Dist. 48, Art. 2, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/48/q/bon-sent-I-d48-a2-q2
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### Article II. *On the conformity of our will to the divine.*
### Question II. *Whether we are bound to conform our will to the divine will in the thing willed.*

Secondly it is asked, whether we are bound to conform our will to the divine will in the thing willed. And that we are, it seems.

**Arguments for the affirmative:**

1. *Matthew* twelve: *He who is not with me is against me*: therefore if he does not consent with God in the thing willed, he is against God: therefore if we are bound not to be contrary to God, we are bound to will what God wills.

2. Likewise, on that text of the *Psalm*: *A perverse heart hath not cleaved to me*, the Gloss: « A perverse and distorted heart he has who does not will what God wills »; but we are bound to avoid perversity of heart: therefore we are bound to will what God wills.

3. Likewise, Tully, defining friendship, says that friendship is to will the same thing and to be unwilling of the same thing in honorable matters; but we are bound to keep friendship with God: therefore also to will the same in honorable matters. But God wills only what is just and honorable: therefore we ought to conform our will to his in all things.

4. Likewise, every intellect which disagrees with the first truth or cognition is false: therefore every affection is wicked which does not agree with the divine will in the thing willed: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, we are bound to will what God commands, then either because he commands, or because he wills. Not because he commands, since those who had been cleansed, to whom the commandment was given by the Lord to keep silent, did not sin by revealing it, because by divine inspiration they recognized that God did not will what he was commanding: therefore we are bound to the precept because we are bound to the will: therefore we are bound to will what God wills.

6. Likewise, we are bound to believe not only what God commands us to believe, but also everything which he says to be true: therefore by a similar reasoning we are bound to will not only what God commands us to will, but everything which God indicates that he himself wills as good: therefore we are bound to will everything which we know God to will.

**On the contrary:**

1. Augustine in the *Enchiridion*: Sometimes a man with a good will wills what God does not will.

2. Likewise, holy men frequently will opposite things, as the Apostle willed to be bound at Jerusalem, and the disciples were unwilling, *Acts* twenty-one; but it is plain that God willed something of these things: therefore it is permitted meritoriously to will the contrary to the divine will: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, if we are bound to conform in the thing willed; then, since in indifferent matters the divine will is not determined for us, whoever wills some indifferent thing in a determinate way commits himself to risk: therefore he sins mortally, which is absurd. If you say he is bound when he knows the Lord's will; on the contrary: knowledge does not introduce a new sin or obligation, but only aggravates the sin: therefore by reason of knowledge no one is bound, just as neither is one ignorant.

4. Likewise, Jeremiah grieved over the destruction of Jerusalem, in *Lamentations*; Christ wept over Jerusalem, *Luke* nineteen; the Blessed Virgin and the Apostles over the passion of Christ. If they wept and grieved, and grief is over things which befall us against our will, therefore they were unwilling. And it is plain that all these merited, and they knew that God willed the contrary: therefore licitly and meritoriously can we will the contrary to the divine will, even where it is known.

5. Likewise, however much my superior may will something, I am not bound to will it unless he commands me, even though I know that he wills it: therefore by parity of reasoning, however much God may will something, I am not bound to will it, however much it may become known to me, unless God commands me.

6. Likewise, what God counsels he wills, and we know that he wills it, yet we are not bound to will it, although it may please him much, even more than what is commanded: therefore we are not bound to will everything which we know God to will.

### Conclusion.

> **Conclusion.** Our will is not bound to be conformed to the divine will in every thing willed, but only in everything which becomes known to us that God wills by absolute will, or in that in which the order of salvation substantially consists.

**Respondeo:** To this some say that we are not bound to conform our will to the divine will in everything which God wills — but this belongs to perfection and supererogation, and this will be in the fatherland — but we are bound only to this, that he himself wills us to will. They say, however, that God wills us to will only what he commands, and to be unwilling of what he forbids. For these are the signs through which he sufficiently indicates to us his will, by which he wills us to will something. In other things willed, whether they become known or not, it is permitted to will the contrary without sin. And by this they solve [the arguments] on either side. Whence they say that it is permitted to us to will some things properly, because it is not fitting to will opposites, as in the matter of the destruction of our nation, and the calamities of the just, and the like. Even if God rains or disposes that it rain, I can ask and will the opposite.

