Dist. 48, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/48/q/bon-sent-I-d48-dubia
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### DOUBTS ON THE LETTER OF THE MASTER.

#### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the letter, and first concerning that which Augustine says: *There is a great difference between what it befits God to will and what befits a man to will*. Therefore from this it seems that a man may licitly will something knowing that God wills the contrary. Suppose then per impossibile that to someone his own damnation be revealed; it is established that God wills him to be damned with an absolute will. Either, therefore, that man is bound to will [it], or not; or — whatever may be said about being held [to it] — what is more perfect to will: to will to be damned, or not? If he wills to be damned: therefore he wills to be separated from God; this an upright will can never desire. If he does not will to be damned: therefore he does not perfectly conform himself: therefore the opposite will is more perfect.

**I respond:** It must be said that this is impossible — that to someone his own damnation be revealed; and when an impossible thing is supposed, it is no wonder if an impossible thing follows. — Nevertheless, if you ask, what is more perfect? I reply that in eternal damnation there are two things, namely the infliction of punishment and eternal separation from God. As for eternal separation from God, in no way do I believe that any soul ought rightly to will it; indeed it should always will the contrary. But to will the punishment, if it has been revealed to it, it ought. And this is clear, because every just person ought to will, both concerning himself and concerning another, that every sinner finally and eternally be punished: therefore if there is supposed a pre-existing certain cognition concerning himself, I believe that, as long as a good will endures in him, he will will this.

But if you ask concerning him who sins, whether he ought to will that grace be withdrawn from him; for it seems that yes, since God wills it, and he himself knows this to be just: it must be said to this that grace's being withdrawn from someone can be regarded under a threefold condition, either absolutely, or for a time. And for a time still in a twofold way: either in itself, or as it has the character of a penalty. In this way God wills to withdraw [it], and in this way the sinner ought to will that God punish him. — Hence the general rule is that in all things which we know God wills absolutely, we are bound to will [them] with an absolute will; nevertheless it is permitted to us to will the contrary with a conditioned will, that is, so far as in us lies, because this befits us; and on account of this Augustine says: *There is a great difference* etc.

#### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what the Master says, that *the action of the Jews was evil*. For this seems false to say, because the action of the Jews was the cause of the passion; but if the immediate cause is evil, [so also is] the effect: therefore if the action was evil, [so too] the passion.

**I respond:** It must be said that this is true of action and passion in the same genus of goodness, according as the one is the cause of the other. It must therefore be said that the action of the Jews was the cause of the passion in the genus of nature, and in that genus, as the action was evil, so also the passion; but it was not the cause in the same genus of morality, but rather Christ's good intention, which was directing the voluntary passion to a good end; whereas, on the contrary, in the action of the Jews, which had no right

end; and therefore in the genus of morality the action was evil and displeasing to God, and the passion good and pleasing to God. And so the whole is plain.

#### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that *he willed Christ to suffer and die* etc. For this seems ill said, because to kill Christ was to do evil: therefore for Christ to be killed was for an evil to come about: therefore if God willed Christ to suffer, God willed an evil to come about; which has been denied above.

**I respond:** It must be said that to kill Christ was evil by comparison to the subject. When therefore the passion is considered, either it is considered simply in comparison to the one suffering or to the one undergoing the penalty, and so it is simply good; or in comparison to the one inflicting [it], and from this regard it is judged evil, because the malice of morality regards rather the intention than the act. And in the first mode the sense is: *For Christ to suffer at the hands of the Jews is good*, that is, for Christ to undergo the penalty which the Jews inflicted is good. In the second mode the sense is: *For Christ to suffer at the hands of the Jews is good*, that is, for the passion to be inflicted on Christ by the Jews is good; and so [it is] false, because the inflicting of the passion was nothing but evil, while the enduring [of it] was nothing but good; and so the Master distinguishes.

#### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *This good was so great that the Apostle Peter, who did not will it to come about, was called Satan by that very One who was killed*. According to this it seems that whoever grieves and is saddened concerning the passion of Christ is to be rebuked: therefore the most blessed Virgin sinned when she grieved, according to what is said in Luke chapter two: *A sword shall pierce through thy own soul*. Likewise the Apostles sinned. The Apostle too speaks falsely in second Timothy chapter two: *If we suffer together, we shall also reign together*.

**I respond:** It must be said that *to grieve concerning something* is in a twofold way: either so that the one grieving, by an absolute will of reason, wills the contrary of that of which he grieves; and so it was permitted to no one to grieve concerning the passion of Christ, and Peter, because by a will of reason he was willing the contrary, was rebuked. In another mode, *to grieve concerning something* is to be carried toward the contrary by a will of piety, while nevertheless willing *this* by an absolute will; in this way it is good to feel co-suffering with Christ and to be piously affected concerning him, and in this way holy men are affected, who give great thanks to God for the passion of Christ, but nevertheless are piously moved in the consideration of the sufferings. So likewise the most pious soul of the blessed Virgin co-suffered, so far as she could bear it, with her most beloved Son suffering. Yet in no way must it be doubted that her manly spirit and most steadfast reason willed even to hand over the Only-begotten for the salvation of the human race, that the Mother might be in all things conformed to the Father. And in this she must be praised and loved in a wondrous way, because it pleased her that her Only-begotten should be offered for the salvation of the human race. And she suffered together [with him] so greatly that, if it could come to pass, she would much more gladly bear all the torments which the Son endured. Truly therefore she was strong and pious, equally sweet and severe, sparing toward herself but most generous toward us. She therefore is especially to be loved and venerated after the highest Trinity and its most blessed offspring, Jesus Christ our Lord, in declaring the mystery of whose divinity all other tongues fall short, because *he himself is the consummation of discourses*. *To him therefore, who is able to do all things superabundantly beyond what we ask or understand, according to the power that worketh in us, to him be glory in the Church and in Christ Jesus throughout all generations of the world of worlds. Amen*.

HERE ENDS THE FIRST BOOK.

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