Dist. 46
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/46/q/bon-sent-I-d46-littera
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### DISTINCTION XLVI.

### Chapter I.

#### *That the will of God, which is himself, can in no way be frustrated.*

Here a question arises. For it has been said in the things above and confirmed by authorities, that the will of God, which is himself and is called his good pleasure, cannot be frustrated, because by that will whatsoever he willed, he did in heaven and in earth: to which, by the Apostle's testimony, nothing resists. « It is asked therefore how this is to be taken which the Apostle says of the Lord: *He wills all men to be saved*. For since not all are saved, but the more are damned, it seems indeed that what God wills to be done is not done, namely, the human will impeding the will of God. The Lord also in the Gospel, addressing the impious city: How often, he says, *did I will to gather thy sons together, as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and thou wouldest not!* So these things are said, as though the will of God had been overcome by the will of men, and, the weakest by their unwillingness impeding, the most mighty could not do what he willed. Where then is that omnipotence by which in heaven and in earth, according to the Prophet, *all things whatsoever he willed, he did?* And how does nothing resist his will, according to the Apostle, if he willed to gather the sons of Jerusalem and did not? » For these things seem very greatly to stand in the way of what has been said before.

### Chapter II.

#### *How this is to be understood: I willed to gather thy sons, and thou wouldest not; and this: Who wills all men to be saved.*

But let us hear the solution; and first let us see how this is to be taken which the Lord says. « For this was not said in such a sense, as Augustine says in the *Enchiridion*, in resolving the aforesaid question, as though the Lord had willed to gather the sons of Jerusalem, and what he willed had not been done, because she did not will it; but rather she indeed did not will her sons to be gathered by him, while she nevertheless being unwilling, he himself gathered all of her sons whom he willed; for in heaven and in earth he did not [will] some things and do them, and again some things he willed and did not do, but *all things*  *whatsoever he willed, he did* », that this may be the sense: How often did I will to gather thy sons, and thou wouldest not! that is, I gathered them by my will, always efficacious, while thou wast unwilling. — Behold, it is plainly set forth, that those words of the Lord do not contradict what has gone before.

It now remains to see how the foregoing words of the Apostle do not contradict what has been said, who speaking of God says: *He wills all men to be saved*. By occasion of which words many have wandered from the truth, saying that God wills many things to be done which are not done. But it must not be understood, as if that were said on this ground, as though God had willed certain ones to be saved, and they are not saved.

« For who would be so impiously foolish as to say that God cannot turn the evil wills of men, which he has willed and when he has willed and where he has willed, to good? It is certainly not true that what is said in the Psalm — *Whatsoever he willed, he did* — [is true], if he willed some things and did them not; and what is more unworthy, that on this ground he did not do [it], namely, lest there be done what the Omnipotent willed, the will of man impeded [him] ». Therefore « when we hear and read in the sacred Scriptures, that he wills all men to be saved, although it is certain to us that not all men are saved, yet we must not on that account take anything away from the most omnipotent will of God, but rather understand what is written — *He wills all men to be saved* — as though it were said, that no man is made saved, except him whom he himself has willed to be made [saved]; not that there is none of men except him whom he wills to be saved, but that none is made saved except him whom he wills to be saved; and therefore he is to be entreated to will [it], because it must needs come to pass, if he shall have willed [it] ». « For it must not be believed that the Omnipotent has willed anything to be done, which has not been done ». « So also is to be understood that: *he enlightens every man coming into this world*, not because there is no one of men who is not enlightened, but because none is enlightened except by him. And in another way also this can be understood, provided we be not compelled to believe that the Omnipotent has willed anything to be done, and it has not been done — [he] who without any ambiguities, if in heaven and on earth, as the Truth sings, *did all things whatsoever he willed*, certainly did not will to do whatsoever he did not do ». — From these things it is plainly shown, that God by that will which is himself does not will anything to be done which is not done, nor anything not to be done, which is done.

