Dist. 8, Part 2, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/8/q/bon-sent-I-d8-p2-dubia
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### Doubts concerning the Master's text

### Doubt I

In this part, concerning the Master's text, a question arises here *about order*. Since composition in a creature is the ground and cause of change, *simplicity* is the cause of *unchangeableness*; for *"if affirmation is the cause of affirmation, negation is the cause of negation"*: therefore since the cause is before the effect, the Master ought first to have placed the property of *simplicity*.

**I respond:** *First solution.* It must be said that indeed composition, according to the order of understanding, is prior to change; but since negations are contrary to affirmations, hence it is that unchangeableness is prior — so some would have it.

*Another solution.* It can, however, be said otherwise and better: that there is the *prior and more known to us*, and the *prior simpliciter*. And since *simplicity* is especially hidden from us (because of this, that the simple insofar as it is simple has the character of a *principle*, and we come from knowledge of the posterior to knowledge of the prior), therefore he treats unchangeableness before simplicity.

### Doubt II

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says in the text: *"And the same is properly and truly simple, because it has neither composition of parts"* etc. For it seems superfluous to say, since *the simple is that of which there is no part*, just as *the composite is said to have parts*.

**I respond:** It must be said that the Master notes here *the simple as it is proper to God*; and thus it is opposed both to composition and to multiplicity. As to *privation of composition*, he says [God] does not have *multitude of parts*; as to privation of *extraneous multiplicity*, he says not *variety of accidents*; as to privation of *intrinsic multiplicity*, he says not *variety of forms* — such as of *genus, species, and difference*. And in this way the *simple* is simple *truly and properly* — which belongs to God alone.

### Doubt III

Likewise it is asked concerning that reason of Augustine: *"For since to be artistic is one thing, to be dull another"* etc. For he proves the soul to be composite *on account of multitude of properties*. But against this: no substance is composed from properties, neither by itself nor with another: therefore from this it is not proved that the soul is composite.

**I respond:** It must be said that Augustine proves this only *a posteriori*. For the composition of accident to subject and the diversity [of accidents] necessarily presupposes another composition — since, as Boethius says: *"What is pure form cannot be a subject."* Therefore for something to be the subject of many accidents, there must pre-exist in it an *intrinsic composition*; but the soul receives in itself a multitude of accidents: and therefore it is necessarily inferred *a posteriori* that it is composite — though not from accidents.

### Doubt IV

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *"Good without quality, great without quantity"* etc. For he seems to speak wrongly, since *"from that from which the superior is removed, the inferior is also"*: therefore if [God] does not have quality, neither does He have goodness. If you say that that goodness is not a species of quality, it is asked: why is *"divine quality"* not said in God just as *"divine goodness"*?

**I respond:** *A solution of some.* Some wish to say that *the name of the genus* is not transferred to divine things — both because it does not signify the thing's completion, as the *species* does; and because it signifies *in concretion to a subject and in dependence*. But special names connote an effect in the creature; and so God is called *good without quality*.

*Not proven.* But if one wishes to look, one finds this not to hold. If then it be asked: *how do magnitude and goodness differ in God?* — it must be said that magnitude signifies the divine essence *in the mode of quantity*, goodness *in the mode of quality*: therefore these modes do fall in God. And again, if it be asked *"what sort of being is God?"*, the answer is: *good and great*.

*The author's solution.* And therefore it must be said that the names of the genera are found in God, but not as they have the *character of genus* — since God is in no genus. And to signify this, Augustine removes the names of the *nine genera* insofar as they are genera.

### Doubt V

Likewise it is asked concerning what is said: *"If it is worthy that God be said to subsist"*. For it seems sufficiently worthy, since *"the highest nobility is to subsist per se."*

**I respond:** It must be said that the property of *substance* is twofold — namely, *to stand per se* and *to underlie another*. The first is of perfection, the second of imperfection; and therefore by reason of the first it is said [of God] *worthily*, not by reason of the second.

### Doubt VI

Likewise it is asked concerning what Hilary says: *"Not from composite things does God, who is life, subsist"* etc. What is the difference among those differences [i.e., *composite / weak / obscure / disparate*]? If there is none, he seems to make a *heaping-up of words*.

**I respond:** *Solution 1.* It must be said that some hold that by those four [terms] *four kinds of composition* are excluded.

(a) The *first* is that of *essence from essential principles*, by reason of which it is said that God is *not from composite things* — that is, *things placed together*.

(b) The *second* is that of *substance from natural principles*, which are *matter and form*; by reason of this he says *neither from weak things* — since matter is subject to privation, which makes both form unstable and weak, and similarly matter; for *the weak* means *the unstable*.

(c) The *third* is the *composition of a mixture from mixables*, by reason of which he says *neither from obscure things* — since where there is mixture, there is some confusion of forms, and so obscuring.

(d) The *fourth* is the *composition of a living thing from disparate parts* — namely from soul and body; by reason of this he says *neither from disparate parts* — because He is *spirit*.

*Another solution.* It can, however, be said otherwise: that he excludes the same composition by reason of diverse conditions. For for some principles to constitute something, the principles must be *different*, must be *dependent*, must be *imperfect*, and must also be *dissimilar*. For if they were altogether conformed and perfect, they could not constitute anything — since *"from two beings in act nothing comes to be"*.

Because, therefore, *different*, they are therefore *composite*, as if *placed with others*; because *dependent*, therefore *weak*; because *imperfect*, therefore *obscure*; because *dissimilar*, therefore *disparate*.

But God cannot be *from different* *and diverse*, since He is *life by essence*; cannot be *from dependent and weak*, since He is *power by essence*; cannot be *from imperfect and obscure*, since He is *light*; nor can He be *from disparate and dissimilar*, since He is *spirit by essence*.

*Supreme actuality, supreme power, supreme clarity, supreme spirituality* — these do not permit any composition to be in God. Hence from these four conditions four reasons are drawn which prove God to be most simple.

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