Dist. 46, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/46/q/bon-sent-I-d46-a1-q2
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### Question II. *Whether God wills that evils come about.*

Secondly, it is asked whether God wills that evils come about. And that he does, is shown as follows:

1. From Anselm: God, he says, does not will what is impossible to come about; therefore by *consequence by conversion*, what is possible to come about, God wills it; but evil is possible to come about: therefore that evil come about is willable by God.

2. Likewise, every just [agent] wills everything which belongs to justice;

but « every punishment is just », as Augustine says, and every evil is a punishment: therefore every evil that comes about is willed by God to come about. That every evil is a punishment is clear from Augustine in *Confessions* I: « You have commanded, Lord, and so it is, that every disordered mind should be a punishment to itself ».

3. Likewise, given two opposed [propositions], between which there is no middle, it is necessary that the one be known by God: therefore by parallel reasoning it is necessary that the one be willed [by him]. But, given the case of a sinner, *that he sins* and *that he does not sin* are opposites: therefore God wills the one. But whatever God wills, that comes to pass: therefore if he wills that this man not sin, this man does not sin, which is contrary to the hypothesis: therefore he wills that this man sin. But this is evil: therefore that evil come about is willed by God.

4. Likewise, every agent willing something by a deliberated and counseled will wills that thing without which it cannot come about — for although someone may will to be an abbot, but not a monk, yet, if he deliberatively wills to be an abbot, he equally wills to be a monk — but God wills some good which can never come about without an evil, as he wills his saints to be tested and his Son to suffer: therefore, etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. Nothing is willed or willable by anyone which altogether displeases him and is hateful [to him]; but in *Ecclesiasticus* twelve it is said: *The Most High hates sinners*; but [he hates them] only by reason of [their] sin or evil: therefore much more does he hate the evil [itself]: therefore he does not will it to come about.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the book of *Eighty-three Questions*: « It is the same [thing] to come to pass with God willing [it] and with God [as its] author »; but evil does not come about with God [as its] author: therefore evil does not come about with God willing [it]. He himself supposes the first [proposition]; the second he proves, because « no man is made worse by a wise man »: therefore much more strongly [is no one made worse] by God.

3. Likewise, [the matter] appears from reason: because every will either is denominated from the willed [object], or denominates the willed [object]. If therefore God wills evil, either the will is evil, or, if the will is good, the willed [object] is good: therefore either nothing is evil, or God is evil, if he wills that evil come about. But both [conclusions] are false: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, everyone willing evil wills [it] under the aspect of an apparent good; therefore everyone willing evil is deceived: therefore if God wills that evils come about, God is deceived; which is impossible.

5. Likewise, everyone who wills something which he cannot [bring about] is miserable; but God cannot do evil, as has been proved above: therefore if he wills it, he is miserable. But this is impossible: therefore, etc.

### Conclusion.

> **Conclusion.** Evil is neither willable by God, nor does God will that it come about [as caused] by others.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as the last arguments prove, evil is not *willable* by God — evil, I mean, of fault [*malum culpae*] — because every will is disordered to which that evil is pleasing: and this all concede.

Yet some have wished to say that God wills that evil come about, while he himself is not its cause, but another [is], with God willing [it]. And this indeed they said, that God wills [it] not by reason of itself, but by reason of that which he elicits from it. — But this is against Augustine, as the Master shows in his text, who refutes this opinion. Therefore neither [way of speaking] is to be conceded; but if anywhere [such language] is read, it must be explained [away].

*Ad 1.* To that, then, which is objected on the contrary side — that God does not will what is impossible to come about: it must be said that *not to will* is spoken of in two ways, either negatively or privatively. If negatively, that [proposition] is not true, nor does Anselm so understand [it]. If privatively, then *non vult* ['does not will'] is a single expression, and is the third person of [the verb] that

is *nolo* ['I am unwilling']; and in this way God is said to be unwilling [for] that which he absolutely wills not to come about. But in this way one cannot say that God is unwilling [for] evils to come about; and in this way the *consequence by contrariety* does not hold, because it does not hold in contraries, but only in contradictories.

*Ad 2.* To that which is objected — that every just [agent] wills justice etc.: it must be said that something is called just in two ways, namely *in itself* and *from [its] order*. What is just *in itself*, according to what it is, is willed by God. But what is just *from [its] order* is willed by God insofar as it is ordered; and evil is not willed insofar as it is *evil*, but insofar as it *punishes*, and so insofar as it is *ordered*, and so, according to what it *is*, is not willed.

*Ad 3.* To that which is objected — that given two opposed [propositions], it is necessary to know the one, therefore it is necessary to will the one: it must be said that, speaking of the will of [divine] good-pleasure, the case is not parallel. For *knowledge* is with respect to all things that come about, but the will of good-pleasure is only with respect to those things which are from him.

*Ad 4.* To that which is objected — that he who wills something wills everything joined to it: it must be said that *to will something without another* [is taken] in two ways, either by an *antecedent* will, or by a *consequent* will. What one wills by an antecedent will, he necessarily wills everything joined to it. But what one wills by a consequent will, he can also will without [its] adjunct. For from an evil a good can be elicited, which would not be elicited unless that evil deed displeased [him], and the elicited good pleased him who knows how to elicit [it]. — Yet a reply can also be given by *interception*: that one willing by a counseled will wills something, but does not however will that which follows upon it; just as someone wills another to rise, but yet does not will that he should have fallen.

Yet it can be said otherwise and better: that *to will something without another* is twofold: either to will this and not to will the other, because the one pleases and the other displeases; and this is possible in those things which are inseparably joined. In another way, *to will something without another* is to say [that one wills] something to be without it; and in this way, to will something without [its] inseparably-joined [adjunct] is to will the impossible. In the first way it does not follow that he wills it, although [he does not will it] not without [the other]. For the sense is, *not without that [other] existing*, but yet *without that [other] being willed*. And there is a perceptible example: I will that someone who has fallen rise up, in such a way that I do not will that he had fallen; not, however, do I will that he rise up in such a way that he had not fallen.