Dist. 47, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/47/q/bon-sent-I-d47-a1-q3
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### Sole Article.
### Question III. *Whether God ought to permit evils.*

Thirdly, it is asked whether God ought to permit evils. And that he should, appears thus:

1. *Job* 12: *The tents of robbers abound* etc.; Gregory: « The Almighty God, what he forbids to be done, it is just that he should allow to be done ».

2. Likewise, God ought to preserve the order which he has instituted; but when God created man, he gave him free will; and free will is so called because it can freely [do] whatever it wills: therefore if it wills evil, it can [proceed] into evil: therefore since he ought not to take away from man the power which he has given, he ought to permit him to sin.

3. Likewise, evil is frequently the occasion of a greater good, which would not come about unless evil had preceded — as is plain in the passion of Christ; but it befits God to do and to permit that which is a way to the better: therefore, since he cannot do evil, he ought at least to permit [it].

4. Likewise, God does all things for the sake of his praise; but in evils the praise of divine justice and mercy is made manifest: therefore, if he ought not to act against the amplification of his praise, he ought not to impede [evils] from happening: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. *Romans* 1: *Not only those who do such things are worthy of death, but [also] those who consent*, [the] Gloss: « To consent is to be silent when you can rebuke »: therefore since God can correct and impede evil, if he permits and is silent, he consents; but those who consent are worthy of death: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Augustine, 19 *On the City of God*, chapter 16: « It belongs to the office of an innocent [person] not only to inflict evil on no one, but also to restrain [him] from sin »: therefore if God does not restrain, when he can, God is not innocent.

3. Likewise, by reason it appears: because all our virtues ought to have an exemplar in God; but in us there is the virtue of zeal: therefore also in God. But zeal, so far as it can, withstands sin: therefore if God has zeal, so far as he can, he withstands [sin]: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, *all the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth*: if therefore he permits the just to sin, [it is] either of mercy or of justice. Not of mercy, it is plain; nor of justice, since the just one has not deserved to fall: therefore etc.

### Conclusion.

> **Conclusion.** God most ordinately permits evils to come about, both on account of the order in the universe, and on account of the order to the end — whether this be the ultimate [end], which is divine glory, or the intermediate [end], which is the salvation of the elect.

**I respond:** It must be said that God permits evils to come about, and this most ordinately.

For there is a twofold order of things: one *in the universe*, the other *to the end*; and each requires that God permit evils to come about.

For the order *in the universe* requires [this], because for the perfection of the universe it was necessary that there come to be a creature free in choice and able to sin; but the administration of the universe is that « God so administers the things he has founded, that he lets them act their own proper motions », as Augustine says in book seven *On the City of God*. Therefore, since he had to give the power of sinning and had to govern, with the order of his constitution safe, if [the creature] willed to sin, he had to permit, and if it did not will to sin, he had to preserve [it]: and so he ought to permit evils.

The order *to the end* requires this, because it is possible to find a twofold end in the universe: one is *the salvation of the elect*, the other *divine praise*. — Since therefore the permission of evils renders *the elect more glorious* by occasion, and God does not care whether the glory of the elect is increased through cause or through occasion; therefore God permits rightly. Hence Augustine in 11 *On the City of God* says, « that he would make no one whom he foreknew to be evil, unless he likewise knew to *what uses for good* he would accommodate [him] ». For [the evil] profit [the good] by exercising [them]. And therefore he says *On the lapse of the world*, that he permitted more to be evil because, if they were few, they would not dare to exercise the good. — Divine praise also requires this, because by occasion of evil divine *mercy* is in the highest degree manifested in the elect, in the giving of the only-begotten Son for [his] enemies *according to the time*. In the highest degree also God's *justice* is manifested in the eternal punishment of the reprobate. Hence Augustine in 21 *On the City of God*: « If all remained in punishment, in no one would the grace of the redeeming Merciful One appear. Again, if all were translated into the light, in no one would the severity of vengeance appear ».

**Replies to the arguments:**

1. To that, then, which is objected — that to permit is to consent — it must be said that *to permit evil* [happens] in two ways: either by not restraining the hand or the spirit, neither in the deed nor in the requital, and thus it is to consent; or by not restraining the hand, but nevertheless punishing the transgressor and rebuking [him] continually, and thus it does not consent; and in this way God permits, and does not consent.

2. To that which is objected — that it belongs to the innocent [one] to restrain — it must be said that this is understood of restraint as regards rebuke and punishment, not as regards coercion of the will.

3. To that which is objected — that zeal withstands sin — it must be said that it is true, the right of justice being safe; and justice, inasmuch as it is the order of the universe, requires this — that God permit, that man go according to the rule of his will.

4. To that which is finally objected, the response is plain; for *to permit someone to sin* is a work of justice — not, I say, of [the] justice which is an exigency of merits, but of the becomingness of divine wisdom and goodness.