Dist. 7, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/7/q/bon-sent-I-d7-a1-q1
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### Question I. *Whether the power of begetting signifies something absolute or relative.*

Concerning the first, that "to be able to beget" signifies *something* (a *what*), is shown:

1. *First*, by the authority of the Master in the text: that « the Father is not powerful save by nature, and his power is the very essence, or essence »; but nature and power signify *something*, not *in relation to something*: therefore so also does the power of begetting.

2. *Likewise*, it is shown by reason thus: to beget is to produce that which is similar to oneself in nature; but according to the Philosopher « nature is a force implanted in things which procreates like from like »: therefore the power of begetting regards nature itself or essence in itself, not the person; but every such thing signifies *something*: therefore etc.

3. *Likewise*, « in things perpetual, to be and to be able do not differ »: therefore much more strongly in things eternal; therefore being and being-able, and power and essence, are the same; but being and essence in divine matters signify *something*, not *in relation to something*, whether they are said by themselves or with an adjunct; hence the essence of the Father signifies *something*: therefore by parity of reasoning so does the power of begetting.

4. *Likewise*, in divine matters, the ability to know and the ability to will are really the same; but in divine matters there is no proper knowledge or knowledge *in relation to something*, rather knowledge signifies *something* and is of the three [persons], and likewise the will: therefore the power of begetting signifies *something*, that is, essence.

**On the contrary:**

1. The Master says in the text, and it is found in the first chapter: *To be able to beget is not to be able [to do] something*, therefore it does not signify *something*; and it signifies either *something* or *in relation to something*: therefore etc.

2. *Likewise*, by reason it is shown thus: powers are distinguished by their acts: therefore if the act of a power signifies *something*, so does the power; and if it signifies *in relation to something*, then so does the power likewise. But it is established that to beget in divine matters does not signify *something* but *in relation to something*: therefore neither does the ability to beget.

3. *Likewise*, although in creatures power and operation differ, yet in God they are the same, as Dionysius will it: therefore in God it is the same to be-able-to-beget and to beget; but to beget in divine matters signifies *in relation to something* and not *something*: therefore likewise the ability.

4. *Likewise*, the Father begets and is able to beget: either, then, he is able because he begets, or he begets because he is able. It is established that he is not able to beget because he begets: therefore he begets because he is able to beget. If, then, the ground of a property must itself be proper, therefore the power of begetting must be proper; and nothing is proper in divine matters except what signifies *in relation to something*: therefore etc.

5. *Likewise*, every active power which is in a creature is in it according to certain conditions or properties, as is plain. For the ability to illuminate is in a luminous body through light, the ability to heat in a hot thing through heat. Now although the power of begetting is not active, yet it is similar to an active power: therefore since it is in the Father, it is there through some property; and that property either signifies *something* or *in relation to something*. If *something*: therefore it is in all the persons, and so likewise is the ability to beget — which the Master manifestly denies: therefore it signifies *in relation to something*: therefore so does the power which is in [the Father] according to it: therefore etc.

> **Conclusion.** Among the three opinions on this matter, that one seems more probable which asserts that the power of begetting signifies both relation and substance, but in the direct sense [signifies] relation.

**I respond:** It must be said that, concerning this problem, there have been three positions.

**Opinion 1.** There were some who distinguished the power of begetting, saying that the power of begetting can be called a *bare* power or a *disposed* power. If it is called a bare power, then they wished to say that it signifies *something* and is in all three persons, since this power so understood follows nature; whence, since nature is in every person, so likewise is a power of this kind. But insofar as it is called a disposed power, since it does not have the disposition or fitness for it to issue into the act of generation except in the person of the Father alone, they wished to say that it signifies *in relation to something*.

**It is rejected.** But the words of this position do not seem true or sound. Not true, I say, because that whose power is bare is by nature equally apt to be disposed; if therefore the power of begetting belongs to the three, inasmuch as it is a bare power, it likewise [belongs to them] as disposed; and so any [person] could beget. Moreover it does not seem sound: for to posit a bare power, which is indifferent to being and not-being with respect to a generation which it is altogether necessary should be, does not seem soundly or properly stated.

**Opinion 2.** There were also others who said that, since in divine matters being-able and being are the same, and power and essence are the same, then just as power and essence signify *something*, so likewise being and being-able. And just as, when I say "the essence of the Father" and "the essence of the Son" and "[the essence] of the Holy Spirit," or "for the Father to be", "for the Son to be," "for the Holy Spirit to be," I do not say another essence nor another being, but [the being] of one and of another; so when I say "the power of the Father," or "the Father can beget" and "the Son can be begotten," I do not say another and another being-able, but [the being-able] of one and of another. And of this position was the Master, as evidently appears in the text. Whence they said that to-be-able-to-beget signifies *something*, but with a respect to *something else*, because it is an essential drawn to the person. For since it is not of an utterly abstract sort, it can be drawn to the person.

