Dist. 8, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/8/q/bon-sent-I-d8-p2-a1-q1
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### Question I. *Whether God is supremely simple.*

Concerning the first [question] — that there is supreme simplicity in God — it is proved thus.

1. Every *first* [thing] is most simple, since *"the more prior something is, the more simple it is"*; but God is *first* in the genus of beings, since nothing prior to Him is, nor can be, nor can be thought: therefore He is so simple that nothing simpler than He can be or be thought: therefore He is most simple.

2. Likewise, everything that *is* whatever it *has*, is most simple; but God is whatever He has: therefore etc. The major is clear in itself. The minor is proved thus: God has power, wisdom, and so on; either, therefore, He is His power, or He is not. If He is, I have what was to be proved. If He is not His power, then since He is powerful by a power, He has *to-be-able* from another — therefore God is from another; but if this is false, then false also is that from which it follows.

3. Likewise, in the noblest being every condition of nobility ought to be placed in the highest degree; but God is the noblest being, and simplicity is a condition of nobility: therefore it ought to be placed in God in the highest degree: therefore God is supremely simple.

4. Likewise, the simpler a thing is, the more powerful it is in strength, and conversely — since *"a united power can do more than one multiplied"*; but God is infinite and immense in strength: therefore He is infinite in simplicity: therefore in God is supreme simplicity.

**On the contrary:**

1. Something is thought as simpler when it is thought as *abstracted from many*, than when it is thought as *contained in many*: therefore since our faith thinks God as *in many*, it does not think Him as most simple: therefore, if faith truly thinks, God is not most simple.

2. Likewise, greater is the simplicity where there is *identity without diversity*, than with diversity; but in God there is *identity with diversity of supposits*: therefore in God there is not supreme simplicity.

3. Likewise, greater is the simplicity where there is *unity without plurality* — because number signifies in some way composition, with respect to which unity is simple: therefore since in God there is unity with plurality of persons, the conclusion is plain etc.

4. Likewise, greater is the simplicity where not only the subject, but also the property itself is the same as another property — because when property differs from property in one [subject], there are several things differing, therefore it is not simple. But in the divine persons, in the same person

property differs from property — hence *innascibility* differs from *paternity*: therefore etc.

> **Conclusion.** Supreme simplicity is in God.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as the first reasons prove, supreme simplicity is to be placed in God.

**To the arguments for the contrary:**

*To 1.* As for the objection that faith does not understand Him as most simple, it must be said that faith does understand Him as most simple, and whoever understands Him otherwise does not understand Him as supremely simple.

*Threefold mode of simplicity.* This is plain thus: for there is the understanding of *one in one*, of *one in many multiplied*, and of *one in many not multiplied*. Now *one in many multiplied* is understood as simpler than *one in one* — which is plain, since the universal is simpler than the singular; and still simpler is that which is *one in many, not multiplied*. It is in this way that our faith understands God. And therefore God is simpler because He is *not-multiplied* in all, than if He were in one alone, or in many multiplied. Hence God is most simple, and our faith understands Him as most simple.

And whoever understands God *multiplied* in essence, or as *one in a supposit*, detracts from His supreme simplicity, and also from the nobility of His simplicity. For where supreme simplicity is understood, *supreme actuality* must also be understood, if He is supremely noble. And where there is supreme actuality, *supreme diffusion and communication* must be placed; and this cannot be except in the *eternal production of a thing altogether infinite and equal in strength*; and this cannot be in *otherness* *of essence*: therefore the divine essence cannot be understood as most simple unless it is understood to be wholly in three persons, of whom one is from another.

When, therefore, it is objected that *abstracted from many* is simpler than *in many*: that is true, if it is multiplied in those many. But if it is not multiplied, it is not true.

*To 2.* As for the objection that greater is simplicity where no diversity is; it must be said that diversity can come in two ways: either *from addition*, or *from origin*.

*From addition* — when there is diversity in absolute properties, which are diverse in diverse things, as *whiteness* in Peter and *blackness* in Paul; and this [diversity] takes away simplicity, since it posits composition.

There is another diversity coming *from origin alone* — as, for example, because one person *emanates* from another, it differs from it; and this does not conflict with simplicity, since it posits no composition, but only order and relation to another; and this is not properly called *diversity*, but *distinction and discretion*. And this is manifest if we understand the Father generating the Son *by Himself*, and we understand Him generating and also not generating — there is here no composition, because no addition.

*To 3.* As for the objection that greater is simplicity where no plurality is; it must be said that *plurality is twofold*.

One kind, in which there is *more in two than in one* — as in two men there is more goodness than in one; and this plurality conflicts with simplicity, since unity adds upon unity.

But there is another plurality, in which there is *as much in many as in one*; and this is in the divine [persons], since there is as much being and goodness and power in one person as in many; and this plurality adds nothing to unity: and therefore it posits no composition at all, nor takes away simplicity.

*To 4.* As for the objection that in the Father property differs from property, it must be said that property differs from property in three ways: with respect to *subject*, with respect to *itself*, or with respect to *object*.

*If with respect to subject* — because [the properties] are caused from diverse natures found in it — thus it posits composition, since it posits the subject to be *from* *many*.

*If with respect to itself* — as *music* and *grammar* differ in Peter; and thus it likewise posits composition, since it posits the subject to underlie *many*.

*If with respect to object* — thus it posits the subject as compared to many; and from this no composition is posited, but *distinction*. The example is in a *point*, which is principle and end with respect to diverse lines. In this way is the difference of properties in God.