Dist. 45, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/45/q/bon-sent-I-d45-dubia
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### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

#### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning what the Master says, that *will is never said relatively*. For this seems false, because just as creator is said with reference to creature, and foreknowledge to what is foreknown, so willing is said with reference to what is willed; but it was held above in the thirty-fifth distinction that those things are said relatively: therefore willing also [is said relatively].

**I respond:** It must be said that the Master takes *to be said relatively here* according as the relative mode of speaking is distinguished from the mode of speaking according to substance, and this is *personal*, and so it is taken here. But he himself objects from the relation with respect to a creature, which is in regard to the mode of understanding, and is not distinguished from the mode of speaking according to substance. — Or alternatively it can be said that the Master speaks according to the general understanding of the name, since *to will* is not only with respect to a created thing, as *to foreknow* and *to create*, but also with respect to God.

#### Doubt II.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says: *God knows all things, that is, God is, of whose knowledge, which is his very essence, all things are subjects*. For it seems to speak ill, because likewise all things are subjects of the divine will, since to his will no one resists: therefore God wills all things; which is not conceded.

Likewise I ask: since all knowables are subjects of the divine knowledge and essence, and likewise the things willed; why do we not say that God in willing himself wills other things, just as in knowing himself he knows other things? If you concede this, then the others would be eternal. If you say that the case is not similar, it is asked: Why not? and it seems that the case is similar, since just as the act of the divine knowledge is not turned aside outside God, and so in knowing himself he knows all things, so it seems also concerning the will.

**I respond:** It must be said that things are not called *subjects* of the divine knowledge because they are *inferior*, but they are called *subjects* with respect to which the act of the divine cognition takes place; and these indeed are all *knowables*; and therefore he knows all things. Similarly *subjects of the will are*, and these are not all volibles, therefore the point is plain.

As to what is asked, whether in willing himself he wills all things; it must be said that *to will* in one mode bespeaks *complacency*, in another mode bespeaks *causality*. And in so far as it bespeaks complacency, I believe it can rightly be said that in willing himself he wills all things, since all things which are from him and toward him please him. But in so far as it bespeaks the *procession of the effect from him*, although the act does not go outside, the things nevertheless go forth, and therefore it bespeaks a respect to what is outside. Whence just as it is not conceded: *by being able [to do] himself, he is able for all things*, so also in the matter at hand.

#### Doubt III.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says: *Why did God make heaven and earth? It must be answered: because he willed [it]*. For this seems an ill response, because then it seems that everything can easily be determined; it also seems that God's will has no reason. But on the contrary: upon that text to the Ephesians, chapter one: *According to the counsel of his will*, the Gloss: *« God's will is from reason »*: therefore a reason is to be sought.

**I respond:** It must be said that our will, when it is moved by what is willed, has both a cause and a reason both as to itself and as to what is willed, especially when it wills something which is for the sake of an end; but the will of God, whose act is himself, because it is not moved by any reason other than itself, can have no cause as to itself. But the thing willed sometimes has a cause other than the will, sometimes the will alone, as in the creation of the world. The will has a reason, but not a cause, because it is not irrational. Whence it does not have a reason as something diverse from itself, but [a reason] *the same* *in thing*; and therefore the will of God cannot be irrational; and on account of this, in those acts which are wholly from it, it suffices to know it itself, nor is it necessary to seek further any other reason. And so the point is plain.

#### Doubt IV.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says, that *God's will is the cause of all species and motions*. For it seems to speak ill, because then, since God's will is an agent acting through intention, it seems that nothing happens by chance or by fortune.

**I respond:** It must be said that God, although he is the cause of all things, yet is not the whole cause, but he together with created causes. On account of this it must be noted that the effect is to be compared to the supreme cause, which is God, and so nothing happens by chance and fortune; it has also to be compared to the will or created cause, which is nature or intelligence, and so, since many things come about beside the intention, many things happen by chance and fortune.

#### Doubt V.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says, *that nothing happens which does not go forth from the inner court of the supreme Emperor*. For this seems false, since sins happen, and they do not go forth from him.

**I respond:** It must be said that the Master does not

take up this authority as it is found in the original. For there it is said that it is not *commanded*, or *permitted*; and so the objection has no place. Nevertheless it can still be said that the Master restricts his distribution to things which are something of nature. — Or it must be said that he amplifies the verb *to go forth* to *to make* and *to permit*.