### Chapter III.

#### *Whether evils come to pass with God willing or unwilling.*

And therefore, since it is established that all the goods that come to pass come to be by his will — which if it were unwilling them to come to be, they would in no way come to be — it is rightly wont to be asked: whether all the evils also which come to pass, that is, sins, come to be by God's will, or come to be while he is unwilling. — Concerning this, different men, thinking variously, are found to contradict one another. For some say that God wills evils to be or come to pass, but does not however will evils [themselves]. Others, however, [say] that he neither wills evils to be nor to come to pass. In this however both these and those agree, that both parties confess that God does not will evils. But each side relies upon reasonings and authorities to fortify its assertion.

For those who say that God wills evils to be or to come to pass, fortify their intention in these ways. If, say they, he were to will that evils not be or not come to pass, in no way would they be or come to pass, because, if he wills them not to be or not to come to pass, and cannot effect this — namely, that they not be or not come to pass — then something resists his will and his power, and he is not omnipotent, since he cannot [do] all that he wills, but is impotent; as we ourselves are, who sometimes cannot [do] what we will. But since he is omnipotent and in nothing impotent, it is certain that evils cannot come to pass or be, except with him willing. For how could evil be done by anyone against his will and while he is unwilling, when it is written: *Who resists his will?* Augustine also said above: « Because it must needs come to pass, if he shall have willed [it] ». But [God] either wills evils to come to pass, or [wills them] not to come to pass. If he wills [them] not to come to pass, they do not come to pass; yet they do come to pass: therefore he wills [them] to come to pass. — Likewise, it is good for evils to be or to come to pass, otherwise the supremely Good [one] would not permit them to come to pass. Whence Augustine in the *Enchiridion*: « Although those things, he says, which are evil, in so far as they are evil, are not good, yet that there be not only goods but also evils, is good. For unless this were a good — that there should be also evils — in no way would they be allowed to be by the omnipotent Good [one], for whom undoubtedly it is as easy that what he wills not to be, he should not allow to be, as it is that he should do what he wills. Unless we believe this, our confession is imperilled, by which we confess that we believe in the Father almighty ». — Behold, here you plainly have [it], that it is good that evils be, and God is the author of every good, who wills every good to be that is. Since therefore it is good for evils to come to pass or to be, therefore he wills evils too to come to pass or to be. — By these and other reasonings and authorities of this kind do those use, who say that God wills evils to be or come to pass.

But those who say that by God's will evils do not come to pass or are not, to the inductions set forth respond thus, saying that God neither wills evils to come to pass, nor wills [them] not to come to pass, nor is unwilling [them] to come to pass — but only does not will [them] to come to pass. For if he were to will them to come to pass or to be, he would certainly cause them to come to pass or to be, and thus he would be the author of evils; but he is not the author of evils, as the authorities of the Saints testify: therefore evils do not come to pass by his will. Likewise, if he were unwilling evils to come to pass, or were to will them not to come to pass, and yet they came to pass, he would not be omnipotent  since his will would be impeded by the effect of the human will. And therefore they do not concede that God wills evils to come to pass, lest he be understood as the author of evils; nor do they concede that he wills evils not to come to pass or is unwilling [them] to come to pass, lest he seem to be impotent; but they say only that he does not will evils to come to pass, that he may be shown to be not the author, but the permitter of evils. Whence also the Evangelist, where he shows that God is the author of all goods, saying: *All things were made by him*, consequently denies that he is the author of evils, saying: *And without him was made nothing*, that is, sin. He did not say, that it was made by him, or with him unwilling and against his will, but only *without him*, that is, without his will, because sin is not made by his will. Therefore evils do not come to pass with God willing or unwilling, but with him not willing, because it is not subject to God's will that evil come to pass or not come to pass, but that he allow it to come to pass, because it is good to allow evils to come to pass; and surely willing he allows, not willing the evils, but willing to allow, that they themselves come to pass; because neither are evils good, nor is it good that they come to pass or be.

