Dist. 5, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/5/q/bon-sent-I-d5-dubia
----------------------------------------
### Doubts concerning the Master's text

In this part doubts arise concerning the text, and the first doubt is about the Master's reasonings.

#### Doubt I

For his first reasoning leads to this incongruity — namely that, if the essence were begotten by the Father, the essence would be set down for a relative; and this reasoning is set down at: *«Therefore it must not be said that the Father begot the divine essence»*. But this seems no incongruity. For if the essence agrees more with the supposit than the universal does with the singular; if it is no incongruity that the universal be set down for the singular, neither is it an incongruity that the essence be set down for a relative.

**I respond:** It must be said that if the essence were set down for a relative, it would be incongruous — not on the side of

the thing, but on the side of the expression of the faith. For then the unity of the essence in a certain distinction would be seen and noted. It would also be incongruous, because what is set down for a relative as such does not indicate the essence. If, then, the essence were set down for a relative, the essence sometimes would not indicate the essence — which is contrary to all reason.

#### Doubt II

Likewise, second, doubt is raised about the second reasoning, by which he leads to this incongruity — that the same thing would beget itself — and which is set down at: *«Likewise, since God the Father is the divine essence, if He were its begetter, He would surely be the begetter of that which He Himself is, because* essence *expresses something common, just as does this name* God *»*; but if it were said: *«*Man* Peter begets a man, and he himself is a man: therefore he begets himself»*, that argument has no force. The same seems to hold here: *«The Father begets God: therefore» etc.* — by parity of reason, neither does it [hold] in the case proposed.

**I respond:** It must be said that *common* is what is in many; but this can be in three ways: either what is multiplied in many both as to *form* and as to *supposit*, as the name *man*; and such has *unity of account* (*unitas rationis*), which admits distinction both as to thing and as to mode. Hence one rightly says: *man is from man*, and: *there are two men*. In another way the common is what is multiplied as to supposit, not as to form, as the name *God*; and such has *unity of thing* (*unitas rei*), according as *thing* names the nature with a multiplication of supposits; and therefore it admits a *distinctive* which imports distinction as a mode, not as a thing. Hence is conceded: *God from God*, but not: *God is other than God*. There is, third, the common *according to name*, which is in many — yet is not multiplied as to form, because it is one in many, nor as to supposits, because it does not supposit for them, as the name *essence*. Of such a common it is true to say that it admits no distinction, neither as to mode nor as to thing; for then the same would be noted as distinguished from itself. And so the Master's argument is good: *«if the Father begot the essence, the Father begot Himself»*; and he speaks of the common on the side of the signifying word, not on the side of the thing — because on the side of the thing the same commonness is in *God* and in *essence*.

#### Doubt III

Likewise, third, an objection is made against the third reasoning: *«if the Father begot the divine essence, then the begotten is the cause to the begetter, that He should be and be God»*, which is set down at: *«And if it is so, the begetter is not [cause] to the begotten»* etc. But this reasoning seems to have no force, because the account of *cause* does not fall in God; «for *cause* is that whose being some other thing follows»; but in God there is no *other*: therefore, etc.

Likewise, it does not follow: *«The Father begot wisdom: therefore He is wise by a begotten wisdom»*: therefore by parity of reason neither does the said expression hold.

**I respond:** It must be said that, taking the name *cause* properly, it does not fall in God; yet the account of *that which gives a principle* (*principians*) and the account of *informing* (*informans*) do fall and are received [there], and under these the name of *cause* is taken. Since, then, the account of *being* (*ratio essendi*) is signified by this name *essence*, therefore essence signifies in some way in the account of cause with respect to *being* (*ens*). If, then, the essence were begotten by being, it would be signified in the account of effect or *principled* (*principiatum*), and the same would then be principle and principled with respect to the same — which is impossible; and on this is founded the Master's reasoning.

To that which is objected concerning wisdom, it must be said that this has been touched on concerning it in the questions outside the text; because a name so abstract as *essentia* does not supposit for a relative, [whereas] *sapientia* does indeed supposit for a relative; and so there is an accident there: *«The Father is wise by wisdom, and He begot wisdom; therefore He is wise by the wisdom which He begot, or by a begotten wisdom»*. But in the name *essentia* there is no accident, since the same thing signifies and supposits.

