Dist. 45
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/45/q/bon-sent-I-d45-littera
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### DISTINCTION XLV.

### Chapter I.

#### *On the will of God, which is the essence of God, and on its signs.*

Now concerning the will of God something must be said, according to the feebleness of our understanding. It must be known therefore that *will* or *willing* is said of God according to essence. For *to will* and *to be* are not for him one thing and another, but altogether the same. And as for him *to be good* is the same as *to be God*, so for him *to be willing* is the same as *to be God*. For the will, by which he is always willing, is not an affect or motion — which cannot fall on God — but the divine substance, by which he is willing, is God, and the like.

### Chapter II.

#### *That although for God to will is the same as to be, yet it cannot be said that God is all the things which he wills.*

And although for God *to will* is the same as *to be*, yet it must not be said that God is all the things which he wills. Which objection certain men, not rightly thinking concerning the will of God, raise against us, saying: If for God to will is the same as to be, then when we say that God wills all the things which he does, we are saying that he *is* all the things which he does; otherwise that word [used] there does not signify the same as is signified by this word *to be*, when it is said of God. And if this is so, then *willing* is not always said of God according to essence. But if at some time it is not said according to essence, how then is it said of God? For relatively it is never said. — To which we say that, although for God *to will* is altogether the same as *to be*, yet he cannot be said to *be* all the things which he wills; just as for God *to be* is the same as *to know*, and yet just as he is said *to know all things*, he cannot in like manner be said *to be all things*.

### Chapter III.

#### *On the understanding of these expressions: God knows, or God wills; God knows all things, or wills something.*

And wherever God is said *to know* or to be *knowing*, and *to will* or to be *willing*, these things are said of him according to essence. For when it is said: God knows or God wills, or God is knowing or willing, the divine essence is predicated and God is declared to be. But when there is added *all things* or *something* or *some things*, and it is said: God knows all things, or wills something or some things — the divine essence is indeed predicated, not simply and absolutely, but in such a way that all things are shown to be subject to his knowledge, which he himself is, and something or some things are said to be subject to his will, which is itself the same — so that this is the sense: God knows all things, that is, God is [he] to whose knowledge, which is his essence, all things are subject. Likewise: God wills these things or those, that is, God is [he] to whose will, which he himself is, these or those are subject. Therefore *willing* or *to will* is said of God according to essence, whose will is essence — eternal and immutable — although those things may be varied and pass away which are subject to it; [the will] which cannot be unjust nor evil, because it is God.

### Chapter IV.

#### *That God's supremely good will is the cause of all things which exist naturally, of which the cause is not to be sought, because it is the first and highest cause of all things.*

This therefore supremely good will is the cause of all things which naturally come into being, or have been done, or are to come, which no preceding cause has anticipated, because it is eternal. And therefore its cause is not to be sought. For he who seeks its cause seeks something greater than it, since nothing is greater than it. Whence Augustine in the book *Of the Eighty-three Questions*: « He who asks why God willed to make the world, seeks the cause of the will of God. But every efficient cause is greater than that which is effected. But nothing is greater than the will of God. Therefore its cause is not to be sought. » The same in the book *On Genesis Against the Manichees*: « If any shall have said: What pleased God to make the heaven and the earth? it must be answered to them: those who desire to know the will of God seek to know the causes of God's will, although the will of God is itself the cause of all the things that are. For if the will has a cause, there is something which precedes the will of God, which it is impious to believe. He therefore who asks: Why did God make the heaven and the earth? must be answered: because he willed it. For the will of God is the cause of heaven and earth, and therefore the will of God is greater than heaven and earth. But he who asks: Why did he will to make heaven and earth? seeks something greater than the will of God; but nothing greater can be found. Let human temerity therefore restrain itself, and let it not seek that which is not, lest it not find that which is. » — Behold, by these authorities it is openly intimated that the cause of God's will is nothing, and therefore is not to be sought.

« The will of God therefore, as Augustine says in the third book *On the Trinity*, is the first and highest cause of all species and motions. For nothing comes to be, which does not go forth from the inner and intelligible hall of the supreme Emperor according to ineffable justice. » « For where does the wisdom of the omnipotent God not work that which it wills? — [that wisdom] which *reaches mightily from end to end, and disposes all things sweetly* », « and not only does those things which by the perseverance of custom admit no wonder », « but also those things which on account of rarity and unusual occurrence seem wonderful — such as defects of the luminaries and earthquakes and monstrous births of living things and the like, none of which comes to be without the will of God, although it does not appear so to most. And therefore the vanity of the philosophers chose to attribute these things to other causes also, since they were altogether unable to see the cause higher than all the rest — that is, the will of God. And so the will of God alone is the first cause of health, of sickness, of rewards and punishments, of graces and retributions. » This [will] therefore alone is that from which whatever is has sprung, and itself has not sprung but is eternal.

