Dist. 8, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/8/q/bon-sent-I-d8-p2-a1-q3
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### Question III. *Whether the rational soul is whole in the whole body, and whole in every part of it.*

Thirdly it is asked whether the rational soul is in the whole body in such a way that it is in every part. And that it is so, seems to be the case.

1. Augustine says that as God is in the greater world, so the soul is in the lesser: but God is in the greater world in such a way that he is whole in every part: therefore the soul is so in the lesser, namely in the body.

2. Likewise, that which gives being to the whole and to the parts is united to the whole and to the parts according to essence, because a form by its essence gives being, and this only to that to which it is essentially united; but the soul gives being to the whole body and to all its parts: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, in the eye there is seeing, there is sensing, there is living. I ask therefore whether these are one act or different acts. Not one; this is clear, because, when sight is removed, it still senses by touch; when sense is removed, it still lives, as in a paralytic; since therefore living is from the substance, seeing from a power, in the eye the soul is according to substance; by the same reasoning it can be proved to be also in all the parts.

4. Likewise, the soul operates in the whole body; therefore in the whole body it is through power; but the power of the soul is simple: therefore if one power is in the hand and the foot, the same [power] is in diverse parts; but a power is not simpler than a substance: therefore, etc.

5. Likewise, the soul is in the body: therefore either it is in every part, or it is determinately in one, or it is in a point. If in every part, I have the proposition. If in one, since that has several parts, and the soul is simple, it will be in several parts: therefore it is not unfitting that the soul be in several parts. But for whatever reason it is in the parts of a part, by the same reason it is in the parts of the whole. If it is in a point of the body, then since a point has no proportion to the whole body, the soul is unproportionable to the whole body: therefore it cannot be the perfection [of the body], since proportion belongs to a perfection with respect to the perfectible. Likewise, « a point is a substance having position », or having a position, therefore the soul has a place in the body; but no situated form is a sufficient mover: therefore, etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. A form which is one in the whole and in the parts denominates the parts and the whole by a like account. Whence every part of fire is fire: therefore if the soul is in every part, then every part of an animal is an animal as the whole is, since every part is an ensouled sensible substance.

2. Likewise, the existence of the rational soul does not depend on any part of the body, since it is fixed in itself: therefore it is not in every [part].

3. Likewise, its operation does not depend on any part of the body, nor is it communicated to any: therefore it is in no part of the body, neither as perfection, nor as mover. Whence the Philosopher says that « the soul is the act of no body », that is, of no part of the body, but it is in that in which it is, as an act.

4. Likewise, the organic body is of diverse accounts in its parts and in the whole; therefore it has diverse perfection: therefore since the soul perfects the whole as to essence, it perfects the parts as to power: therefore the rational soul is not in the parts except only

as to the account of power; and this also the Philosopher says: « As the soul is to the body, so the parts of the soul are to the parts of the body ».

5. Likewise, if the soul is whole in every part of the body, then it is whole in the hand; but when some whole is in something, it is moved when that is moved: therefore when the hand is moved, the soul is moved, and likewise, when the hand is at rest, the soul is at rest: therefore since one hand can be moved, while the other is at rest, one and the same soul numerically is at once at rest and moved according to the same.

6. Likewise, if the soul is whole in many parts, by whatever reason in three, by the same reason in more, and thus in infinite, and however much the body is extended: therefore the soul is by nature to be everywhere, and so it seems that the soul is not a limited substance, but infinite.

7. Likewise, if the whole soul is in the hand as in the other parts: then since life is from the soul, the hand does not receive motion and sense from the heart more than conversely. But this is against all philosophers; and there follows from this such an inconvenience, that, as when the heart is injured life perishes, so [it should perish] when the hand is injured.

> **Conclusion.** The rational soul is whole in the whole body and whole in every part.

**I respond:** It must be said that some say that the soul according to essence is determinately in some part [of the body], but according to power it is and influences in the whole body, as a spider is in its web. Whence they said that it is in the heart, because the heart is the dwelling-place of life, and its inhabitant is the soul. And experience together with a defect of reason moved them to posit this. Experience, because it visibly appears that, when the heart is injured, the soul is separated, and from it flows sense and motion, and it is the noble member existing in the middle, as the center of the body. Defect of reason, because they could not understand how something limited could be one and the same whole in many; and because faith does not compel us to believe it, and reason does not understand it, therefore they say it must not be posited that it is in the whole by reason of every part.