But although this [opinion] is easier, nevertheless, because Augustine says that he is impious to whom divine providence is not pleasing, it seems not only that man is bound to will God's commandments, but also that he is bound to will God's works. And again, how does our will not kick against the divine will, when God wills something, and we will altogether the contrary? It seems wholly to oppose him. And again, the aforesaid Gloss seems to say that a man who does not will what God wills has a perverse heart; it does not say that God wills him to will it, or that God commands it.

Therefore it must be said otherwise, that in truth we are not bound to will everything which God wills, but only what he wills and which becomes known, and not even all of that. Hence it should be noted that God shows himself to will something absolutely and as far as it lies in him, as the goods which he does. And these we are bound to will simply and with absolute will, as far as it lies in us.

Some thing he shows himself to will by absolute will, but the opposite, as far as it lies in him, as the evils which he inflicts. And these we are bound to will with absolute and deliberative will: yet the opposite we may will with the will of piety, as Hugh says. Whence just as God is not delighted in our punishments, but rather says: *Alas, alas, I will console myself over my enemies*, *Isaiah* one; so also we. Whence Hugh distinguishes in us a threefold will, namely of reason, of piety, and of the flesh, and in Christ a fourfold, extending the name of will. Whence he says in the book *On the Wills of Christ*, speaking of Christ: « The will of the Deity by justice dictated the sentence; the will of reason by obedience approved the truth; the will of piety by compassion in evil sighed; the will of the flesh through suffering in its own evil murmured ». And therefore by the will of reason we ought also to will the evil of punishment, which we know God to will; but by the will of piety we can conditionally, that is, as far as it lies in us, if it please God, not will it. For even God himself, as far as it lies in him, does not will it, as has been said.

Something God shows himself to will, as far as it lies in him, around which the order of salvation substantially consists, as are those things which he commands to be done, and which he commands not to be done; and these we are bound to will.

Something God shows himself to will, as far as it lies in him, around which the expediting of salvation consists, as are those things which he counsels. And to such he does not bind nor will he bind: for he wills to save some thus, and others to go by a broader way.

From these things, then, it is plain that we are bound generally to conform our will, not in every thing willed, but in everything which becomes known in the three ways aforesaid, otherwise friendship would be broken; and concerning such a thing willed the reasons and authorities run. For this is why by the precept we are bound to conform ourselves, because he wills us to will what he commands; and this we know. And to my superior I am bound to be conformed in this, that I expressly know him to will me to will; but in a superior I do not know except through a command, but in God I know through other signs, as has been said.

**To the arguments on the contrary side:**

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that in nothing can the intellect disagree without being false, etc.; it must be said that the case is not similar concerning the good and the true. For the true is said absolutely, but the good in relation to an end. And because two opposites are not together, therefore disagreeing intellects cannot be true. But the good is said in relation to an end. And since opposite things willed can be ordered to the same end, therefore they can simultaneously be good, and the affections in their regard can be right. Therefore it is not necessary to be conformed in every thing willed, because we can will the opposite in a holy manner, since it is ordered to the end; but the opposite of that which God wills us to will, we cannot order to the end, because God does not accept it.

To that which is objected on the contrary, that we are not bound to every thing willed; it must be said that this is true, because [we are bound] not to the thing willed because it is willed, nor because it is known, but because it is known to be willed by God, such that we will it. — Yet otherwise it can be said, that we are bound, because [it is] absolutely willed, but we are excused through ignorance, especially where due diligence is employed, just as someone is bound not to be ignorant of what is his own [duty]. Whence concerning the obligation inducing fault, what he says is false, that knowledge does not induce a new obligation. For just as ignorance of fact excuses from the whole, so knowledge of opposition to the divine will makes someone to be bound, such that in no way can he go to the contrary without fault. And so in our case; and so that is plain.

*To 4 [on Christ and the Blessed Virgin].* To that which is objected concerning Christ and the Blessed Virgin and the others compassionating, it must be said, as has been said, that by absolute will they willed what God willed; yet by conditional will or by the will of piety they ought to will the contrary; and by this will they merited, since this [will] is not only of nature, but also of reason.