Dist. 8, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/8/q/bon-sent-I-d8-p1-a1-q2
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### Question II. *Whether the divine being is so true that it cannot be thought not to be.*

Secondly it is asked whether this property belongs to God in the highest degree, that is, whether the divine being is so true that it cannot be thought not to be.

1. And that it is so, seems [proved] through Anselm, who says that God, according to the common conception of the mind, is that than which nothing greater can be thought; but that which cannot be thought not to be is greater than that which can; therefore, since nothing greater than God can be thought, the divine being is such that it cannot be thought not to be.

2. Likewise, Damascene says that the knowledge of God's existing is naturally impressed upon us; but natural impressions do not desert us nor grow accustomed to the contrary: therefore the truth of God impressed upon the human mind is inseparable from it: therefore it cannot be thought not to be.

3. Likewise, there is greater truth in the divine being than in any axiom; but some axiom is so true that one cannot contradict it in the heart, as, every whole is greater than its part, and the like; whence it cannot be thought not to be: therefore much more strongly will this be true to say of the first truth.

4. Likewise, our intellect understands nothing except through the first light and truth; therefore every action of the intellect, which consists in thinking something not to be, is through the first light; but through the first light it does not happen [one] to think the first light or truth not to be: therefore in no way does it happen [one] to think the first truth not to be.

5. Likewise, what it happens [one] to think, it happens [one] to enunciate; but it does not happen [one] to enunciate the first truth not to be: therefore neither to think it. Proof: every enunciative speech asserts itself to be true; whence it follows: if man is an ass, that man is an ass is true; but everything which posits truth posits the first truth, because every truth implies it: therefore every speech asserts that the first truth is: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, every enunciative speech is either affirmative or negative; but the affirmative affirms *this* of *this*; but it follows: if there is a being which is this, there is a being which is not this, because when I say "this being," I say a being limited, finite, and constricted; and with such posited, the highest being is posited: therefore every affirmative speech concerning the creature implies God.

7. Likewise, the negative similarly, because no speech is more negative than this: there is no truth. But Augustine in the *Soliloquies* proves that this speech posits some truth to be; because if there is no truth, it is true that there is no truth; and if this is true, something is true; and if something is true, some truth is: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. Damascene: «So far has the pernicious malice of men prevailed, that he says God is not, according to that of the Psalm: *The fool hath said* etc.»

2. Likewise, the idolater says that there is no other God except the idol, and this he believes and thinks; but it is established that the idol is not God: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, every such thing, with which understood not to be, something can be understood, can be thought not to be. But Boethius in the book *de Hebdomadibus* says that with [it] understood to be impossible that the highest good is not, something round and white can still be understood: therefore similarly in the highest true, and thus it will be able to be thought not to be.

4. Likewise, that which is most hidden from us can easily be thought not to be: but the truth of the divine being is of this sort, because *God dwells in inaccessible light*: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, I ask, what is it to say that God cannot be thought not to be? If because he cannot in any way be thought either *truly* or *falsely*, that is manifestly false; if because he cannot *truly*, similarly neither the soul nor the heaven and the like [can be thought not to be].

6. Likewise, what it happens [one] to express, it happens [one] also to think; but it happens [one] to express the divine being not to be: therefore also to think it. That it does so happen is clear, when it is said in particular: God is not, and in general: nothing is; and that neither of these implies God to be is clear, because the opposite does not imply the opposite, and what posits nothing implies nothing; but each of these posits nothing.

### Conclusion.

> So great is the truth of the divine being, that it cannot be thought not to be with assent except on account of a defect on the part of the one understanding, who is ignorant of what God is; but on the part of the intelligible there can be no defect either of presence or of evidence, whether in itself or in proving.

**I respond:** It must be said that to think something not to be is twofold. Either in the manner of the false, as I think concerning this: man is an ass; and this thinking is nothing other than to understand what is said. In this way the truth of the divine being can be thought not to be.

In another way it is to think with assent, as I think something not to be, and I believe it not to be: and in this way to think something not to be which is, can come either from a defect of the one understanding, or from a defect of the intelligible.

Now the defect of the *one understanding* is blindness or ignorance, on account of which, because he is ignorant of the thing, he thinks it not to be. But it happens that the thinking concerning some being is twofold, namely *whether it is* and *what it is*.