#### Doubt VI.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says, that *the monstrous births of living things and earthquakes and the like happen by the will of God*. For this seems false, because a monster bespeaks some disorder in nature: therefore it is not from a supreme cause.

**I respond:** To some it seems that it must be said that a monster bespeaks some disorder in nature, and it bespeaks also *some substance*. That substance has a positive cause, which is God, but that disorder has no positive cause but a privation; and this is for the most part a disproportion of the power of the agent to the matter: for either the matter superabounds, or it falls short according to the proportion of the operative heat and power. And Augustine speaks of monsters as to that which they have as a substrate.

But it could also be said otherwise that monsters are likewise from God *as punisher*, since they are penalties; and so they have the character of order. For although God does not act against order toward an *end*, he nevertheless frequently acts against the customary course of nature, either for vengeance, or for mercy.

#### Doubt VII.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says: *It pleased the vanity of the philosophers to attribute [things] to other causes*. For it seems that he does not speak well, because the philosophers truly attributed things to other causes: therefore in this they were not vain, for instance the moon is eclipsed because the earth is interposed.

**I respond:** It must be said that they are not called vain *therefore*, because they attributed [things] to others; but because they *so* attributed [things] to others, that yet they did not refer them to the principal cause. And therefore *they became vain*, since they did not come to the first and principal cause, which alone is the cause simply first and simply most universal.

#### Doubt VIII.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says: *The divine will does not receive multiplicity in itself*. For this seems false, because the *ideas* are many, on account of the many things ideated: therefore likewise the wills are many, because of the many things willed.

**I respond:** It must be said that the case is not similar, as is plain in the question on ideas; since *will* bespeaks [something which] holds itself more on the side of the one willing, both as to being and as to the mode of speaking, and therefore in thing and in account the will of [God's] good pleasure is one: but the *idea* according to the mode of speaking holds itself more on the side of the thing ideated, since it bespeaks its likeness. And cognition, according to the mode of understanding and speaking, bespeaks a motion in us from things to the mind according to thing, but in God according to the *mode of understanding*; will however does not. Therefore by this twofold reason it is conceded of ideas, not of will.

#### Doubt IX.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says, that *the will does not receive mutability*. For this seems false, because God now wills something to be, which afterwards he will not will to be: therefore it seems that he ceases to will and likewise begins [to will]: therefore the divine will seems to be changed.

**I respond:** It must be said that in locutions of this kind there is change only with respect to the *connotate*, which is compared to the divine will, by reason of which a beginning and *cessation* are placed in those acts which connote something of the present. For if it is said: God wills this to be future, he has willed it from eternity, but yet a cause in act, that is, *actually causing* he was not, except when he willed *to make*, that is for that instant in which the act of will is coupled to the work — but not to the very subject willing. And so it is plain how he is an actual cause in time, with no change made in him; since he willed continuously, and so was in act; but as *actually causing* he was not, except for the time for which he willed, so that no will began with respect to God, but only the effect began.

#### Doubt X.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what is said: *And God is said to be angry; but there is no anger in him*. For it seems

to speak ill, because in God there is the *rational* and *concupiscible* power: therefore by parity of reason the *irascible* power is to be posited in God: therefore just as in him there is truly the act of the cognitive [power] and of love, so [there is] properly the act of fury.

**I respond:** It must be said that *irascibility* in some way sounds toward imperfection by the ratio of its name; and therefore some say that it is in no way received in God, not even *transsumptively*. — But since the acts of this *power* in us are *to be glorified* and *to dominate*, and these are in God; why not also similarly this power?

And on account of this it must be said that in God there truly is this power of being glorified and of dominating, which is the divine substance itself. Yet because *anger* has a passion conjoined by the ratio of its name, therefore it is not received in God, neither *irascibility*, nor anger, except transsumptively and in tropic speech. And it is to be noted that God has *signs of anger*, not such as signify anger in him, but such as signify anger in us — and truly, when [anger] is in us.

#### Doubt XI.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says, that *he commanded Abraham to sacrifice [his] son, but yet did not will it*; therefore according to this it seems that the precept was a false sign.

**I respond:** It must be said that God's will willed the faith and devotion of Abraham to be *manifested* in his preparation for obeying; and this God willed, and this the *sign* imported, and truly; but nevertheless according to Abraham's estimation it imported more, and through that "more" — which Abraham understood — the Lord was testing his faith, so that there was neither falsity in the sign nor deception in Abraham, but a probation.

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