### Chapter IV.

#### *How that saying of Augustine is to be understood: it is good that evils come to pass.*

But [as for] that which Augustine says: *It is good that evils come to pass, nor would evils be allowed to come to pass by the omnipotent Good [one], unless this were good — that they should be*; they assert that it was said on this ground, because from the evils which come to pass God draws goods, nor would he himself permit them to come to pass, unless from them he were to make something of good. Whence Augustine in the same book *Enchiridion*, plainly indicating that the understanding of the aforesaid words is such, says: « God omnipotent, to whom the supreme power of things [belongs], since he is supremely good, would in no way allow some evil to be in his works, unless he were to such an extent omnipotent and good as to do good even out of evil ». Likewise in the same: « God judged it better to make goods out of evils than to permit no evils ». From this sense therefore it has been said and is true that it is good for evils to come to pass, because from the evils which come to pass, to the good — who *are called Saints according to purpose* — goodness, that is, utility, accrues. For to such, as the Apostle says, *all things work together for good*, even evils, because they profit them, which to others doing [them] hurt. Whence also sometimes in Scripture it is read that evil is called good, as Jerome on Mark: « The evil of Judas, he says, was good, namely to us. Nor, if it is good for this man or that, does it follow on that account that it is simply good. For properly and simply that is good which is good both in itself and to the doer ».

### Chapter V.

#### *On the manifold acceptance of "good."*

For there is something which is good in itself and to him to whom it is done, but is not good for the doer — as when help is given to a poor man, but not for God's sake. And there is something good in itself and for the doer, but not for him to whom it is done — as when truth is preached for God's sake to one not obeying. And there is something good in itself and for the doer and for him to whom it is done — as when the truth is preached for God's sake to one believing. Whence the Apostle: *We are a good odor to God, to some an odor of life, to others an odor of death*. There is yet another, which is neither good in itself and harms and damns the doer, unless he repent — as evil [is] — yet has its worth toward something. For as Augustine says in the *Enchiridion*: « By the supremely and equally and immutably good Trinity have been created all things — not supremely nor equally nor immutably good; but nevertheless good also taken singly. But all together very good, because from all consists the admirable beauty of the universe; in which even that which is called evil, well ordered and put in its place, more eminently commends the goods, that they should the more please and be the more praiseworthy, when compared with evils ».

### Chapter VI.

#### *That evils are of value to the universe.*

Hence it is plain that from the evils which come to pass some good comes forth, while the goods more please and are more praiseworthy. To the very doers themselves also, from the evils which they do, sometimes goods come forth, if they are called Saints according to purpose. « For to such, as Augustine says in the book *On Correction and Grace*, God so far cooperates all things unto good, that, if some of them deviate and stray, this very thing he makes profit them unto good — because they return more humble and more learned », as Peter. « Those evils also, which the faithful piously endure from the wicked, as Augustine says in the book *On the Trinity*, are surely of profit to them either for blotting out sins, or for exercising and proving justice, or for showing the misery of this life ». And therefore  Job felt the hand of God, and the Apostle the goad of Satan; and both profited well, because [each] bore evil well.

If anyone therefore diligently attend to what has been written, it is easy for him to perceive that goods come from evils, and that it has been said on this ground that it is good for evils to come to pass or to be — not because evil is good, or because it is good for evil to come to pass. For it is not good that evil come to pass through anyone, since it is not good that anyone do evil. For if this were good, surely God would be its author, who is the author of all good. But if God is the author of this, then with him as author man does evil, and so with him as author man becomes worse. And if with him as author man becomes worse, then with him willing man becomes worse. For it is the same to say that something comes to be with God as author as [to say] with God willing; but with God as author man does not become worse: therefore neither with God willing — as Augustine in the book *Of the Eighty-three Questions* plainly establishes, arguing *a minori* thus: « With no wise man as author does a man become worse; for so great is this fault, that it cannot fall on a wise man. But God is more excellent than every wise man: much less therefore with God as author does a man become worse. For God's will is much more excellent than that of a wise man. When *with him as author* is said, *with him willing* is said. Therefore there is a vice of the will, by which man is made worse. From which vice — if it be far from God's will, as reason teaches — must be sought, from whom it is ». — Behold, here Augustine plainly says that with God as author or willing, man is not made worse, but by the vice of his own will. Therefore it is not with God as author that evil is done by anyone, and so with God willing evils do not come to pass.

