Dist. 47, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/47/q/bon-sent-I-d47-a1-q2
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### Question II. *Whether anyone can act against the will of sign.*

Secondly it is asked, whether anyone can act against the will of sign. And that he cannot, is shown thus.

1. Because sign and thing-signified ought to be conformed: therefore what is done against one is done against the other: therefore if it cannot [be done] against the thing-signified, neither can it [be done] against the sign. Otherwise, if it is not done against the thing-signified, and it is done against the sign, then the sign is false. For if the sign leads to the thing-signified, it signifies that what is done against it is done against the thing-signified.

2. Likewise, the least among all signs is permission, since it is in respect of evil, to which the good-pleasure of God is in no way ordered: therefore if it least approaches the will of good-pleasure, [then] if it cannot be done against permission, much less against the others. But it cannot be done against permission, as the Master says in the letter [of the text] and Augustine *On the City* book twenty: « Just as no human acts rightly except aided by divine help; so no human or demon acts iniquitously, except by that same divine and most just judgment being permitted ».

3. Likewise, that will is more powerful which can be resisted neither in fact nor in sign, than that which can [be resisted] in sign at least, even if not in fact; but God is most powerful: therefore it seems that neither his will nor the sign of his will can be resisted, and so on.

**On the contrary:**

1. Among all signs of will, *praeceptio* or command seems to be the most powerful; but it can be done and is done all day long against the divine commandment: therefore against all the others [as well].

2. Likewise, it seems that especially against permission, because permission is only of the evil of fault; but the evil of fault is not evil unless it is done voluntarily; and if it is done voluntarily, it can not be done; therefore, when God permits someone to act badly, he can not act [so]: therefore he can act against permission.

3. Likewise, on that text of the Psalm: *He brought them forth with silver and gold*, the Gloss says that the same thing was both commanded and permitted, namely the carrying-off of the vessels: therefore, since it can be done against precept, by parallel reason also against permission, and against the others by consequence: therefore against every will of sign.

### Conclusion.

> **Conclusion.** Against three signs of the divine will something can be done; against two, however, not — which is proved by a twofold reason.

**Respondeo:** It must be said that against some sign of the divine will it can be done, against some it cannot.

And the reason for this is twofold, from the twofold mode of distinguishing signs. For some are signs in respect of the present, as fulfillment and permission; some in respect of the future, as precept, counsel, and prohibition. And since concerning what is being done in the present it is impossible for it not to be in the present, because « whatever is, when it is, must necessarily be », therefore in respect of signs of the present there cannot be resistance; because if there were resistance, they would no longer be present. But because things future or to-be-done can fail to be done, therefore as regards the three following signs there can be resistance.

Another reason is taken according to another mode of distinguishing: because some signs are of absolute divine will, others of conditioned [will]. I say therefore, that because against the absolute will it cannot be done, neither can it be done against the signs of absolute will, as for instance fulfillment and permission. But because against the antecedent or conditioned will it can be done, since man can turn aside from the order to which by his constitution he was made fit: hence it is that it can be done against the will of sign which signifies that [conditioned will], namely against prohibition, precept, and counsel.

**To the arguments:**

*To 1.* To that which is objected first, that against none can it be done; the solution is plain, that [those premises] are not false.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that permission is the least; it must be said, that greater or lesser signification has nothing to do with this matter, but the presentness of the effect, or also, because it signifies the absolute will, which connotes something absolutely.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that that is more powerful against whose sign it cannot be done; it must be said, that this is true when a will wills altogether that nothing be done except what it shows itself to will; but the divine will is not such, but rather wills that each one have his own liberty and do what he wills. Whence also the power of acting against the divine will is from the divine will; and therefore [the divine will] would not be more powerful on that account. Whence it must be distinguished, that to be able to act against the sign of someone's will either is against that will, and so attests impotence; or that being-able is from the will, of which it is the sign, and so it attests not impotence but rather power.

**To the arguments for the negative side:**

*To 1.* To that which is objected, that [it is done] against all [signs] because it is done against precept, which is the greatest sign; it must be solved by interception, [namely] that it is not the greatest sign. Furthermore, this is nothing to the purpose, but [what matters is] the presentness in the effect and the absoluteness in the thing-signified.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that it is done against permission, because the sinner can refrain from sinning; it must be said, that God is not said to permit to sin except him who actually sins, while he sins; and then it is impossible that he not sin.

*To 3.* To that which is objected last, that there [in the Psalm] the same was both precept and permission; it must be said, that he permits evils because he does not restrain [them]; and in this mode it is a sign of the divine will distinct against precept. In another mode, not to punish in time; and so the bill of divorce is said to be permitted, *Matthew* nineteen: *Moses, on account of your hardness, permitted [it]*. In a third mode, not to prohibit, *Psalm*: *Be angry, and sin not*, Gloss: « he permits what is of necessity », that is, he does not prohibit. In a fourth mode, to permit is to indulge a lesser good, on that text of first *Corinthians* seven: *I say this, however, by way of indulgence*, etc., Gloss: he permits.