Dist. 47, Art. 1, Q. 4
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/47/q/bon-sent-I-d47-a1-q4
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### Question IV. *Whether God can command evils.*

Fourth and last it is asked, whether God can command evils. And that he can, it seems:

1. Because he commanded Hosea in chapter one that he should take a fornicating wife, and Bernard expounds [this] according to the letter. But if you say that it is not to be understood according to the letter; it is objected then: that he commanded not only to take a wife, but also to beget sons of fornication; but if she were a legitimate wife, they would not be sons of fornication.

2. Likewise, in *Exodus* chapter twelve he commanded the sons of Israel to commit theft; but theft is evil and contrary to the law of nature: therefore etc. If you say, that it is not evil *in itself*, and therefore can be done well; it is objected: because he commanded Abraham to kill his innocent son, and one whom he knew to be innocent, *Genesis* chapter twenty-two; and this is evil *in itself*: therefore it seems that God can command an evil.

3. Likewise, by reasoning it seems so: because God is above every law: therefore in every commandment he can dispense: therefore he can command the contraries of all precepts and prohibitions.

4. Likewise, non-being is more distant from being than evil from good; but God by the sole command of his will makes being out of non-being: therefore by the sole command of his will he makes good out of evil: therefore he can command evils, as it seems.

**On the contrary:**

1. A precept is a sign of the divine will: therefore either it is a false sign, since it signifies that God wills what he commands, or God wills it. But if God wills evil, he is evil; if he does not will it, and yet commands it, he is false; and both are impossible with God: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, no one obeying a divine precept ought to be punished: therefore if God can command an evil, an evil can be done with impunity. But for an evil to remain unpunished is against divine justice: therefore God

would be able to act against himself, and so to be opposed to himself. But this is impossible: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, God commands evils not to be done: if then he commands them to be done, he commands two opposites; but for two opposites to be done is impossible: therefore God commands the impossible. But to no such precept are we bound: therefore we can disobey God; which is absurd. And again, everyone commanding the impossible is foolish or impious: therefore God would be foolish or impious, both of which are impossible. And therefore Jerome says: *Whoever says that God has commanded the impossible, let him be anathema*.

### Conclusion.

> **Conclusion.** God can in no way command an evil which remains under the ratio of evil, and therefore never that which is evil *according to itself*; nevertheless that which is evil *in itself* he can command, and by commanding [can] make [it] good.

**Respondeo:** It must be said that when it is asked, whether God can command an evil, this can be understood in two ways: either as an evil remaining an evil, or in such a way that by commanding [it] he makes [it] good. The first is simply impossible; the second, however, is in some way possible, though not entirely.

For there is something evil *in itself* (*in se*), and something evil *according to itself* (*secundum se*). What is evil *in itself* can be done well; what is evil *according to itself* can in no way be done well, but rather to understand that it be done well is to understand that the same thing be evil and good. It can therefore be said, that God can command an evil *in itself*, and not an evil *according to itself*; because he can command nothing which is not good once it has been commanded; and that is evil *in itself*, but not *according to itself*; therefore he can command this and not the other.

And from this arises what Bernard says in his book *On Dispensation and Precept*, namely that God can dispense in the precepts of the second table and not [in those] of the first. And the reason for this is that in the precepts of the second table, as far as the ratio of the precept is concerned, an ordering to the neighbor is touched upon or commanded, and disorder toward the same is prohibited. But disorder with respect to the neighbor, unless it is a disorder with respect to God, is evil *in itself*; if, however, [it is] with respect to God, it is evil *according to itself*: just as to know a woman not one's own is evil *in itself*, but to know another's [woman] out of lust, or one not one's own [out of lust], is evil *according to itself*. But in the precepts of the second table God dispenses, and can dispense, and against them he can command, for the aforesaid reason. Nor does it follow from this, that he commands contraries, because a special mandate releases from a common one, just as a special privilege [does].

In the precepts of the first table, however, God cannot dispense, because their opposites are evils *according to themselves*; for the precepts themselves bespeak an ordering to God or to [him as] end by their very ratio, and their opposites [bespeak] disorder. And therefore, if he commanded the contrary, he would command against himself; but he cannot act against himself. And if he were to command those things — since they are evils *according to themselves*, such that in no way can they be done well — either God would will evil, which is unfitting; or evil would be done with impunity; or the same thing would be good and evil, both of which are unfitting absolutely.

And therefore the reasonings are to be conceded which prove, that God cannot command every evil, namely an evil remaining an evil, and this is what is evil *according to itself*. — Yet the last argument, about [God's] commanding evil, does not hold, and has already been answered.

**To the arguments:**

*To 1.* To that which is objected concerning Hosea, it must be said, that that was evil *in itself*, namely to know a woman not one's own, and by the divine precept it became for him a good. But insofar as fornication denotes a lustful act and to know some woman out of lust, this the Lord never commanded.

*To 2.* To that which is objected from the authority of Exodus, that he commanded the sons of Israel to commit theft; it must be said, that he commanded that likewise, insofar as it was evil *in itself*, namely to take another's property; and this he was able to do, because, since he is Lord of all, he was able to transfer dominion. But he never commanded that they should do this out of lust; for that is evil *according to itself*.

To that which is objected concerning what he commanded Abraham regarding Isaac; it must be said, that that was not evil *according to itself*, because Isaac, although he was not guilty of a death to be inflicted on him by a man, nevertheless by reason of original sin he was guilty of a temporal death to be inflicted on him by God, to which he was bound by necessity; and therefore God had the authority, and so by right he could commit [the doing of] it to Abraham for a [just] cause. — Yet some wish to say that he did not command [him] to kill, but to offer. But against this is the Gloss

and the text, because it is said, that he carried fire and a sword.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that he can [act] above every given law; it must be said, that it is true, that he can, because he can impose [law], but he cannot destroy [a law] already laid down. For since certain commandments bespeak an ordering to himself, just as he cannot act against his own justice, so neither [can he] command against them.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that out of non-being he can make being; it must be said, that it is true that he can do this, but he cannot do this, that anything be at the same time being and non-being; and because non-being does not have any necessity that it be non-being, therefore it can become being. But some [things] are evils which, if they are, are of necessity evils, such as to lie and to hate God. And therefore the case is not similar, because if he were to make these things to be good, he would bring it about that the same thing would at once be good and evil.