Dist. 8, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 4
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/8/q/bon-sent-I-d8-p2-a1-q4
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### Question IV. *Whether God is in any determinate genus or predicament.*

Fourthly and lastly it is asked whether God is in any determinate genus. And that he is, is shown thus.

1. That which is distinguished from other beings is some determinate nature; but God is of this sort, since he is distinguished from all creatures, because no creature is God: therefore he is a determinate nature; but what is a determinate nature is in a determinate genus: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, that which has something univocal and essential above itself has its being in a determinate genus; but God has above himself substance, which is said of God and of creatures both essentially and univocally, since according to that account it is a thing existing through itself: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, that he is in every genus appears thus. Because everything that belongs to completion in a creature is to be attributed to God; but every predicament has something of completion: therefore the realities of all the predicaments are in God; but whatever is in God is God, and conversely: therefore God is essentially subject to the reality of every predicament: therefore he is in every one.

4. Likewise, to the highest good nothing of goodness is lacking: therefore to the highest being nothing of entity is lacking: therefore in God is every entity and every difference of entity: therefore, since the differences of beings are the ten predicaments, all are in God.

**On the contrary:**

1. Augustine in the fifth book *On the Trinity*: «God is good without quality, great without quantity»: therefore the greatness of God is not in the genus of quantity, nor his goodness in the genus of quality: therefore neither his substance in the genus of substance: therefore he is in none.

2. Likewise, it appears that he is not in a determinate genus; because everything that is in a determinate genus has being that is finite and limited; but God is infinite: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, that he is not in every genus appears, because that which has in itself the realities of several genera is composite; but God is most simple: therefore etc.

> **Conclusion.** God is neither in any determinate genus, nor in several.

**I respond:** It must be said that it is not fitting for God to be in one determinate genus, because every such thing has being that is limited and contracted and composite. In several genera he cannot be. For either something is in several on account of the diversity of natures and properties — as *white*, insofar as it signifies some subject or white thing, is in the genus of substance, but insofar as it signifies the form, which is whiteness, is in the predicament of quality — or on account of generality, as *one* and *being*.

On account of the multiformity of natures God cannot be in several, because everything such is composite and multiform, whereas God is simple. Nor on account of generality, because such a being is nothing having anything distinct from created things. But God is one having in himself a being distinct from things, and having simple and infinite being; and therefore he can be neither in one genus nor in several.

**To the arguments:**

*To 1.* To that which is objected, that what is distinguished from others is a distinct nature, etc.; it must be said that this is true, if it be distinguished by something which contracts and constricts it, as by a difference falling within a genus; but God is not so distinguished, but by himself.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that God has something univocal above himself; it must be said that nothing is above God, because nothing is simpler; nor univocal,

because that account does not apply uniformly to creature and Creator. For God is a being through himself, because needing nothing; a creature is a being through itself, because it is not in another as in a subject, yet it needs another for its conservation.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that everything that belongs to perfection and goodness is to be placed in God; it must be said that this can be in two ways: either by *diversity*, and this causes it to be in diverse genera; or according to entire *unity*, and this causes it to be outside every genus.

*To 4.* To that which is objected last, that to God nothing of goodness is lacking; it must be said that God is not called non-deficient in goodness on the ground that every difference of particular good is in God by way of difference, but because it is in him by equivalence. For since he is the highest good, he encompasses in himself every good; the same is to be understood of entity; and so that point is plain.