#### Doubt IV

*«Likewise, it must not be said that the divine essence begot the Son»*. Against this, Joachim objects, both against the position and against the reasoning. *Against the position*: because if the essence neither generates nor is generated nor proceeds, then in God there is a thing generating and generated and proceeding, and a thing neither generating nor generated nor proceeding; and so there is, there, a *quaternity*, if there are four things.

Likewise, he ridicules the Master's reasoning: if essence generates essence, and essence is one thing — therefore one thing generates itself. Similarly, says Joachim, you could have said, Peter: *«God generates God, and* *one is God»*: therefore the same thing generates itself.

**I respond:** It must be said that Joachim does not argue rightly, and his reasoning fails — because *thing* (*res*) is not taken uniformly: when *thing* is said in the first way, *thing* is taken there for *thing of nature*; but when said in the second way, it is taken for the very divine nature itself. Furthermore, his argument fails *from the insufficient*, because it does not hold: *«if something is said of one thing*, *and is not said of another, that on this account those should make a number»*. Hence it does not hold: *«Peter is an individual; man is not an individual; therefore Peter and man are two»*. For to have a property and not to have [it] does not suffice for distinguishing.

To his counter-instance it must be said that he does not press rightly; because *the essence is one thing as to supposit and signified* — for it does not supposit for the persons; but *God is one thing as to the signified, but several as to supposit*. And therefore Joachim ignorantly rebuked the Master, and because, being a simple man, he did not revere the Master, therefore by the just judgment of God his book was condemned at the Lateran Council, and the Master's position was approved.

#### Doubt V

Likewise it is asked about that which Hilary says: *«The Son has nothing except what He received in being born»*. It is asked, then, about this verb *received*, whether it expresses substance or relation. If substance: then the Father similarly received; if relation: then since the Son received the essence, the essence is received: therefore the essence is referred.

**I respond:** It must be said that *to receive* says two things — namely *to have* and *to be from another*; as to *having* it regards the essence, but as to that which is *to be from another* it regards the person: hence by the verb *receiving* it is signified that the essence is had by a person who is from another.

#### Doubt VI

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *«And therefore He is not referred to another, who in one subsists from one»* — because this seems false, since the Son subsists from the Father, yet is referred to the Holy Spirit.

**I respond:** This can be understood in two ways: in one way, that the Son does not have a respect except to one person; and this is understood insofar as He is *Son*, because insofar as He spirates, He is referred to another; or that the person of the Son does not have a respect except to one nature; and this is true, because the Son does not have in Himself anything except the Father's nature.

#### Doubt VII

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *«And the unchangeable God, as it were, follows His own nature»*. For in God there is no *prior* or *posterior*, and so neither *to precede* nor *to follow*. If you say that this is according to the account of understanding — this is nothing, because God begetting follows nothing either in reality or in understanding.

**I respond:** It must be said that Hilary speaks improperly, and therefore he adds the qualifier *as it were*; and by *to follow* he wishes to say only as much as *inseparably to accompany* and *to consort with* and *not to depart from* it, and this is plain by what follows.

#### Doubt VIII

Likewise it is asked about Augustine's authorities — first, about that which he says, that *«God begot the Son once»*. For *once* seems to be said badly, because *once* expresses succession; but in eternal generation no succession occurs: therefore, etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that *once* can express either *now of time* or *now of eternity*. And if it expresses *now of time*, since time has diverse *nows*,

it denotes interruption; but if *now of eternity* — and that *now* is always invariable and one — *once* expresses every kind of invariability, perfection, and unity.

#### Doubt IX

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *«Of the Son of His charity»* — whether *charity* is taken there essentially or notionally. If essentially: then Christ the Son is *of the essence*, which is not conceded. If you say that it is an improper expression, and the sense is *Son of essence* — that is, who is essence — then no sense seems to remain, and *of charity* is added for nothing. And again Augustine expounds: *«Of the Son of charity»* — that is, *of the beloved Son*; but the Father loves the Son by the Holy Spirit: therefore, etc. If for this reason you say that it is taken notionally — then therefore the Son of God is the Son of the Holy Spirit, which is altogether absurd.

