Dist. 46, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/46/q/bon-sent-I-d46-dubia
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### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

#### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning that saying of Augustine: *Unless he were so far omnipotent and good that he should do well even with evil*. For this seems to speak in an undue manner, since malice is a privation; therefore it is not the matter of a good. If you say that it is taken by reason of the substrate — namely, *from evil*, that is, from the one who is evil, he makes good — on the contrary: this is nothing other than to destroy evil; from this therefore it is not had that God ought to permit evils, since it is his to destroy what has been done.

**I respond:** It must be said that *from* is not there causal nor material, but occasional, as if he should say: from evil he makes good, *because after evil he makes good*, the occasion being taken from evil. He himself however objects as if this *from* were held causally or materially.

#### Doubt II.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says: *That evil is well ordered and placed in its own location*. For this seems to speak ill, because what is not is not [capable of] being placed. If you say that it has a place by reason of the substrate — on the contrary: a due and suitable place for ra-

tional nature is glory: therefore evil is placed in glory.

**I respond:** It must be said that when I say *hell, or the place of punishment*, I say two things: both a *part of the universe*, and *baseness*. In so far as it is a place, it is owed to the underlying nature; but in so far as it is base, it is owed to the deformity of fault: and so evil has both a place and baseness — but place by reason of the substrate, *baseness* however by reason of deformity.

#### Doubt III.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says: *If any of these deviate and go astray, this very thing also he will make to profit them unto good*: therefore it seems that evils profit or cooperate. On the contrary: it is of evil to corrupt the good: therefore in no way is [evil] able to cooperate or profit toward the good.

**I respond:** It must be said that *to profit* or *to cooperate toward good* with someone can occur in three ways, namely: by *helping*, as grace cooperates with free choice or the other way round; or by *exciting*, as poverty and misery, which excite to the love of God or sting and impel, as Gregory says; or also by *resisting*, as hot water freezes more strongly, because, while it resists, the action of the contrary is invigorated. And so evil is said to cooperate, either because it makes a man be more excited to good, or rather because, while it resists and the man prevails, the power of grace is invigorated and grows fervent.

#### Doubt IV.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says, that *Augustine argues from the lesser*. For it seems false to say so, because a *locus from the lesser* is not destructive, but positive; but that argument is destructive: *a wise man cannot make a man worse, therefore neither can God*: therefore it is not from the lesser.

**I respond:** It must be said that in truth this *locus* is not from the lesser, properly speaking, but from the greater; since what is there said is not *a lesser thing* less, but [rather] what *seems less* to be present. But it seems more that man can do evil than God; but the wise man cannot: therefore neither can God; and so the *locus* is from the greater. — Nevertheless it can be said that it is from the lesser; but it is reduced to the affirmative form thus: it seems less, that the impossibility of doing evil should be in man than in God; but the wise man, remaining wise, is unable to a lesser degree to make anyone worse: therefore much more so God.

#### Doubt V.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says, that *fault cannot fall upon the wise*. For this seems false, because just as wisdom stands to ignorance, so does virtue to fault: therefore by exchange, just as virtue [stands] to ignorance, so wisdom [stands] to fault. But virtue stands together with ignorance: therefore wisdom stands together with fault.

**I respond:** It must be said that *wisdom* in one mode bespeaks true cognition; in another mode it bespeaks a true and most noble cognition, namely [obtained] through the highest causes; in a third mode it bespeaks a true, noble, and savory cognition; in a fourth mode *wisdom* does not bespeak another cognition than divine religion or worship — according to which it is said that piety itself is *wisdom* or *theosebia*; and this consists, as Augustine says, in faith, hope, and charity, and in this mode it includes virtue in itself, and so is opposed to fault. And so the response is plain.

#### Doubt VI.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says, that *God is not the cause of tending toward non-being*. For this seems false to say, because in the Canticle of Deuteronomy it is

said: *I will kill, and I will make to live; I will strike, and I will heal*: therefore it seems, since death is the corruption of tending toward non-being, that God is the cause of this.

**I respond:** It must be said that *non-being* is not here named by the privation of being of any kind, but of that which Boethius defines saying: «*Being is that which retains order and preserves nature*». And to that God does not lead; but he himself objects from natural being.

Or it can be said that he speaks here according to the institution of nature, according to which it is said: *God did not make death*. As for what is said, *that he himself kills*, this is according to the punishment of justice; this however will be better treated in [book] II.

#### Doubt VII.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says, that *evil is to tend toward non-being*. For this seems ill said, because if it tends toward non-being, either this is said as to the being of nature, or as to [the being] of grace. If of nature: therefore evil corrupts nature — which is against Dionysius, who says that «*evil corrupts none of existing things, with respect to that which is essence or nature*». But if it is understood as to the being of grace, this likewise seems false, because after the first fault gracious being does not remain according to anything of itself, since fault is wholly expelled by mortal [sin]; therefore it does not tend toward non-being, but is already at its terminus.

**I respond:** It must be said that in a just and good man there are three things to consider. For since he has a nature ordered through grace, one is to consider *the being of nature*, and *the orderability to grace*, which by a common name is called *aptitude*, and *the order of grace*, or *the ordering of grace*. Evil therefore, properly speaking, corrupts the orderability itself, and from this it withdraws from grace and makes [the person] tend toward non-being. And since aptitude is never altogether removed, with nature preserved, and nature is not corrupted: evil always makes [him] tend toward non-being, so that he is never at the terminus.

#### Doubt VIII.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what Ambrose says: *The true, by whomever it is uttered, is from the Holy Spirit*. For this seems ill said, because if this is true, then since the detractor in his detraction frequently speaks the true, it seems that he speaks [it] from the Holy Spirit. Similarly, the devil says many true things. Similarly, against that saying it is objected: *No one says: Lord Jesus, except in the Holy Spirit*. For many sinners say this all day long. — Likewise, truth is appropriated to the Son: therefore Ambrose ought rather to say that everything true is from the Son.

**I respond:** It must be said that something is said from the Holy Spirit who illuminates the intellect and moves the affect; and that is true and good, because something is said as true out of charity. Likewise, there is something from the Holy Spirit moving the affect, but not illuminating the intellect; as the Apostle said, that he was going to go to Spain. He said something false, yet in saying it he merited, because charity moved him to say it. Something is said from the Holy Spirit illuminating the intellect, but not rectifying the affect; and that can be evil, and yet it is true to say it. Therefore the perfect [case] includes both; and so it is said *from the Holy Spirit and in the Holy Spirit*, and so the Apostle understands [it]; Ambrose however speaks more broadly.

And so what is objected — that truth is appropriated to the Son — is plain: for the response is that interpretation is appropriated to the Holy Spirit. — Or it must be said that this is not said as appropriated, or, if as appropriated, this is by reason of the gift.

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