Dist. 47, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/47/q/bon-sent-I-d47-a1-q1
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### Article Unique. *On the efficacy of the divine will.*
### Question I. *Whether the will of good-pleasure of God can be impeded.*

That the will of good-pleasure cannot be impeded is shown, first, from authority.

1. *Genesis*, last chapter: *Can we resist the will of God?* As if to say: no.

2. Likewise, to the *Romans*, ninth chapter: *Who resists his will?*

3. Likewise, on that text of first *Timothy*, chapter two: *Who wills all men to be saved*, the Gloss: « He is to be entreated to will it, because if he wills, it must necessarily come to pass ».

4. Likewise, on that of the Psalm: *The Lord is just in all his works*, the Gloss: « With God, to will is the same as to do »; but he cannot be impeded from willing, because he freely wills what he wills: therefore he cannot be impeded from bringing it about.

5. Likewise, every will that can be impeded can be overcome; but the divine will cannot be overcome, since it is supreme: therefore the divine will cannot be impeded.

6. Likewise, every cause that is impeded from the prosecution of its effect either fails or is changed; but the divine will neither fails nor changes, nor can it fail or change: therefore etc.

7. Likewise, that is the nobler agent and the nobler cause which cannot be impeded, rather than that which can; but the divine will is the highest and supreme cause of all things, as has been shown above: therefore etc.

**On the opposite side:**

1. Every cause whose effect comes about contingently can be impeded — for if it cannot, then the effect comes about of necessity — but the divine will is of this sort, because it is the cause of many contingent things — otherwise, either nothing would be contingent, which is contrary to freedom of choice and counsel and chance, or God would not be the cause of it, both of which are absurd — therefore etc.

2. Likewise, every cause that is fulfilled through another acting agent, if it is so fulfilled, can be impeded through that agent's failing, if it is able to fail — this proposition is known per se — but the divine will is of this kind — for God wills many things to be done through created causes, which he does not do without them, such as to beget a man, a donkey, and the like; likewise concerning those things which are from our own action; and these can fail — therefore the divine will can be impeded.

3. Likewise, every cause whose power extends to the contrary of [its] will can will something other than it wills; but the divine essence is of this kind — for God wills something, such as that this man be damned, the opposite of which

he can [will]; this is certain, otherwise he would not be omnipotent — he is therefore able to do the opposite of what he wills. But every possibility is positable: let it then be posited that God does the opposite of what he willed; if this is so, the will of God is frustrated and impeded: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the will wills something, which God wills the will itself to will; either, then, it can will the contrary, or it cannot. If it can: therefore the divine will can be impeded; if it cannot: therefore his liberty must necessarily be constrained.

### Conclusion.

> **Conclusion.** The consequent will of God cannot be overcome nor frustrated nor impeded; the antecedent, however, can be impeded, but cannot be overcome nor frustrated; nevertheless the necessity, by which the consequent will connotes the outcome, is the necessity *of consequence*, not *of the consequent*.

**Respondeo:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that, according to John Damascene, the will of good-pleasure is twofold, namely *antecedent* and *consequent*: the antecedent or conditional, by which he wills, so far as in him lies, the salvation of all, and the absolute, by which he wills determinately something which he knows will certainly come to pass.

It must therefore be understood that no will of God is it possible to overcome; none is it possible to frustrate; some, however, namely the antecedent, it is possible not to fulfill; some, namely the consequent, it is necessary to fulfill, and impossible to impede.

None, I say, is it possible to overcome. For if a man does not do what God wills, so far as in him lies, that is, by his antecedent will, God brings it about concerning him that he wills by the consequent will; and so it is always fulfilled either concerning the man or by the man, and thus is never conquered nor overcome.

Nor is it possible for the will of God to be frustrated. For something is called frustrated when it is deprived of its proper effect to which it is [directed]: but no will is deprived of the effect to which it is properly [directed]. For what is said — that God wills all men to be saved, so far as in him lies — this will does not connote salvation, nor is it properly directed to the effect of salvation, but it connotes the ordination of nature, or nature as ordinable to salvation. Whence it is no more to say: God wills this man to be saved, so far as in him lies, than it pleased God to give to this man a nature through which he could attain salvation, and that God was ready to help, in such a way that salvation does not fail through any defect on God's part. Whence it is not frustrated, because it has its proper effect. — Concerning the absolute will, however, it is plain that it cannot be frustrated, because it puts forth every one of its effects, nor does it ever remain unfulfilled.