### Chapter V.

#### *In what ways the will of God is taken.*

Here it must not be passed over by us, that sacred Scripture has been accustomed to speak of God's will in various ways; and yet the will of God is not diverse, but the manner of speaking concerning the will is diverse, because under the name of *will* it takes diverse things. For the *will* of God is truly and properly said [to be] that which is in him and is his essence; and this is one, and admits neither multiplicity nor mutability — [the will] which cannot be unfulfilled, of which the Prophet says: *All things whatsoever the Lord willed, he did*. And the Apostle: *Who resists his will?* And elsewhere: *That you may prove what is the good and well-pleasing and perfect will of God*. And this will is rightly called *the good pleasure of God* or *disposition*.

### Chapter VI.

#### *That precept, prohibition, permission, counsel, and operation are sometimes understood under the name of "will."*

But sometimes, according to a certain figure of speaking, that is called *the will of God* which according to propriety is not his will — such as *precept*, *prohibition*, *counsel*, and likewise *permission* and *operation*. And therefore Scripture sometimes pronounces *the wills* of God in the plural. Whence the Prophet: *Great are the works of the Lord, sought out unto all his wills*. Although there is but one will of God, which he himself is, yet [the prophet] says *wills* in the plural, because the will of God is taken in various ways and for diverse things, as has been said. Likewise also the same Prophet, on account of the many effects of mercy and of justice, says in the plural: *The mercies of the Lord I will sing forever*. And elsewhere: *The justices of the Lord are right, gladdening hearts* — although in God there is one mercy, one justice, and the same is mercy as is justice, namely, the divine substance.

But *precept* and *prohibition* and *counsel*, since they are three, [yet] each one of them is called the will of God, because these are *signs* of the divine will: just as the *signs* of anger are called anger, and the *signs* of love are called love; and God is said to be angry —  and yet there is no anger at all in him; but only *the signs*, which come to pass outwardly, by which he is shown to be angry, are named *his anger*. It is a figure of speech, according to which what is said is not false, but the truth which is said is overshadowed under the cloud of a trope. And according to these tropes the diverse wills of God are spoken of, because diverse are the things which through a trope are called the will of God.

For the precept and counsel of God, *will* can be taken, as in this place: *Thy will be done, as in heaven so on earth*. And elsewhere: *He who does the will of my Father, who is in heaven, he is my brother and sister and mother*. And against this will many things come to pass. Whence Augustine in the book *On the Spirit and the Letter*: « Unbelievers, he says, act against the will of God, when they do not believe his Gospel. »

### Chapter VII.

#### *That God wills all to do those things which he commands, or not to do those which he forbids.*

And if those three are called the will of God on the ground that they are *signs* of the divine will, it must not however be thought that God wills everything to be done which he commands to anyone, or [wills] anything not to be done which he forbids. For he commanded Abraham to immolate his son, and yet did not will [it]; nor did he command for this reason, that it should be done, but that the faith of Abraham might be tested. And in the Gospel he commanded the healed [man] to tell no one; but he preached everywhere, understanding that God had not forbidden [it] for this reason — that he was unwilling that his work be preached — but that he might give to man a pattern of declining human praise.

The permission also of God and his operation are called the *will* of God, in the way Augustine takes it in the *Enchiridion*, saying: « Nothing comes to be, unless the Omnipotent wills it to be — either by *allowing* [it] to come to be, or by *himself doing* [it]. Nor must it be doubted that God does well even by allowing the things to be done, whatsoever come to be evilly. For he does not [allow] this except by a just judgment, and surely good is all that is just. » — Behold, here you plainly have [it], that the will of God is called his *operation* or his *permission*, when he says: nothing comes to be unless the Omnipotent wills it to be — where he includes both all good things and all evil things which come to be. And therefore he plainly distinguishes how he said that God *wills*, lest by the same reckoning it should be understood that he wills both good things and evil things, adding *either by allowing it to come to be* — this in respect of evil things — and saying *or by himself doing* — this in respect of good things. For he allows evil things to come to be, but does not do them; whereas good things he himself does. And therefore he said that he *wills*, because as willing he allows evil things, and as willing he works good things; and on this account *permission* and *operation* are called the *will* of God.

Five things therefore have been set forth above, which are said according to a trope [to be] the *will* of God, because they are *signs* of the divine will, which is one and immutable — namely, the good pleasure of God. And therefore let the reader diligently distinguish, when Scripture makes mention of the will of God, in what way it must be taken — whether, namely, for the good pleasure of God, or for some sign of him. For great discretion must be employed in the knowledge of the divine will, because both the good pleasure of God is his will, and the sign of his good pleasure is called his will. But his good pleasure is eternal, but the sign of his good pleasure is not; and his good pleasure is in concord with the effects of things, and the effects of things do not disagree with it. For all that he wills by good pleasure to be done comes to be, and all that he does not will to be done in no way comes to be. But it is not so concerning the *signs*, because God has *commanded* to many [men] things which they do not do, and *forbids* what they do not avoid, and *counsels* what they do not fulfill.

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