And this position of the Master is sufficiently probable, and seems sufficiently well able to be sustained.

**Opinion 3.** There were also a third group, the more modern, who said that the power of begetting signifies *in relation to something* in divine matters of itself. And their reason is: because power signifies a relation of an originating principle to that which is principiated. And because a relation can be of person to person — and then it is truly a relation — and of essence to creature — and then it is according to the manner of speaking or of understanding — hence it is that "principle" by its very account is not only an essential [term] appropriated by addition, but rather also signifies a property of a person. By like reasoning, since power signifies an originating relation, not merely an essential one, it is not only said or drawn to the person so as to signify essence personally, but rather it signifies a property, and so [signifies] *in relation to something* of itself.

And this position, without prejudice, seems more probable. For the power of begetting does not seem to signify anything but the fecundity for the act of generation; and that is a property of a person, whence likewise so is the power. Nor is the case of being-able and being similar except in one mode. For this verb *is* is sometimes predicated by itself, sometimes is the third adjacent. When it is said by itself, then it signifies an absolute act, because it signifies the act of being by reason of essence; and then it must be said absolutely and must signify *something*. But when it is the third adjacent, as when it is said *the Father is God*, *the Father is the Father*, then this verb *is* signifies a relation of predicate to subject. And because it can signify a relation to either an essential or a personal predicate, therefore it can signify essential being and a personal mode of being. But "to be able," by its own proper account, signifies a relation according to origin; and hence it is that it is specified by its adjunct, so as to signify the condition of an essential or of a personal principle. Sustaining this position, then, I respond to the arguments which prove that it signifies *something*.

**To the arguments proving that it signifies *something*:**

*To 1.* As to what is first objected, the matter is plain: for I concede that the Master was of this position. Whence they said that the Son can be begotten by the same power by which the Father can beget; which would not be so unless the power signified *something*. Whence he said that the power of begetting is in the Son, but not *for begetting*, but *for being begotten*. But this position says that it is in the Father alone, because it does not regard nature only, but a property of the person.

*To 2.* As to what is objected, that begetting follows nature; it must be said that, in divine matters, it does not follow nature simply, but nature as in a person; because not in every person is there a fecund nature, but only in the person of the Father, and this is through some property which is of that person alone; it is not so in lower things, as will soon be plain: hence it is plain that that [argument] is not valid.

*To 3.* As to what is objected, that in eternal things being and being-able are the same; it must be said that this is true; but nevertheless the argument is worth nothing. For although in divine matters being and being-the-Father are utterly the same, yet it does not follow that, if being-the-Father is proper, therefore being is proper. Likewise neither, if being is common, that on this account being-the-Father [is common]. Likewise it must be said in the case proposed.

*To 4.* As to what is objected concerning knowledge, that it signifies *something* whether said by itself or with another; it must be said that knowledge and power are not alike. For knowledge, as far as concerns itself, signifies an absolute quality, and therefore, as far as concerns itself, signifies *something*, unless it be drawn [to a person]; but power signifies a relation to origin, and therefore can signify a proper relation, and one of person to person. Whence that comparison of the Master is not valid according to this position, namely that, just as there is one will by which the Father wills to be the Father and does not will to be the Son, and conversely, so likewise there is one power, as it seems.

**To the arguments on the contrary:** But if anyone wishes to sustain the position of the Master, he can easily reply to all the arguments on the opposite side.

*To 1.* For no reason proves that power of itself signifies a property, but only that the power of begetting taken actively, or "to be able to beget," signifies from the adjunct a respect to the person, and so signifies *in relation to something*; but this is only by reason of what is added. Whence it is to be noted that there are four kinds of names in divine matters. For some essential ones are said essentially, as *deity* and *majesty*; some essentials are said personally, as *power of begetting*; some personals are said personally, as *begetting* and *begotten*; some personals are said essentially, as *sent*, *incarnate*, and the like, which signify a respect to the person, and therefore are personal, and an effect in the creature, and therefore are said essentially.

*To 2.* It is easy to reply to the two following arguments, since that does not have truth except when the act exhausts the whole power; it is not so in the power of God, since the same is the power to beget and to be begotten in God.

*To 3.* As to what is objected, that to-be-able-to-beget and to beget are the same; it must be said that it is not valid. For although the Father and the substance are the same, yet it does not follow that, if the Father is said *in relation to something*, the substance also is, as will be better shown below.

*To 4 and 5.* It is difficult to reply well to the two last arguments; nevertheless one can say that those reasons do not conclude that power signifies *in relation to something* of itself, but only by reason of the adjunct, which is "to beget"; and so the rest are clear.