Dist. 7, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/7/q/bon-sent-I-d7-dubia
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### Doubts concerning the Master's text.

#### Doubt I.

In this part there arise doubts concerning the text, and the first is about that solution of the Master, in which he says that it does not follow: *The Father can generate that which* *the Son cannot: therefore he can do something which the Son cannot;* and he answers that *to be able to generate is not to be able [to do] something subject to the divine power*. But this seems not to solve but to aggravate the argument. For then, since *to be able to generate* is to be able [to do] the greatest thing, it seems that a greater unfittingness follows, and the power of the Son is more derogated, if he is deficient in this, than if [he were deficient] in things subject to the divine power.

**I respond:** It must be said that the Master solves [it] well. For the power of the Father can be compared to what is below and to what is equal, but not to what is above, since it has nothing above it. When it is compared to what is below, then it is essential power and essentially retained, because it connotes a respect to the creature; and with respect to such a power it would be unfitting that the Father should be able to do something which the Son could not do, because then they would differ by essence. But when it is compared to what is equal, namely to a person, then it is drawn to the person; and then it is no unfittingness, if some personal property is in the Father, which is not in the Son. Therefore it does not follow that some power is in the Father which is not in the Son.

#### Doubt II.

Likewise, there is doubt about the statement that the generation of the Son is not [included] among "all things." For Richard of St. Victor seems to say the contrary, who says that *because he is omnipotent, he cannot be excused from having generated the Son:* therefore the generation of the Son is contained under omnipotence: therefore the Son is contained among all things and is [one of them].

**I respond:** It must be said that, as the Master says, the generation of the Son is not contained under omnipotence, unless omnipotence be taken by appropriation. And what Richard says is not to be understood as though the Son were among all things, but as though [he were] before all things; whence he argues a posteriori. For if the emanation of nature according to the rational order of the intellect precedes the emanation according to the rational order of the will, God would never be able to produce a creature through the will, unless he had also produced the Son through nature.

#### Doubt III.

Likewise, he seems to speak ill when he says that *to be the Father is not to be something;* because, since between something and nothing there falls no middle, if it is not to be something: therefore it is to be nothing.

**I respond:** "To be something" is said in two ways: either commonly, with reference to essence and person; and so no middle falls, and in this sense to be the Father is to be something; in another way, insofar as it is drawn to the essence; and thus a middle falls between to be something and to be nothing, namely to be someone; for a person is predicated as *who*, not as *what*.

#### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning this inference of the Master: *The Holy Spirit could have been the Son, therefore he could have been changed,* and there is added: *For if he could have been born, he could have been the Son* etc. This inference seems not to hold, because in creatures, where

a relation differs more from a supposit, it can be said that one similar [thing] can be dissimilar to another without its being changed: therefore, since filiation and spiration are relations, by parity of reasoning the Son could be the Holy Spirit, and conversely, without change. Likewise, every changeable thing is something besides that according to which it is changed, as if a non-white [thing] becomes white, it is other than the whiteness: therefore if the Holy Spirit be understood to be changed, if he were generated, then in him the generation would be one thing, and the one who is generated another; but this is false: therefore etc.

**I respond:** The case is otherwise in the relations of the creature and of God: because relations in creatures do not give the related things existence; whence without them the thing can exist and with them; but in the divine they give the persons existence; and therefore if it be understood in the persons that a property is in the hypostasis, it is understood that the hypostasis is, and likewise, if it is understood not to be in [it], it is understood that the hypostasis is not. Since therefore the Holy Spirit cannot be at once spirated and generated — because, although one person can produce in two modes, nevertheless one person cannot be produced except in one mode — it follows of necessity: if the Holy Spirit can be the Son or could have been, he can not be the Spirit or not be spirated; and if he could not be spirated, he could not be; and again if he could be generated, he could be: and so he could become a non-being from a being, and a being from a non-being, and through this be changed.

And thus the last point is clear, because [he] is not said to be changed on account of a diversification of properties about the same supposit, as is the case in natural change, but on account of the corruption and inception of the same. Nor is that similar: *The Father can generate and spirate without his being changed: therefore the Holy Spirit* *[can] be generated and spirated;* because it is not unfitting that one principle produce in many modes, but that one thing originated be produced in many modes is impossible and incompossible; and therefore that is clear.

#### Doubt V.

Likewise, he seems to speak falsely when he says: *The Father is not powerful except by nature;* for his power is essence, since according to this, "to generate," which in no way is of the essence, in no way would be of the power.

**I respond:** Although power, considered absolutely, is the same as essence, nevertheless power, because it is not a name as abstract as essence, is drawn to the person. Hence the power of generating does not signify the divine nature simply, but the nature as in such a person, namely the unbegotten one; therefore there is no parallel between this name *essence* and this name *power*.

#### Doubt VI.

Likewise, he seems to speak ill there: *That you should signify another power, by which the Father is able to beget* etc.; because the division of power is sufficient by [its division into] active and passive; but *to be able to beget* signifies active power, *to be able to be begotten* passive power: therefore no other power can be signified. If you should say that to generate is not properly to act, similarly neither is to be generated to undergo; it is objected that powers are distinguished by their acts; but to beget is one thing and to be begotten another: therefore the power of this and of that is different.

**I respond:** This distinction which the Master sets down concerning the power of begetting actively and passively, is founded on this, that power can be considered according to *that which it is;* and so it signifies the nature, and as one nature is in the begetter and the begotten, but in one and another mode, so it is the same power. It can again be considered according to *that to which it is;* and so it signifies the mode of the nature's existing in the person in comparison to another, which is the principle or that which is originated. And so, since the modes are diverse, the properties *to be able to generate* and *to be able to be generated* are said to be diverse and are distinguished according to personal acts; but in the first mode, [they are] not.

#### Doubt VII.

Likewise it is asked concerning this, that he says that *the Son has the power by which he can be the Son or by which he can be begotten.* For this seems doubtful or false, because to be begotten is wholly from to beget, and to beget is from the power of the Father: therefore so is to be begotten.

**I respond:** Just as the power of begetting in the Father signifies nothing other than the nature in the person as apt of itself to produce another, so the power of begetting in the Son signifies nothing other than the nature in the person as apt to be produced from another; for as it belongs to the hypostasis of the Father to generate, so it belongs to the hypostasis of the Son to be generated. Nor does what is objected to the contrary hold. For everything that the Son has, whether essential or personal, he has from the Father. Therefore, although the very being-begotten is from the power of the Father, it is nevertheless not excluded that the passive power of begetting is in the Son. But that power is not the principle of generation, but the suitability or hypostasis with its property to be generated. Hence what is called *the ability to be begotten*, the power can be understood *originally*, and so it is in the Father alone; or *formally*, and thus is posited to be in the Son; but in no other way.

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