Dist. 46, Art. 1, Q. 6
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/46/q/bon-sent-I-d46-a1-q6
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### Question VI. *Whether evil is of the complement of the universe.*

Sixthly and lastly it is asked whether evil is of the complement of the universe. And that it is, appears thus:

1. *Ecclesiasticus* 33: *Against evil is the good, and against death is life; and so look upon all the works of the Most High*. If therefore such opposition pertains to the beauty and complement of the universe: therefore so also [does] evil.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the *City of God*, speaking of evils, why they are permitted by God, says that God adorned the universe as it were by certain antitheses; and he exemplifies [this] in speech and in pictures: in speech, as the Apostle uses [it] in the second [letter] *to the Corinthians* 6: *Through glory and ignobility*. And likewise in pictures: for « just as a white picture is beautiful with a black color placed in its own location, so [is] the universe with evils »: therefore evil in this respect adorns the universe. But everything such is of the complement of the universe: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, by *reason* [it appears so], because just as evil is the privation of good, so silence is the privation of voice, and sleep [the privation] of waking; but for the perfection and beauty of speech it is necessary that silence be interposed, and for the perfection and beauty of an animal it is necessary that sleep sometimes be interposed in waking: therefore for the perfect beauty of the universe it is necessary that evils be interposed among goods.

4. Likewise, the universe was founded for the manifestation of God; but in the works of God mercy and truth are most of all made manifest; but if evil had not been, neither mercy nor truth would be so perfectly manifested as is manifested in eternal punishment and in the remission of sins and redemption: therefore the universe would not be complete.

**On the contrary:**

1. *Genesis* 1: *God saw all things that he had made, and they were very good*; and he had not made evils — it is established: therefore without evils all things were very good in the universe. But the universe would not be very good if perfection were lacking to it: since therefore evil was lacking to it, it appears that evil is not of its perfection.

2. Likewise, Augustine in book III *On Free Choice*, speaking of the perfection of the universe, says: « Whatever better thing occurs to you by true reason, know that the Maker of all has made it ». If therefore he did not make the world with evils, but without evils, then the world without evils was more perfect than with evils: therefore evil is not of the perfection of the universe.

3. Likewise, by *reason* [it appears so], because « that is whiter which is more unmixed with black », therefore [that is] more beautiful and better which is more unmixed with evil; but if in the world there were no evil, then the universe would be more unmixed with evils, therefore better, therefore more perfect: therefore the ordering of evil is not of the complement of the universe.

4. Likewise, « *the good and the beautiful are the same* », as Dionysius says; therefore what is the privation of good is the privation of the beautiful; but evil is the privation of good: therefore [it] is the privation of the beautiful, therefore evil disfigures. But what disfigures and defiles does not pertain to beauty or to ornament: therefore neither [does] evil or the ordering of evil.

### Conclusion.

> **Conclusion.** Evil neither per se nor per accidens contributes to the substantial beauty or complement of the universe; but to the accidental [complement] it contributes per accidens, and indeed in a threefold manner.

**I respond:** For this it must be noted that on this matter different [authors] have thought differently.

For some have said that there is to speak of evil [in two ways]: as it is in the power of the agent, and as it is in [the] work or in fact. If we speak [of evil] as it is in the power of the agent, in this way they wished to say that *the ability to do evil* was of the perfection of the universe — because the creature had to be made who could sin and could abstain, in order that the universe might be perfect, as is said in book III *On Free Choice*. If we speak of evil as it is in the [state of] having-been-done, thus they say that in no way does it pertain to the complement of the universe, neither per se nor per accidens. — But since authorities say the contrary, namely that from the ordering of evil to good a certain beauty results, as Augustine expressly says, it is necessary to speak otherwise.

Therefore *others* say that the beauty of the universe is in part *substantial* or insofar as [its] *being*, [and] in part *accidental* or insofar as [its] *well-being*. As regards the first beauty, evils are not contributors, neither per se nor per accidens; but as regards a certain accidental beauty, evils well ordered do contribute, not because [they are] evils, but because [they are] ordered, and so per accidens, just as they are ordered per accidens. And with that beauty set aside, the universe would still be beautiful and perfect, although it would not have this [particular] beauty.

To this beauty evils contribute, not by reason of themselves, but by reason of the subject, which is ordered in [its] punishment to the manifestation of divine justice; or by reason of the *opposite*, whose beauty the more shines forth from the presence of evil, just as « opposites placed next to each other shine forth the more », as is commonly said; or by reason of the *good elicited*. For God made many goods, and many things were made, which would not have been made unless sin had supplied the occasion — as those things which were done in our reparation. Yet without all these the universe would be complete.

But if it is asked whether [the universe] would then be more beautiful than it now is, it can be answered that they stand as *exceeding* and *exceeded*: just as two faces, in one of which there is no mark, [while] in the other there is some scar well placed, which appears to grace the face. — And if you proceed further: which beauty exceeds more? it can be said *without prejudice* that [it is] the beauty which now is. And the reason of this is that the divine power, eliciting good from evil, is more powerful than evil; and therefore the good which it elicits thence prevails over the good which evil corrupts. And therefore the universe is worth more now than it would have been worth then; in which now the wisdom of the Creator is commended. Whence Gregory in the blessing of the Paschal candle: « O happy fault, which deserved to have such a Redeemer ». And the *example* is of a sound cup, which is broken and bound back together with a silver or gold thread, because it is better afterward than before — not by reason of the breaking, but by reason of the binding-back.

And if you ask me: Would it not be better if all were blessed, than if some [were] blessed and some wretched? It must be said that, as I believe, if man had stood firm, no more would have come to the supernal Jerusalem than thus [in fact] are going to come. Whence the evil are as it were *of abundance* and are not in the count.

And thus it must be conceded that the ordering of evil contributes to the *accidental* complement, as the arguments adduced for the first part prove; but to the complement or to the *substantial* beauty [it does] not [contribute] per se nor per accidens; per se indeed [it contributes] to none, as those arguments [for the contrary] show.

**To the arguments for the negative side:**

*Ad 3.* Yet to what is objected against the first part by a simile drawn from privations; it must be said that the simile does not hold, because those privations are not something taking away, nor removing anything of the good or of the beautiful; evil, however, does take away. Therefore that is clear.

*Ad 4.* To what is objected — that mercy and justice would not be manifested: it must be said that although they would not be manifested *in act*, they would yet be manifested in their *origin*. For he who knows God in himself sees in that eternal exemplar what is befitting for God to do and what is possible [to him] — although not entirely — and so [he sees] mercy and justice equally. Nevertheless mercy would be shown in [his] over-bestowing, and justice in [his] retribution, although not so clearly as now in the work.