Dist. 6, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/6/q/bon-sent-I-d6-a1-q1
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### Question I. *Whether the generation of the Son is according to the account of necessity.*

Concerning the first point, that the generation [of the Son] is according to the condition of necessity, it is shown thus.

1. *The nature in the Father is more fertile and more actual* for producing the Son than [the nature] in light is for producing a ray; but it is necessary that light produce a ray, so that the production in it is according to the condition of necessity: therefore much more so in the Father with respect to the Son.

2. Likewise, everything that emanates from another emanates either according to the condition of necessity or [according to the condition] of contingency: therefore the Son too emanates in one or the other of these two modes; but not according to the condition of contingency, because then it would be contingent that the Son be generated: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, to take away from the omnipotent the greatest power is impossible; but God the Father is omnipotent, whose greatest power is to generate the Son: therefore to take from him the power to generate the Son is impossible. But in eternal things potency is conjoined to act: therefore by parallel reasoning it is impossible to take away the act of generation: therefore it is impossible not to generate; but *to be impossible-not-to-be* and *to be necessary-to-be* are convertible: therefore it is necessary to generate.

**On the contrary:**

1. Augustine *to Orosius*, and the Master says in the text: « Neither by will nor by necessity did the Father beget the Son, because necessity is not in God »: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Hilary in the book *On the Synods*: « Not led by natural necessity did the Father beget the Son »: therefore there was there neither natural necessity nor any other necessity, as it seems; therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the more noble producer is that which is master of its own action, rather than that which is subject [to it]; but an agent acting according to the account of necessity is subject to the action, because willing or unwilling it must do it: therefore if the Father, who is the most noble agent, produces the Son in the most noble manner, [it is] therefore not according to the condition of necessity.

4. Likewise, this same point can be shown thus: what is given gratuitously is not given of necessity; but Richard says that in the Father there is gratuitous love, because he gives being to the Son and to the Holy Spirit: if therefore he gives gratuitously, he does not give of necessity.

> **Conclusion.** Generation in the divine [persons] is necessary by necessity of *immutability*, not however by any other species of necessity.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing, it must be noted that necessity is manifold. For there is one kind of necessity proceeding from a *disagreeing* principle, another from a *deficient* principle, another from an *agreeing* and *sufficient* principle.

That [necessity] which proceeds from a *disagreeing* principle is twofold: for either it is from the mover itself acting against nature, and this is *necessity of violence*; or against the will, and this necessity is [the necessity] *of coercion*; and concerning these two modes — which are very common — the heretic inquires.

Likewise that [necessity] which is from a *deficient* principle is twofold: for either it is with respect to that by which a thing is naturally completed; and this is *necessity of indigence*, as of food and drink; concerning this it is said in 1 John 3: *Whoever sees his brother suffering necessity* etc.; or with respect to that which is incurred from the very defect; and this is *necessity of inevitability*, such as is in death and in first motions; man incurs this necessity from the lack of original justice, [as in] the Psalm: *From my necessities deliver me.*

Likewise the third [necessity], which is from a *sufficient* and *agreeing* principle, is twofold: for either it is from a principle sufficient *in disposing*, and this is the *necessity of disposed matter*, which can be called *necessity of requirement*; or [a principle sufficient] *in completing*, and this is the *necessity of immutability*.

And this last necessity falls in God, and principally in God, because he alone is the one who is wholly sufficient unto himself and who wholly agrees with himself. But this necessity does not conflict with freedom of the will, but only with changeableness, such as is not in God.

1. To that which is objected from the text, it must be said that it is understood of the necessity of coercion, which in no way falls in God, and concerning this the heretic was inquiring.

2. Likewise Hilary too understands [this] of this same [necessity of coercion], whence he also adds in the text: *not by natural necessity, when he was unwilling*; for then there would be coercion, when the will resists.

3. To that which is objected, that an agent [acting] through necessity is subject to its action; it must be said that it is false, unless the necessity is one repugnant to the will. For when there is a repugnant necessity, the will must be subjected, because it cannot prevail. But when there is a necessity supremely consonant [with the will], not able to disagree with the will, then it induces no subjection, as is clear. For God is necessarily blessed and necessarily wills to be blessed; and just as it is necessary that he be blessed, so [is it necessary that he] will [it]; thus it is to be understood in the generation of the Son.

4. To that which is objected lastly concerning gratuitous love, it must be said that there are two [things] in gratuitous love: one is, that it gives from sheer liberality, so that there is no requirement or debt of merit or of nature; the other, that it gives without retribution, and as far as this second [sense] is concerned, [the love] in the Father is called gratuitous love, not as to the first. For the natural fecundity of the Father is necessarily the ground of communicating the nature to another.