Since therefore it is true that the will of God can in no way be overcome nor frustrated, yet the absolute will must necessarily be fulfilled, while the conditional [must] not at all.

But it must be noted that there is a necessity *of the consequent* and a necessity *of consequence*, as was said above concerning foreknowledge, because foreknowledge does not have the necessity of the consequent, but of consequence, because it necessarily infers, and it follows: God foreknows this, therefore this will be; but nevertheless he does not necessarily foreknow, because in the act of foreknowing a contingent effect is frequently noted. — So in the will it is to be understood, that the absolute will of God connotes the outcome of the thing; and therefore there is in it a necessity *of consequence*, but not *of the consequent*, because it does not change the outcome of the thing, but rather God wills that a contingent consequent come about. Whence, just as foreknowledge, because it necessarily infers the effect, cannot fail, so neither can the absolute will, because it necessarily infers, be impeded; on the contrary, it is necessary that it be fulfilled. The conditioned will, however, is not necessarily fulfilled in every respect, neither by the necessity of the consequent nor by the necessity of consequence, because it does not connote the outcome of the thing, but connotes that which is ordinable to the outcome, as was said before. Whence it well follows: he wills this man to be saved with absolute will: therefore this man will be saved; for he would never will it unless he likewise foreknew that he was to be saved. Concerning the conditioned will, however, as has been seen, it does not so follow.

If, therefore, it be objected that the will of God is necessary in itself, and necessarily infers its effect, therefore it sets every kind of necessity around it; it must be said, that although it is necessary that God will, and that his will be in act, nevertheless its relation is to a contingent future, and therefore the effect comes about contingently.

**To the arguments:**

*To 1.* To that which is objected, that it can be impeded because it is a contingent cause; it must be said, as has been touched upon, that although the comparison of the divine will is to a contingent future, nevertheless the comparison of the divine will to the willed object and the outcome of the willed object necessarily accompany each other, as one contingent [does] another; and therefore it cannot be impeded. For a cause is impeded when, the relation and ordering of it to the effect remaining, the effect does not come about. Therefore what is proposed — that every cause whose effect is contingent can be impeded — the proposition is false and has an instance against it, namely when the effect necessarily accompanies and follows from the cause; and this is the instance in our case.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that it can be impeded through the defect of the cooperating cause; it must be said, that just as the divine will or divine willing connotes the effect, so it connotes the existence of the particular cause. For when it is said: God wills this man to be saved, the sense is not, that he wills it in every event, but that he wills this man to be saved, and wills this man to will [it]. Whence, just as the divine will connotes this effect to come about, and therefore the effect necessarily follows from it, so it connotes the created cause to concur. And therefore it necessarily follows: if God wills this man to be saved, that he also wills [it]; and so it never fails, just as neither does the effect, and so it is never impeded.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that God can [will] the opposite of what he wills; it must be said, that the divine will does not constrain the power in respect of being-able, whence it is able to do more than it wills; yet it does constrain the power in acting — for the power never does anything except what is willed — and it is impossible that the action exceed the will. Whence it can do nothing except what it can will. — When therefore it is said, that he can [will] the contrary of his will; it can be understood in two ways: either by a will moving toward the contrary, and so a repugnance of the will to the power is signified, and this is impossible; or by a will not moving, and so neither impediment nor repugnance is signified, but the will is freely able, [a will] which thus is able to [will] this in such a way that [it can also will] its opposite. For it wills this in such a way that it can will its opposite without any change in itself, as was said above concerning foreknowledge. And the reason for this is that he wills by one and the same [act] whatever he wills.

*To 4.* To the last [argument] it must be said, that the will of God, in accordance with [its] correspondence to foreknowledge, wills those things which it wills. Whence, just as foreknowledge embraces the whole of willing and being-able and acting, and cannot fail without thereby withdrawing something from the contingency of the thing that comes about; so likewise it must be understood in our case.