Dist. 9, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/9/q/bon-sent-I-d9-a1-q2
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### Question II. *Whether generation in God distinguishes between the one begetting and the one begotten.*

Secondly it is asked, whether generation in God is distinctive of the persons. And that it is so, is shown in this way.

1. Augustine, near the beginning of *On the Trinity*: «There is no thing which begets itself, that it may exist»: if therefore it begets, it begets another; but between one and another there is distinction: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, generation is an emanation; but where there is emanation, there is multiplication or plurification; and where multiplication, there distinction: therefore where generation, there necessarily is distinction.

3. Likewise, generation in God is a relation; but relation imports respect and order; but where respect and order, there is distinction of the supposits and of the things related or ordered: and so etc.

4. Likewise, greater diversity is sustained by a supposit, or in a composite and manifold supposit, than in a simple and uniform subject; but relatively opposed things do not stand together in the same created individual: therefore neither in a simple hypostasis. Proof of the middle [premise]. It well follows: Socrates is the father of Plato: therefore he is not his son, or he is distinct from him: therefore much more strongly in God.

**On the contrary:**

1. The Father, in begetting the Son, gives him everything that he has; but he has the essence and the person: therefore he gives him the essence and the person: therefore just as the Son is not distinguished from the Father essentially, so neither personally, as it seems.

2. Likewise, the Father communicates his essence to the Son on account of [his] supreme simplicity; but the person is just as simple as the essence: therefore by the same reason by which he communicates the essence, he also communicates the person.

3. Likewise, in the Father the nature and the person are the same: therefore it is impossible that he should communicate the one and not communicate the other; therefore if he gives the nature, [he gives] also the person.

4. Likewise, it seems that relation does not distinguish by any account, because one and the same point is the beginning and the end with respect to diverse lines: therefore if these relations are not distinctive, it seems likewise that neither are paternity and filiation. If you say that not all relations distinguish, but only mutual ones, as principle and that which is from a principle, end and that which is ended; on the contrary: the Father and the Son are related as the one understanding and the thing understood, as Anselm says; but the same can be understanding and understood: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, there is greater repugnance in contraries than in relatives; but whiteness and blackness, which are contraries, do not make a distinction in Peter, because the same [subject] can now be white, now black: therefore much more strongly will one in God be now Father, now Son.

6. Likewise, it is asked, why rather do the relations make the distinction of the person than of the essence, since equally well there could be several essences or natures in one person, as conversely.

> **Conclusion.** Against Sabellius it is proved, that generation in God makes a real distinction between the one generating and the one generated; against Arius, however, [it is proved] that this distinction is with regard to the person, not with regard to the essence.

**I respond:** It must be said that generation in God, as has been shown, makes a real distinction between the one generating and the one generated, not a rational or intellectual one only, as Sabellius said; and [makes] a real [distinction] with regard to the person, not with regard to the essence, as Arius said.

That it is so appears thus. Generation in creatures bespeaks an emanation by way of action or change; in God, an emanation by way of relation.

Insofar as [it is] emanation, it bespeaks some distinction; insofar as [it is] such an emanation, it bespeaks distinction in the person. By reason of emanation there is distinction; because, as Anselm says, «neither does the intellect grasp, nor does nature permit, that he who is from another should be the one from whom he is», according as one is said positively to be from another — for the Father is said privatively to be from himself, that is, not from another. Insofar as [it is] such an emanation, it places distinction in the person. For generation is the production of one agreeing in nature; by reason of nature there cannot be distinction: therefore either it will be by reason of the supposit, or of a property. If of a property, either absolutely or relatively; not absolutely, because then there would be distinction in nature; nor relatively, as for example of a relation, because in a relation taken in itself there is no motion in creatures nor origin in God; whence filiation is not generated except in another. Therefore it is necessary that there be distinction in the supposit.

Likewise by reason of the relation there is distinction, because nothing is referred to itself nor ordered [to itself]. But by reason of such a relation there is personal distinction; because to generate and to be generated, since they bespeak a relation by way of action and passion, bespeak it in a supposit and with respect to a supposit. And therefore, since the relation between the extremes notes a distinction, it is clear that the distinction is there a distinction of supposits. These things being seen, it is easy to answer the objections.

**To the arguments:**

1. To what is therefore objected: the Father communicates to the Son everything that he has; it is true, except for the generation and the distinction of generation; for the very account of communicating gives [us] to understand a distinction, because no one communicates to himself, but to another: and therefore that in which he distinguishes [himself], he does not communicate.

2. To that which is objected, that the person is just as simple as the essence; it must be said that the simplicity of the essence is that it be in many; but the simplicity of the supposit is that it not be in many. For a supposit or individual, insofar as it is in itself, is said [to be] that which is in one alone; therefore it is not the same.

3. To that which is objected, that the essence and the person are the same; it must be said that, although they are the same, yet they are not toward the same: because the person is toward another, therefore it is generated and is referred; but the essence is not, therefore the essence is communicated and the person is distinguished. As therefore, although in the Father the essence and the person are the same, yet the person generates, the essence does not; so conversely the essence is communicated, the person is not.

4. To that which is objected concerning beginning and end in a point, the answer is clear, because those are not mutual relations, which is properly required for distinction; whence it does not hold. As to what is objected concerning the one understanding and the thing understood, I say that there is not there a relation according to being, but according to predication. For the relation to distinguish, it is required that the relations be mutual, because otherwise they do not distinguish; it is required also that they bespeak a relation according to being.

5. To that which is objected concerning whiteness and blackness, it must be said that there is no opposition of forms unless they be considered with respect to the same time; and it is impossible that the same subject at the same time be white and black; but the relations in God are simultaneous.

6. To that which is finally asked, why rather do the relations make the distinction in persons than in essence; the answer is clear from what has already been said. Another reason can also be given, namely that the plurality of natures impedes the simplicity of the person, but not so conversely. Which appears thus: if several natures are in one person, then either through grace or through nature. If we are united through grace, in that case — because the united nature follows the unity of the person — it does not impede; but if naturally, as in Peter, there is a plurality of essences or natures, then — since the understanding of nature precedes the person, and the nature is not from the persons, but the person from the natures — it is necessary that the person be composite; and from this it is that in God there is rather a unity of nature with a plurality of persons than conversely.