But the opinion of others is, as of Augustine's, that the soul is whole in every part of the body; and to posit this, experience, an example, and a reasonable argument move [them]. Experience, because the soul senses as quickly in parts distant from the heart as in parts near; likewise it senses, at once as it were in the twinkling of an eye, an injury in distant parts, and when the soul is separated, there is pain in each part and dissolution. Example likewise moves, as Augustine says: « For we see that in one perfectly healthy animal there is one health in each of the parts, neither greater in the greater nor lesser in the lesser ». If therefore this is so in a corporeal form, how much more in a spiritual one? The argument from reason moves, because the soul is a simple form and a sufficient mover. Because it is the total form of the body, it is in the whole; because it is simple, it is not according to part and part of itself; because a sufficient mover, therefore it has no place, and therefore it is neither in a point nor in a determinate part. And because the more rational opinion is that which is founded upon reason, than that which is founded upon defects of reason, and because Augustine says this, I approve this one as the better.

**To the arguments to the contrary:**

*To 1, 2.* To that therefore which is objected to the contrary: *the form which is in the whole* etc.; it must be said that there are three kinds of form. For there is a certain one which perfects and is extended and depends. And this, because it perfects the whole, is in the whole; because it is extended, communicates the perfection of the whole to the parts; because it depends and does not act per se, communicates the operation of the whole to the parts, as is evident in the form of fire, because every part of fire is fire and every [part] heats. There is another form, which perfects and depends, but is not extended; and such a

form, because it perfects the whole, is in the whole and in every part: but because it is not extended, therefore it does not attribute the act of the whole to the parts: but because it depends, it communicates the operation of the whole to the parts; and such is the vegetable and sensible soul, because no part of an animal is an animal, yet every part of an animal lives and senses. There is again a form which perfects the whole, yet is neither extended nor depends as to operation; and such [a form], because it is a perfection, is in the whole and in the parts; because it is not extended, does not communicate the perfection of the whole to the parts: because it does not depend, therefore it does not communicate operation either: and such is the rational soul, because no part of a man is a man, and no part of a man understands. Yet even if it does not communicate the act of the whole to the whole [as such], it does communicate [it] to the parts; because every part is a part of a man and is vivified by the perfection of a man; and therefore the perfection of a man is in every part.

*To 3.* And thus the answer is evident to that [objection], that *it is the act of no body*; because to no part of the body does it communicate its proper operation nor the perfection of the whole, yet it perfects all the parts in the whole. Similarly to the other [objection] concerning form: because a form which is in the parts does not denominate the whole and the parts in like manner, unless it be a dependent and extended form; and I speak here only of substantial form, not of accidental.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that the whole and the parts are not of the same account; it must be said that in the parts there is to be considered organization and complexion. By reason of complexion they are uniform with the whole and are disposed to the same kind of life and are perfected by one [thing]; by reason of organization they are diverse and are perfected by powers.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that *it is moved, when the hand is moved* etc.; it must be said that a perfection has power over the whole perfectible both as to substance and as to power; and since the soul is the perfection of the whole body, it has power over the whole, and therefore its substance and power are bounded by nothing less than the whole body; it is bounded, however, by its own body, which it perfects, and therefore when the body is moved, it is moved consequently; but by the parts it is not bounded, because they are less than the whole, and so it is in one [part] in such a way that it is outside it. And therefore, because it is in no part definitively, it is not moved by the motion of any part, just as God is not moved by the motion of any creature.

*To 6.* And by this is evident what follows, because the whole body is compared to the soul itself as one place; and therefore it is not in many parts except inasmuch as in one place; whence if they are separated, it will not be in them. Nor does it follow from this that it is infinite, because « of all things constituted by nature there is a limit and account of magnitude and of growth », and so [also] of the human body. Whence so great a body can be conceived that it could not be vivified by the soul.

*To 7.* To that which is objected last, that then one part does not receive from another; it must be said that, just as God in the greater world is immediately in every creature containing it, yet through the order of the universe one creature influences another with something; so it is to be understood that the soul, by its presence, is immediately in every part, which it contains and preserves, yet not entirely, but it influences all the parts through one: and therefore when that part and its influence cease, the essential order of the body perishes, and so the soul is separated.