Dist. 5, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/5/q/bon-sent-I-d5-a1-q2
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### Question II

*Whether the expression should be conceded that the Son is begotten of the substance of the Father.*

Secondly it is asked whether it should be conceded that anyone is begotten of the substance of the Father, as the Son is. And that it is so, it seems:

**1.** By many authorities in the text and especially by this: *«It is also said, and frequently read in Scripture, that the Father begot the Son from His own substance»*; but Scripture says nothing except what is true, and uses frequently nothing except what is proper: therefore the aforesaid expression is true and proper.

**2.** Likewise, it is shown by reason thus: whoever is from something and is consubstantial with it, is of its substance; but the Son is from the Father and is consubstantial with Him: therefore He is of His substance.

**3.** Likewise, *the Father begets the Son*: either, then, from something, or from nothing; not from nothing, because then He would be a creature: therefore from something; not from something other than Himself: therefore from His own substance.

**4.** Likewise, among inferior beings a son who has a part of his father's substance is said to be *of the father's substance*: therefore much more strongly, one who has the whole substance is said to be *of the substance of the begetter*: therefore this is true: *the Son is of the substance of the Father*.

*On the contrary:*

**1.** Propositions are transitive, and where there is transition, there is distinction and diversity: therefore when it is said *the Son of the substance of the Father*, this preposition *de* (of/from) denotes a distinction between the substance of the Father and the Son: therefore, since there is no distinction — because the Son *is* the substance of the Father — the aforesaid proposition is false. If you say that this preposition *de* falls from the general signification of prepositions, retaining the special: then there is here a solecism, just as if one were to say *sublime volat* for *sublimiter* ("it flies sublime" for "sublimely"), which it is foolish to say.

**2.** Likewise, an objection is made concerning the special signified meaning. This preposition *de*, as it is taken specially, is sometimes taken *materially*, as *a knife of iron*; sometimes *ordinally*, as *from morning comes midday*, that is, after morning; sometimes *originally*, as when it is said, *a ray from the sun* or *splendor from fire*. But in whatever of these modes it is taken, the expression is false: if materially, it is false because the Son lacks matter; if ordinally, false because the sense is that the Son is after the Father, or after the substance of the Father; if originally, similarly false because then the sense is that the Son has His origin from the substance of the Father — but this is not admitted: *«the substance of the Father begets the Son»*: therefore in every way it is false. If you say that it is taken in none of those modes, but is held in a fourth mode, *substantially*, it is asked whence this signification has its origin, and where it is similarly taken; and it seems that this is nothing, because then this would be true: *the Father is of the substance of the Son*, which no one concedes.

**3.** Likewise, the same is shown thus: this preposition *de* differs from *a* (from): for *a* properly expresses the relation of an active principle, but this preposition *de* expresses the relation of a passive principle; but the account of an active principle belongs more to God and His substance than that of a passive: therefore this is more true: *the Son is from (a) the substance of the Father*, than *of (de)*; but this is not received: therefore neither should the other be received.

**4.** Likewise, *de* expresses either identity or diversity; if identity — then since the highest identity is in the essence or substance, this will be true: *substance of substance*, which the Master denies; if diversity — but the substance of the Father is not distinguished from the Son, because the Son is the very substance of the Father: therefore it is altogether false.

### Conclusion

> *It is to be conceded that the Son is begotten of the substance of the Father.*

**I respond:** It must be said that the aforesaid expression is to be conceded.

And for the understanding of the foregoing it should be noted that besides the three aforementioned modes in which this preposition *de* is taken, it can also be taken in a fourth mode, namely *substantially*, so that it expresses a substantial agreement between the extremes. But it never says this purely, since it is a preposition and imports some relation and respect to the extremes. For if it were held only substantially, as it is said *son from the substance of the father*, so it would be said *father from the substance of the son*; which is absurd.

Therefore it should be noted that *to be taken substantially* is customary in three ways. Sometimes it is taken *substantially and partially*, as when it is said that parts are *of the whole* or of the substance of the whole, as *a jug of wine from the cask*. Sometimes it is taken *substantially and ordinally*, as when it is said: *from bread is made the body of Christ*; for there is order there, because the substance of the bread does not remain in the body of Christ, just as morning does not remain at midday; but further substantially, because the substance of the bread passes into the substance of the body of Christ. Sometimes it is taken *substantially and originally*, as when it is said: *the Son of the substance of the Father*; by reason of the ablative it is held substantially, by reason of the genitive originally: and therefore it imports some distinction of the Son to the Father, not to His substance, and so the preposition there holds its general signified meaning together with its special one.

**1. 2.** And so the response to the first and second arguments is clear. Yet as to what is said, that prepositions are transitive — it is not understood that they thereby denote diversity necessarily; but just as it is said that oblique [cases] are transitive as to manner, because they are construed transitively with verbs, as *I see myself*; likewise this is said of prepositions, which are construed with oblique cases.

**3.** The third is also clear: that *de* expresses not only the relation of a passive principle, nor only the relation of an active principle, but a consubstantial relation together with the relation of origin — which this preposition *a* does not do; and therefore they are not alike.

**4.** To that which is last objected, the response is clear, because *de* there does not express identity at all, nor diversity, but *consubstantiality with the relation of origin*.