Dist. 45, Art. 3, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/45/q/bon-sent-I-d45-a3-q2
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### Question II. *On the number and sufficiency of the signs of the divine will.*

Secondly, it is asked about the number and sufficiency of the signs of the divine will. And the Master sets down five signs, which are contained in this verse:

> *He commands and forbids, permits, counsels, fulfils.*

And it appears that he ought to set down fewer.

1. Because *sign* and *signified* are said correlatively, and if one of opposites is said in many ways, so also is the other; but if one is not said in many ways, neither is the other, by the art of the *Topics*; but the will of God is one and is disposed in one manner: therefore it ought to have only one sign.

2. Likewise, either these signs are distinguished by reason of the *mode of signifying*, or by reason of the *thing*. If by reason of the *signifying thing*, then there must be as many signs as there are things, because every thing is a sign of the divine will as of [its] cause. If by reason of the *mode of signifying*; but precept and prohibition signify the divine will in the same mode: therefore they are one sign.

3. Likewise, the will of God, as will appear below, is not with respect to evil: therefore no sign of it ought to be taken by comparison to evil; since, then, *permission* and *prohibition* are with respect to evil, they are not signs of the divine will.

That there are more, appears thus:

4. Because to every good there corresponds an evil from the opposite, indeed to one good there correspond many evils: therefore as many or more signs ought to be taken on the side of evil as on the side of good. Since, then, on the side of good there are three, [the conclusion] is plain, etc.

5. Likewise, just as to *fulfilment* corresponds *permission*, so also *restraint* (*cohibitio*) — indeed much more strongly and rather, from the opposite: therefore it seems that there are more signs.

6. Likewise, just as to *precept* is opposed *prohibition*, so to *counsel* [is opposed] *dissuasion*: therefore it appears that there are more.

> **Conclusion.** The number and sufficiency of the five signs of the divine will are explained.

**I respond:** It must be said that the number of signs has been customarily taken in one way thus. For the divine will, properly speaking, is of present and future things; but of past things it either is not, or [is] in no other mode than [it is] of present things. According to this it must be noted that, if it is with respect to a present thing, that thing is either good, and so [we have] *fulfilment* (*impletio*); or evil, and so *permission*. If with respect to a future thing, this is in three ways: either it is evil, and so *prohibition*; or a necessary good, and so *precept*; or a supererogatory good, and so *counsel*. But a supererogatory good has no opposed evil; therefore neither does *counsel* have an opposed sign.

In another way they can be distinguished thus: the divine will, as will appear below, wills some things absolutely, and some things conditionally or so far as in itself; and in either mode it happens that it is signified. The absolute will, therefore, can be related to something either by way of *complacency* (*complacentia*) or by way of *displeasure* (*displicentia*). If by way of displeasure, that thing in no way comes to be: and so this [absolute will of displeasure] cannot be signified or known by any exterior sign. If by way of complacency, [it is so] either because that which comes to be pleases, and so [we have] *fulfilment*; or because something [arising] out of it pleases, and so *permission*; and thus we have two signs. The divine will can again be signified as antecedent or conditional, and this in two ways: either by way of complacency, in such a way that the opposite displeases, and so [we have] *precept*; or by way of displeasure, and so *prohibition*; or by way of complacency, yet so that the opposite does not displease, and so *counsel*. But by way of displeasure such that the opposite does not please,

it is not possible to be found. — And according to this the number and sufficiency [of the signs] and the solution of the objections are clear.

1. For to what is objected, that the will of good pleasure is not manifold; it must be said that this is true as to substance; yet as to its connotates it is manifold, as has been seen. For the absolute will connotes the *effect*, the conditional will connotes a *natural ordering of the thing to the event*, as of all things to salvation.

2. To what is asked, whether [the signs are distinguished] by reason of the mode of signifying etc.; it must be said that [it is] by reason of the mode of signifying. For there is one mode of signifying the will as *detesting*, which prohibition performs; another mode [of signifying it] as *approving*, which precept performs.

3. To what is objected, that the will is not with respect to evil; it must be said that, by way of approving, it is not with respect to evil, but to that which is elicited out of evil; but by way of detesting it is with respect to evil in itself.

4. To what is objected, that to every good there corresponds an evil from the opposite; it must be said that [this is] true; yet to a supererogatory good there can be opposed an *evil* and a *non-evil*. For insofar as [the good is] supererogatory, [there] is opposed a *lesser good*; but insofar as [it is] a good, [there] is opposed an evil, but not another [evil] — and that [evil] indeed is opposed to the good of precept; and therefore it falls under prohibition.

5. To what is objected concerning *restraint* (*cohibitio*), it must be said that it [merely] hinders the effect, and on this account is deprived of the character of signifying, as has been seen.

6. To what is objected, that to *counsel* is opposed *dissuasion*; it must be said that, just as *opinion* is one of contraries, because it is the acceptance of one part with fear of the other, so *counsel*, since it does not take the other part determinately, comprehends [both] persuasion and dissuasion. For he who persuades counsels, and he who dissuades likewise counsels something.