Dist. 45, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/45/q/bon-sent-I-d45-a2-q1
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### Article II. *On the will of God according to its causality.*

As to the second article, the matter is inquired concerning the divine will, namely as regards causality. And concerning this two [questions] are asked. *First*, it is asked in general, whether the will of God is the cause of things. *Second*, whether it is the first and immediate cause.

### Question I. *Whether the will of God is the cause of things in general.*

That it is the cause is shown thus.

1. Hilary in the book *On the Synods*: « To all creatures the will gave substance, but to the Son nature gave [it] ».

2. Likewise, Augustine in the book *Against the Manicheans*: « It must be answered to those who desire to know the will of God, that the will of God is itself the cause of all things that are ».

3. Likewise, it appears by reason: because God is the cause of things; but of every thing of which God is the cause, [it is so] through knowledge, power, and will: therefore either he is the cause because he is powerful, or because he is knowing, or because he is willing. Not because he is powerful, since he can do many things which he does not do; likewise not because he is knowing: therefore [it is] because he wills, that he therefore does. But « a cause is that whose being is followed by another »: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, God is the cause of created things: therefore [he causes] either by nature, or by will, or by chance and fortune. Not by chance and fortune, because such causes are according to an imperfect manner [of causality]; not by nature, because in this way like is produced from like: it remains, therefore, that [he causes] by will: therefore, etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. If the will of God is a cause, [it is so] either by reason of the principal thing signified, or by reason of what is connoted. If by reason of the principal thing signified: then, since wisdom, power, will, and essence are the same, they ought by the same reason to be called causes. If by reason of what is connoted, I ask, what is that? Nothing is to be given except an effect; but an effect follows the formal character of a cause, not conversely: therefore [the will is] not [a cause] by reason of what is connoted. And again, if it connotes the effect: then in no way can it be said: *God wills himself to be*, since concerning himself he effects nothing at all — which is false.

2. Likewise, either the will is the cause by [its] property, or by appropriation. If by [its] property, then wisdom and power are not causes. If by appropriation, then either because in the will the formal character of causality is prior, or because [it is] more immediate. Not because [it is] prior; for power and knowledge precede the will according to the order of understanding. Nor because [it is] more immediate, since Hugh says that « God moves by will, disposes by wisdom, and carries out by power »: therefore knowledge and power have a more immediate comparison to the work than the will: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, either [the will] is the cause on account of the power of acting, or on account of the mode [of acting]. Not on account of the power, because the will does not bespeak power, but power [as such] does. If on account of the mode of acting; on the contrary: the mode of acting by way of nature is more noble: therefore nature is more [properly] a cause. *Proof:* that agent is more virtuous which

is more sufficient and produces a more noble effect; but nature is more sufficient in acting and needs fewer [aids] and produces a more noble effect than art or a voluntary agent: therefore, etc. — Likewise, that [the will is] not [a cause] as regards the mode [of acting] appears, because the agent which gives the product properties like to its own natural [properties] acts by way of nature; but God gives to his effects unity, truth, and goodness; nor can he make [them] without these, and these are the natural properties of the divine substance: therefore God acts by way of nature, not of will.

4. Likewise, every voluntary agent is an agent by pre-conceiving; but God does not act by pre-conceiving, as Dionysius says *On the Divine Names*: since, just as the sun illuminates without pre-conceiving, so God creates without pre-conceiving: therefore, etc.

### Conclusion.

> **Conclusion.** The formal character of causality is attributed to God under the aspect of will, [and] not so under the other aspects.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that, although the divine essence is a single, most simple [reality], nevertheless « it is an infinite sea of substance ». And therefore all the things which in us are found by diversity — all [of them], I say — are found in God more nobly through complete identity, yet nonetheless according to complete perfection and truth. Whence, just as in us wisdom, power, and will are truly being and the cause of the things that come from us; so also they are in God, but yet they are one. And although they are one, because our intellect cannot comprehend the infinity of that substance nor express [it] in a single word, therefore we understand God in many modes and express [him] in different names; and according as we understand him through those modes, we predicate several things [of him], so that we attribute to God something according to one mode which [we do] not [attribute] according to another, and indeed truly so, because all things in God have a true existence. And therefore, since we understand God in one way when we say *God is good*, in another when we say *God is eternal*; we grant that he diffuses himself because he is good, not because he is eternal — for this is a property of goodness, not of duration. Hence it is that, when we understand that the will truly is in God, and the property of the will is to produce those things which proceed by way of generosity, we say that God, insofar as he is will, is the cause of things.