### Chapter VII.

#### *That in God there is no cause that man should be made worse.*

Then the same Augustine, asking what is the cause that man is worse, asserts that it is not in God, saying in the same book thus: « That man be worse, either the cause is in himself, or in another, or in nothing. If in nothing, there is no cause; if in another, either in God, or in some other man, or in that which is neither God nor man. But not in God; for God is the cause only of goods: therefore either it is in man, or in that which is neither God nor man, or in nothing ». — From these things it is plainly shown that it is not good that man be worse, because God is not the cause of that thing, who is the cause only of goods. And if it is not good that man be made worse, it is not therefore good that evil be done by him: God does not therefore will that evil be done by him.

Likewise it is also otherwise shown that with God as author, that is, willing, evils do not come to pass, because he himself is not the cause of tending to non-being. For to tend to non-being is evil. But he himself is not the author of evil; whereas he tends to non-being who works evil: therefore it is not with God as author that anyone works evil. It is not therefore good that anyone work evil, since God is the author only of good. This Augustine in the same book plainly explains, saying thus: « He who is the author of all that is, and to whose goodness it pertains that there should be all that is, is the cause only of good. Wherefore he is not the author of evil, and therefore he himself is the highest good, from whom in nothing it is good to fall away; and evil is to fall away: therefore he is not the cause of falling away, that is, of tending to non-being, who, as I may so say, is the cause of being; because he is the author of all that is, which in so far as they are, are good ». — Behold, you plainly have [it], that to fall away from God, who is the highest good, is evil: therefore to do evils is evil: therefore evils do not come to pass with God as author or willing.

It has now sufficiently been shown that with God as author evils do not come to pass. Some however, advancing *sophistically*, and on that account *hateful* to God, attempt to prove that with God as author it [is] that evils come to pass — in this manner. That evils come to pass is true; but every truth which is, is from the Truth, which is God: from God therefore it is, that evils come to pass. That every truth is from God, they confirm by the authority of Augustine in the book *Of the Eighty-three Questions* saying thus: « Every truth is true by the Truth; but the Truth is God: therefore every truth has God as author ». But it is true that evils come to pass or are: therefore with God as author it [is] that evils are or come to pass.

To these it is easy for us to answer; but unworthy of answer seems what they say: « For every truth is from God », as Augustine says, with whom agrees Ambrose, who treating the saying of the Apostle: *No man can say: The Lord Jesus, except in the Holy Spirit*, says that « every truth, by whomsoever it be said, is from the Holy Spirit ». Since therefore it is true that evils  come to pass, this truth, which is said in that locution, namely *evils come to pass*, is from God; but it does not follow from this that it is from God that evils come to pass. For if this were said, God would be understood [to be] the author of evils. Which from a similar [example] is manifestly shown to be false: God forbids theft to be done; but that theft be done is true: therefore he forbids the truth. It does not follow.

These things therefore and other vain things of this kind setting aside, favoring the sounder side of the foregoing question, which is more fully approved by the testimonies of the Saints, let us say that God does not will evils to come to pass, nor however wills them not to come to pass, nor is unwilling them to come to pass. For all that he wills to come to pass, comes to pass, and all that he wills not to come to pass, does not come to pass. But many things come to pass which he does not will to come to pass — such as all evils.

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