**I respond:** To this some say that this genitive is taken neither properly essentially nor properly notionally, but in an intermediate way — that is, *appropriately*. For although charity is common to all and proper to the Holy Spirit, yet in one mode it suitably belongs to the Father by appropriation, because charity is *gratuitous love*; and so Richard says, because *gratuitous love is that which only gives and receives nothing*, and this is in the person of the Father — therefore it is appropriated to the Father. In another way it can be said that *charity* is there taken essentially, as Augustine says, that to say *«of the Son of charity»* is no other than *«of the Son of substance»*; but the genitive is not construed in the account of *principle*, but by force of declaration of essence, and the sense is: *«of the Son of charity»* — that is, *of the dear Son*; and *«of the Son of substance»* or *«of nature»*, that is, *of the Son consubstantial* and *natural*.

#### Doubt X

Likewise it is asked about that which he says, that *«the Son is of the substance of the Father, homoousion»* — because, since a natural son draws part of his substance from the father and part from the mother in these inferior things, and in God draws the whole substance from the Father, it seems that the Father should not only be called *father* but also *mother*, and much more *mother*, since the mother gives more than the father. Likewise, the Son of God calls Himself *wisdom, and wisdom which is conceived and brought forth*, in Proverbs 8. Therefore, since this is proper to a mother, it seems that the Father should more properly be called *mother* than *father*.

**I respond:** It must be said that the name *mother* is not transferred to divine things. And one reason Anselm assigns in the *Monologion*: that the maternal principle pre-supposes another, prior, principle. And the reason for this is that the mother is a *passive principle*, and every such is moved by another: therefore there is another principle before it. Since, then, the principle of the generation of the Son is *first* and is *purely actual*, the maternal principle is in no way transferred [to God]; the maternal *act* is, however, transferred — as *to conceive* and *to bring forth* — for this reason, that there one principle does what here two [do].

#### Doubt XI

Likewise it is asked about that which he says, that *«the Son and the Holy Spirit are not from nothing»*. For this seems false, because that which is from no pre-existing matter is *from nothing*; but the Son and the Holy Spirit are such: therefore, etc. If you say that the Son and the Holy Spirit are from something — namely from the Father — it is then asked whether the Father is from nothing; and it seems so, because *not-something* and *nothing* are convertible; but the Father is not from something: therefore He is from nothing. Likewise, because the Father has no effective principle, He is therefore said to be *from no one*: therefore, since He has no matter, He must be said to be *from nothing*. If this is conceded of the Father — on the contrary: everything that has being from nothing is *created*: therefore, etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that when it is said that *something is from nothing*, according to Anselm in the *Monologion* it can be understood in three ways. In one way, that *nothing* be taken simply *privatively*, as when it is said of one silent: *«he speaks of nothing»*; in another way *positively*, as if it be so said or understood that something is made from nothing — as *a knife from iron*; in a third way *partly positively, partly privatively*, as when it is said that something is made *from nothing* because *after nothing is something* — as is said: *«from a poor man comes a rich man»*.

It must therefore be said that according to the first sense God can be said to be *from nothing* — whether the Father or the divine essence; yet this mode is not customary. As to the second mode, nothing at all is made from nothing, because nothing is the matter of nothing. As to the third mode — according to which Augustine speaks, that only the creature is made *from nothing* or is *from nothing*, because *from* there denotes order, that it has being after non-being — this *from nothing* removes pre-existing matter. Although, then, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit do not have pre-existing matter, yet because they do not have being after non-being, they are not said to be *from nothing*. And therefore the first argument has no force, because it proceeds from the insufficient.

But the second and third arguments, made about the Father, do hold according as the negation of that which is *nothing* is carried outside to the verb and makes a negative sentence; and according to this sense, just as it is conceded that the Father is *from no one*, so [also] *from nothing*. Yet, as has been said, this sense is not customary; for we commonly use this expression according as the negation *from nothing* stays within, and that *from* (*de*) is taken there *ordinally*.

---