Now the reason why causality is attributed to the will is this: that the formal character of causing is goodness, both in the character of the *effective* and in the character of the *final*. For « the good is said [to be] diffusive », and « the good is that on account of which all things [exist] ». But the effective [principle] does not become efficient in an effect except on account of an end. Therefore that which bespeaks the conjunction of the effective principle with the end is the formal character of causing in an effect; but the will is the act according to which the good is reflected back upon the good or goodness: therefore the will unites the effective [principle] with the end. And hence it is that the will is the formal character which makes [something] cause in an effect; and therefore we attribute to God the formal character of causality under the aspect of will, [and] not so under the other aspects.

And this is gathered from the words of Dionysius in the fourth [chapter] *On the Divine Names*, where he says that « all things seek goodness as containing, as principle, and as end: as principle, from which they are; as containing, by which they are preserved; as end, to which they

tend ». Whence « the divine love is a certain eternal cycle, [going forth] from the best, through the best, and into the best ». From which it is gathered that [the will] bespeaks the conjunction of principle with end, and therefore [is] cause in act when it wills to act; in such a way that actuality in causing is referred to the will — not for the instant in which it has the will, but [for the instant] in which it wills to act. Just as I will tomorrow to hear Mass, and the will will bring it about that tomorrow I am in act with respect to the thing willed; thus in its own mode it is in God.

**Replies to the contrary arguments:**

1. To that which is asked: whether the formal character of causality belongs to the will on account of what is connoted, or on account of the thing signified; I say that [it belongs] neither on account of the thing signified only, nor on account of what is connoted, but on account of the thing thus signified, because the divine essence is signified as will, to which mode of signifying truth corresponds. Whence, just as, when we say that a stone is likened to God insofar as it is a being, an animal insofar as living, and a man insofar as understanding, in reality essence, intelligence, and life are the same in God — yet the same [reality] is given to be understood in another mode, not on account of connotation, but on account of the infinity of the same substance, in which all the noble properties are one. They cannot, however, be signified except through diverse [names].

2. To that which is objected, whether [the will] is the cause by [its] property or by appropriation; I say that, speaking simply, [the will] most properly is the cause. But comparing the will to knowledge and power, it is called cause by appropriation; and this, because the will itself signifies God as actual cause. Whence in the will is found first the formal character of actuality, not of causality. For power and knowledge, although they have the character of a habitual cause, nevertheless [do not have] that of an actual [cause] except through the will. Whence the will makes a disposition of knowledge — or makes knowledge to be disposing, and power to be carrying out; for [God] disposes because he wills, and acts because he wills. And thus that [point] is clear.

3. To that which is asked: why the will is called cause, whether on account of the agent power or on account of the mode of acting; I say that [it is so called] on account of *both* — for in God to will is to be able — but principally by reason of the mode of acting. For the production of [something] diverse in form and nature, from the sole generosity of the agent, pertains to the agent [acting] by will. — *To the objection* that the mode of a natural agent is more noble: it is true where the will is not omnipotent; but if art could do everything it willed, it would act no less nobly than nature [acts]. — Yet it can be said that the natural mode of producing belongs to a person with respect to a person, but not to the divine essence with respect to creatures, since they cannot agree in form.

*To that which is objected*, that God produces what is like [himself] according to [its] properties: it must be said that nature produces what is like in special properties, if it is a particular agent; or, if it is a universal agent, it produces necessarily, not from its own generosity; but God [acts] in neither mode.

4. To that which is objected, that God is not an agent who pre-conceives; it must be said that this is true of *prior-thinking* (*praecogitatio*), which precedes the will, but it is not true of *pre-conception* with respect to the work. And Dionysius speaks in the first mode; he, however, sets [himself] against [it] in the second mode.