Dist. 45, Art. 3, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/45/q/bon-sent-I-d45-a3-q1
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## Article III. *On the divine will according to its mode of signifying.*

Consequently the divine will is inquired into according to its mode of signifying, and concerning this two things are principally asked. *First* it is asked about the fittingness of that division of the divine will into the *will of good pleasure* and the *will of sign*. *Second* it is asked about the number and sufficiency of the signs of the divine will.

### Question I. *Whether the divine will is conveniently divided into the will of sign and of good pleasure.*

And that the first division is not fitting appears thus:

1. Because just as the will is with respect to things, so also is power and knowledge; but knowledge is not distinguished into knowledge of *truth* and knowledge of *sign*, and likewise neither is power: therefore neither will. *If you say* that these [knowledge and power] do not have signs, *to the contrary*: just as creatures are signs of the will, so also do they intimate, from their order, knowledge, and from their magnitude show power: therefore if a sign leads on to another thing, the [conclusion] is plain, etc.

2. Likewise, if it happens that the divine will is signified, [this is] either by *natural* signs or by *voluntary* signs: not by *natural*, because precept and prohibition are not from nature, but from the will; not by *voluntary*, because a voluntary sign is what signifies by [conventional] institution, but precept and prohibition signify not by institution the will, but the very thing which is commanded: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the thing signified does not communicate its name to the sign — whence although a hoop is a sign of wine, yet it is not wine — therefore although precept and prohibition etc. are *signs* of the divine will, yet they should not be called *wills*: therefore the will ought not to be divided into the will of sign and the will of good pleasure.

4. Likewise, *precept* and *prohibition* and the like are signs either by reason of the *act*, or by reason of the *object* or connoted thing. If by reason of the *act*: but the act is the same as the divine will and as God — because when I say: God commands, it is said of God, and so it predicates the divine essence — therefore on this account it would be a sign of itself. Or by reason of the *effect*; and then, since precept and prohibition connote no effect, nor does counsel, there will be no sign at all; and so in no way do they appear to be signs.

**On the contrary:**

1. Scripture says, *there are many wills* of God; but it is plain that the *will of good pleasure* is one: therefore if there are *many*, it must be that [the term] stands for some will other than the [will] of good pleasure. But no will of God is anything except *good pleasure*, or *sign* of it: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, it happens that we know the will of God;

but we cannot know it through itself: it is necessary therefore that we should know [it] through signs. But we name [things] in the way that we know [them]: therefore we ought to call not only the will of good pleasure a *will*, but also its sign.

3. Likewise, anyone's precept is rightly called his will, therefore also God's precept; but it is not a will *causing*, because the precept exists even if nothing comes to be: therefore it is a will *as signifying*.

### Conclusion.

> **Conclusion.** It is proved by authority and by reason that the will of good pleasure and [the will] of sign must be distinguished.

**I respond:** It must be said that both reason and authority compel us to distinguish God's will into the *will of sign* and the *will of good pleasure*. *Authority* indeed: because the Apostle says in the first [letter] to the Thessalonians, chapter 4: *This is the will of God, your sanctification*; but that is not said by [way of] essence — therefore either by [way of] *cause* or by [way of] *signification*; but not by *cause*, therefore by *signification*. — Likewise, *reason* dictates [this], because by common usage of speech we are accustomed to call our own precept a *will*.

On this account it must be understood that, just as it is not absurd that *intellect* should be called both the intellective power and the very thing understood, so also *will* is called both the very power of willing and the very thing willed. And because God's will becomes known to us through the thing willed as through a visible sign, and « a sign is that which makes [the mind] arrive at another thing, when it offers itself to sense »: hence it is that we divide the will of God into the *will of good pleasure* and the *will of sign*.

**To the arguments:**

1. To what is objected concerning knowledge and power, it must be said that the will itself is related more immediately to things, and since it is not determined in indifferent future things, therefore it needs certain signs. And on this account, since we must conform ourselves to it, we must come to know it. But the divine knowledge is with respect to all things, and likewise the power; and besides, we are not required to conform ourselves to either: therefore knowledge of sign or power [of sign] is not so called as the will [of sign] is.

2. To what is objected — whether [these] be natural or voluntary signs — it must be said that a sign is [both] *a being* and [also] *a sign*; therefore it can be called *natural* either insofar as it is *a being*, or insofar as it is *a sign*. Therefore the signs of the will, insofar as they are *beings*, are voluntary, because [they come] from the will; but they are *natural* insofar as they are signs, because they signify naturally, as effects naturally signify their cause.

3. From this is plain the next [point], because the thing does not communicate its name to a *given* (conventional) sign, but it does communicate [it] to a *natural* sign, as is plain: for urine is called *healthy*, because it is a sign of health; for it is a sign which is caused naturally. Yet this is not generally true, nor according to the propriety of speech, but according to a trope of speaking, as the Master touches on in the [main] text. And the reason for the transference is the likeness found between the sign which naturally signifies and the thing signified.

4. To what is objected: by reason of what are they signs? it must be said that by reason of the *caused* act by comparison to the object. For the object makes the will to be known, insofar as it is under the act of precept and prohibition and the like. Hence this which is commanded is a sign of the will, insofar as it is commanded.