect to a thing done and willed: knowledge is with respect to every thing in which the formal character of knowledge is preserved, and power is with respect to every thing in which the formal character of power is preserved; but the will is not with respect to every thing in which the formal character of will is preserved. For knowledge is with respect to all future things and present and past things, of both good things and evil, because there the formal character of knowledge and of nobility is preserved; because to know an evil is [genuinely] to know, and to know an evil belongs to nobility. Similarly, power is with respect to all good things, in which alone is preserved the formal character of power. For to be-able for evil is not [genuine] ability. Hence to be-able for evil not only derogates from the perfection of power, but also from power itself, because to be-able-to-fail is not [genuinely] to-be-able; and therefore [God is] still all-powerful. But will is with respect to good things only, not with respect to evils. And although in willing evil the dignity of will is not preserved, yet the formal character of willing is preserved, because to will evil is [genuinely] to will. And hence it is that God is not called all-willing, because he does not will evil, but yet he is called all-powerful, although he cannot do evil.

If it be asked: why is the formal character of power not preserved with respect to evil, just as the formal character of will [is]? It must be said that power, the very thing it expresses, expresses according to the mode of *habit* and of *position* — speaking of active power; whence, when it is with respect to a privation, it is no longer power, but a defect of power; but the will, the very thing it expresses, expresses according to the mode of a certain *indifference* and *complacency*. Since therefore in evil the formal character of consent and complacency is preserved, just as also with respect to a good, therefore to will evil is [genuinely] to will, but to be-able for evil is not [genuinely] to-be-able.

**Replies to the contrary arguments:**

*Ad 1.* To that which is objected, that God wills everything that befits [him]; it must be said that that is not the reason why he is called all-powerful, but rather the one that was assigned earlier, namely because he can do everything that belongs to the being-able of power.

*Ad 2.* To that which is objected, that the knowing power embraces every truth, and the affective every good; it must be said that the one embraces in one way, the other in another. For the knowing power embraces actually by knowing everything that is true and that can be; but the affective [power], because its act is in the character of act, embraces

and wills only the good that is or shall be. Furthermore, [the knowing power] embraces the whole act of knowing, because nothing is known that is not loved [as known] — but the good does not altogether embrace the act of will — for to will the opposite of a good is [genuinely] to will — and hence it is that God, in knowing every truth, is called all-knowing, but not in like manner [is he called] all-willing in willing every good.

*Ad 3.* To that which is objected, that God by knowing himself, who is truth itself, knows every truth: therefore etc.; it must be said that this is true, but in a different way: because in knowing himself he is the *exemplary* cause, and an exemplary cause not only of future things, but also of things possible to be done by God. But in loving himself as good, he is the *actual* cause, as will appear; and therefore it does not follow that he wills [anything] except goods which shall be or which he shall make, and on this account he cannot be called all-willing. But there is yet another reason for this, as will appear in the [Master's] text.

*Ad 4.* To that which is objected concerning the will, that better is that [will] which extends itself to more [things]; it must be said that the will is a *rational act*; whence a will is not called better because [it extends] simply to more [things], but because [it extends] to more *rationally*. And since right reason dictates that creatures should be made in a definite number, because an infinite number does not befit things: therefore the best and most perfect will wills that things be good in some number, but a finite [one]; and from this it does not follow that the will is of infinite things or of all possibles, nor even of all [goods]. — Yet it can be said that that [proposition], if it has truth anywhere, has it only there, where the will receives something from the willed [object]; but the will of God receives nothing, and therefore he is not better by willing three goods than [by willing] one, or a thousand than three; and therefore that reasoning does not hold in the present matter.

From these things appears that which it has been customary to ask: whether *will* and *power* and *wisdom* are equal. For it must be said that one can speak of these as to *affect* or *act*, and as to *effect*, and as to *object*. If as to act, there is an utterly all-around equality and *circumincession*; as is clear, because whatever God knows and is-able [to do], he wills to know and to be-able, and conversely. If as to effect, here too they are equal, because God effects nothing except by power, wisdom, and will. If as to object or connotatum, they are unequal: for in this manner knowledge is greater [in extent], and power lesser, and will lesser. For [the] *known* is good-and-evil; [the] *possible* is good only, but [is both] future and not-future; [the] *willed*, however, is good and future only.