Our intellect, however, fails in the thinking of the divine truth as to the cognition of *what it is*, yet does not fail as to the cognition of *whether it is*. Whence Hugh: «God so from the beginning tempered the knowledge of himself in man, that just as never could *what* he is be comprehended, so never could *that* he is be ignored». Since therefore our intellect never fails in the cognition of God, *whether he is*, therefore neither can it be ignorant that he is simply, nor think him not to be.

But because it fails in the cognition of *what he is*, therefore it frequently thinks God to be what he is not, as the idol, or not to be what he is, as a just God. And because he who thinks God not to be what he is, e.g. just, consequently thinks him not to be: therefore by reason of the defect of the intellect God can be thought not to be, or [thought to be] the highest truth [not to be]; not however simply or generally, but as a consequence, as he who denies blessedness to be in God denies him to be.

In this way proceed the reasons proving that some intellect thinks or can think the divine being not to be.

In another way it can be thought that something is not on account of a defect on the part of the intelligible, and a defect of this sort can be twofold: either a defect of presence, or a defect of evidence; a defect of presence, inasmuch as [a thing] is not always, not everywhere, not everywhere wholly. What is not always, sometimes is, sometimes is not: and therefore sometimes truly can be thought not to be. Similarly concerning that which is not everywhere, because by the same reason by which it can be thought not to be here, it can be thought not to be elsewhere. Similarly concerning that which is present in part, is absent in part.

But God is always and everywhere and wholly always and everywhere: therefore he cannot be thought not to be. This reason Anselm assigns in the book against the [insipient]…

Not only on account of a defect of presence can something be thought not to be, but also on account of a defect of evidence, because it is not evident in itself, nor evident in being proved. But the truth of the divine being is evident both in itself and in being proved. In itself, because just as we know principles insofar as [we know] the terms, and because the cause of the predicate is enclosed in the subject, therefore they are evident through themselves; so also in the matter at hand. For God or the highest truth is being itself, than which nothing better can be thought: therefore it cannot not be, nor be thought not to be. For the predicate is enclosed in the subject. Nor does it have evidence only from itself, but also from proof, since every truth and created nature proves and concludes the divine truth to be, because if there is a being by participation and from another, there is a being by essence and not from another. Every right understanding also proves and concludes the same, because the cognition of him is impressed upon every soul, and every cognition is through him. Again, every affirmative proposition proves and concludes the same; for every such posits something; and with something posited, the true is posited; and with the true posited, truth is posited, which is the cause of every true. The negative proposition, however, does not prove it except sophistically, as they say. Whence from this — that nothing is, or that no truth is — it does not happen to conclude or to infer that truth is. For this proposition: nothing is, destroys all truth. And therefore no affirmation follows upon it, and this is false: if nothing is, "nothing is" is true. And if it be said that every proposition implies a *dictum*, this is true, but if nothing is, no proposition is, nor anything. Augustine, however, makes such an argument not by approving, but by inquiring.

It must therefore be granted, that so great is the truth of the divine being, that with assent it cannot be thought not to be except on account of the ignorance of the one thinking, who is ignorant of what that is which is said by the name of God. And the reasons to this effect must be granted, even though some are sophistical.

**To the arguments to the contrary:**

1. To that therefore which is objected to the contrary: *So far has* etc.; it must be said that Damascene speaks of the thinking which comes from being blinded; which is clear from his own word, when he says *malice*.

2. Similarly to that about the idol, it must be said that [the idolater] errs, because he is ignorant of what [God] is; whence he does not think God not to be universally.

3. To that which is objected, that with God understood not to be, other things can be understood; it must be said that Boethius speaks of the understanding by which we think something through the impossible, but do not assent.

4. To that which is objected, that [God] is most hidden from us; the response is clear, because *what* he is is most hidden from us, but yet *whether* he is is most manifest.

5. To that which is objected, what is it to say that the divine truth cannot be thought not to be? it must be said that this is to say that no one can believe that God is not, so long as he uses reason. Not so concerning creatures; because although it is certain that one creature is present to one [thing], not however to all, because it is not of such power that it offers itself equally to all, as the first truth does.

6. To that which is objected, that what it happens [one] to express, it happens [one] also to think; it must be said that "to think" can be taken generally for an act of the mind, whether erring or not, whether assenting or not; and then that [statement] is true; or for thinking with assent; and thus it is false, because to axioms it happens [one] to contradict as to the outer reasoning, not however as to the inner, as the Philosopher says in the book of the *Posteriora*.