Dist. 46, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/46/q/bon-sent-I-d46-a1-q3
----------------------------------------
### Question III. *Whether the coming-about of evils is a good.*

Thirdly it is asked, whether the coming-about of evils is a good. And that it is, is shown thus:

1. What is expedient for the doer toward salvation, that is a good; but evil is of this sort — whence on that passage *to the Romans* eight: *To those who love God all things work together for good*, the *Gloss*: « even the very fall [itself] »; and Augustine, fourteenth book *On the City [of God]*, chapter thirteen: « I dare, he says, to say that it is useful for the proud to fall into some open and manifest sin, that thereby they may become displeasing to themselves, who already had fallen by pleasing themselves » — therefore that evil come about is good and useful for the doer toward salvation: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, what is good for God and for the universe is good simply, since the common good is preferred to the private good; but that evil come about is good for the universe: therefore etc. Boethius in the book *On Consolation*: « Only the divine power is such that for it each [of the] evils is good ». And Augustine in the book of *Confessions*: « To you nothing at all is evil, and not even to your universal creation, because nothing is outside you that corrupts the order which you imposed ». Therefore if that evil come about is a good for the universe, it is plain, etc.

3. Likewise, « that whose use is good, [is] itself also good »; but the use of evil deeds is good: therefore etc. The minor is plain through Augustine, eleventh book *On the City*: « For neither would God have foreknown evils to be, unless by parallel reasoning he had foreknown for what uses of good things he was to fit them ».

4. Likewise, « everything which is just is good »; but evils to come about is just, because it is the punishment of a preceding sin, as Gregory holds: therefore evil to come about is good.

**On the contrary:**

1. Evil to come about is an evil in the being of [its] production: if therefore evil to come about is good, the production of evil is good. But the rule is in the art of the *Topics*: « That whose generation or production is good, is itself also good »: therefore if the production of evil is good, evil is good.

2. Likewise, evil to come about is the same as good being deprived [of] or corrupted: therefore if evil to come about is good, the corruption of good is good. But the rule is: « That whose corruption is good is itself also evil »: therefore if the corruption of good is good, the good is evil, which is absurd.

3. Likewise, of two convertibles, if the one is good, [so] also the other; but *evil-to-come-about* and *evil-to-be-done* are convertible: therefore if evil-to-come-about is good, evil-to-be-done also is good. But for a good no one is to be punished: therefore no one doing evils is to be punished.

4. Likewise, « if the opposite [holds] in the opposite, then the proposed [holds] in the proposed »: if therefore evil-to-come-about is good: therefore good-to-come-about is evil. But this is absurd, that it should be evil to do good: therefore also the first [is absurd].

5. Likewise, if evil-to-come-about is good: then either [it is good] in itself, or because from it good comes about or follows. Not in itself, that is established. If therefore [it is good] because thereby a good comes about, then the one who says: *Let us do evils, that goods may come about*, speaks well: therefore the Apostle wrongly rebukes [him].

### Conclusion.

> **Conclusion.** That evils come about is in no way a good, but it can be the occasion of good, insofar as it is ordered by God to a good.

**I respond:** It must be said, for the understanding of the foregoing, that in [human] works that is called *good* or *useful* or *conducive*, which leads to a good end or is the way to a good. But [the term] *to lead to a good* is said of something in three ways, namely by the mode of *cause*, or by the mode of *chance*, or by the mode of *occasion*. And these three differ. For a *cause* per se leads into that about which it is set, in such a way that it is producing and intending. But *chance* takes away the intention, but not the operation, as is plain in the digger who finds a treasure besides [his] intention. *Occasion*, however, takes away both. For it does not name a producing principle, but rather names something which affects the principle, that it may effect [something]: as someone, on hearing a word, strikes another; the heard word was an occasion, not effecting the striking nor cooperating with the effector, but in some way affecting [him].

And this *occasion* exists in two ways. There is one which in some way has the character of *active*, since in some way it stirs the effector — as a bad example [stirs] to sin. Or that which has the character of *passive*, as that from which someone takes a ground, just as one [takes] from another's evil [and] stirs himself to doing good.

According to this it must be understood that *evil* says two things, namely *privation* and *an orderable nature*; and by reason of [its] malice it is compared to the good which is elicited, as a *passive* occasion; by reason of the good which is laid beneath, as an occasion in some way *active*, on account of which evil is called the occasion of good.

Since then a thing leads to a good in these three modes, it has this difference in [its] leading. For one [thing] can lead another to something either from itself or through something of its own; and then it holds the character of *cause per se*. Or it can lead through another, to which however it is not ordered, but that [other] is ordered to a third, with an occasion taken from it; and so it holds the character of *occasion*. Or it leads with another, to which however it is not ordered, nor that [other] to a third, but both together; and so it holds the character of *chance*, which is from the concurrence of causes.

Hence then it is plain that that which leads by the mode of *cause* has in itself the character of an ordering toward the end; and therefore in itself there is goodness, and therefore it is rightly called good. But that which leads by the mode of *occasion* has no character of ordering toward the end within itself, and therefore no goodness either; and on account of this it cannot be called good per se except with the addition of that through which it is ordered, in which there consists the character of ordering and of goodness, and around which goodness is placed.

Since then evil does not lead to good from itself, but through that which is elicited from it by the wise God, speaking absolutely, that evil come about is not a good; rather, all similar [statements] are to be denied, since the goodness is noted to be put around the evil itself. — But if there be added the good which is elicited, or the elicitor himself, then *secondarily* such expressions are to be conceded: *that evil come about is a good for him who knows how to order [it] to a good*; likewise: *that evil come about is a good, that the elect may be proved*.

**Replies to the arguments:**

*Ad 1, 2.* Hence then the first two reasons are plain; for they proceed with [a] qualification, as is plain in the authorities themselves.

*Ad 3.* To that which is objected thirdly: *that whose use is good etc.*; it must be said that the use of a thing is twofold: one to which the thing of itself is ordered; and of such [a use] it is true, as is plain in [the case of] a horse which is for riding; another use, which is sometimes also after the fact; and this [use] can be good from the goodness of the user, [though] not [from any] usefulness [of the thing], since a good user uses evils well. And of such a use the rule is not true: but of such [a use] Augustine is speaking.

*Ad 4.* To that which is objected: *what is just is good etc.*; it must be said that *just* is said in two ways: in one way [as] *justly ordered* through the justice which is in [the thing] itself, and everything which is so just is good, since it has justice within itself; or it is *declarative of justice*, and so evil can show [it]. For as evil can dispose toward the retribution of justice, so also [it can] show [it]. And in this way it expresses an ordering of justice *in another*; nor does it follow that it is good, because *just* implies more the character of an ordering. Yet nevertheless that saying is not properly spoken in which it is said: *He is just, [in such a way] that he who is in filth, let him be befouled*; rather it is understood very much per accidens, since it is just that he be left by God, and to this it follows that he be further befouled: hence it is understood per accidens.