Dist. 47, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/47/q/bon-sent-I-d47-dubia
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### DOUBTS ON THE LETTER OF THE MASTER.

#### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the letter, and first concerning that saying of Augustine: *Unto the damnation of those whom he justly predestined to punishment*. For this seems to speak improperly, since above at the fortieth distinction it is said that predestination is concerning saving goods. Likewise, Damascene: «*Not for punishing did God fashion us*»: therefore he speaks ill. — Alongside this it is asked, since God is most just, just as he is most merciful: why is it rather said to be proper to God to be merciful, than to condemn or to punish.

**I respond:** It must be said that Damascene distinguishes the will of God into antecedent and consequent. Therefore the preparation can be as to either; and so there is a preparation of goods, and in this mode there is preparation properly and predestination strictly so called. In another mode preparation is taken broadly, according to any will whatever; and so there is [a preparation] of evils, and there is predestination broadly. The Master, however, and Damascene above took it properly, but Augustine takes it commonly; and so the solution of the contrary [argument] is plain.

To that which is asked concerning the work of mercy, it must be said that it is rather proper to God to be merciful, because the work of mercy requires nothing but God's kindness; but for this — that he should exercise the severity of justice — our iniquity is presupposed; and therefore the former is more appropriated to God himself than the latter.

#### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what the Master says, that *evils come about beside the will of God, but not beside his permission*. For this seems ill said, because, since permission is a sign of the divine will, if they come about beside the will, then also beside the permission. Likewise, it is asked what the difference is between coming about *beside* the will and *against* it; and it seems there is none, because in Matthew chapter twelve: *He who is not with me is against me*.

**I respond:** It must be said that *to come about beside the will* is this: that the will of God is neither in *this coming about*, nor in its opposite; and so it comes about beside the will, since it comes about neither according to the will nor against, and there is a middle between these. The Lord, however, in Matthew, understands [it] concerning the precepts, which whoever neglects becomes an enemy of God. — As for what is objected, that permission is a sign of the will of good pleasure: it must be said that it is not a sign that God wills that which is permitted, but that he wills that which is elicited from it. And so that is plain.

#### Doubt III.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says: *But not beside his permission, which he himself is not*. According to this it seems that permission is not God. On the contrary: God is his own action: therefore God is his own permission, since permission is an action of God. If you say, this is said by reason of what is connoted; then it is objected that the will of God likewise connotes something with respect to the thing willed.

**I respond:** It can be said that the Master speaks according to the opinion of those who say that the names of the six genera do not predicate anything of God or in God, but from God. But this opinion has been disproved above. — And therefore it can be said that the Master speaks of permission by reason of what it itself connotes, which it imports by reason of its own name. And if you object concerning the will, that it connotes [something]: it must be said that this is true from an adjunct, but it is not so concerning the principal signification of the name.

#### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *Nor did he therefore command good things to all on the ground that he willed from all the good things which he commanded to be done*. For this seems false to say, since God's precept is a sign of God's will, just as our precept is a sign of our will; but an upright man never commands anything to anyone except what he wills to be done: therefore much more so does not God himself.

**I respond:** It must be said that Augustine, and the Master following Augustine, when they speak of the will of good pleasure, always take it for that will by which God absolutely wills something to come about; and concerning this [will] there is no doubt as to what he says. But further, the masters, following Damascene, distinguish the antecedent will — or [the will] as it is in itself — and the sign of this is the precept; and concerning this Augustine does not speak, nor does the Master.

#### Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that *he commanded both in the new and in the old Law things which he did not will to be done by those to whom he commanded them*. For this seems ill said, because a precept is a sign of the divine will: therefore if he was commanding what he did not will, it seems that he was deceiving those to whom he was commanding [it]. Likewise, it seems false to say that he did not will the immolation of Isaac, since Abraham was willing it: therefore he was not conforming his will to the divine: therefore he was not meriting, as it seems. Likewise, why did Abraham prepare himself to obey, but not the man cured in the Gospel?

**I respond:** It must be said that some things the Lord commanded for doing — like the moral precepts; some for proving — that is, for showing what is proved; some for instructing; and examples of two of these are touched on in the text. In the precept to Abraham, therefore, it is signified, not that God wills the immolation, but that he wills Abraham to will it; and therefore, when he willed [it], he conformed himself to him. But in the precept which he made to the cured man, he signified that he wills contempt of praise; and therefore Abraham is to be praised in the will of obedience, and the cured man in this, that he did not keep silent.

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