Dist. 9, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/9/q/bon-sent-I-d9-dubia
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### Dub. I.

In this part doubts arise concerning the text [of the Master], and first there is a doubt about what is said: *The Father is not other, the Son other, the Holy Spirit other, although personally* etc. For what is said seems false, because it well follows: Peter is a white man (*albus homo*), therefore he is a white animal (*animal album*), since *albus* and *album* signify the same thing: therefore by parity of reasoning, since *alius* and *aliud* signify the same thing, it follows: he is another (*alius*), therefore he is another being (*aliud ens*). If you say that the case of the noun *alius* and the noun *aliud* is not similar; on the contrary: it well follows: he is another man, therefore he is another animal: therefore by similar reasoning that follows.

**I respond:** It must be said that, because in God there is a singular otherness, since the otherness is of supposit with complete unity of nature: therefore it must be expressed in a singular manner. And since the masculine gender imports a certain distinction or discreteness, therefore it regards the person; but the neuter, on account of indistinction, regards the nature: and therefore *alius* imports otherness in person, *aliud* in nature, and so in the divine [persons] they do not signify the same.

It could also be said that in creatures *aliud* signifies, when I say: *this one is other than that one*, and *aliud*, when I say: *it is another thing*; and one follows upon the other. Not so in the divine [persons]; and the case of *white* is not similar, because *album* is imposed from a special form, namely whiteness.

### Dub. II.

Likewise, secondly there is a doubt about what he says: *The three persons are coeternal to one another.* It seems false, because if [they are] coeternal, [they are] also eternal: therefore three eternals, which is against the [Athanasian] Creed, where it is said: «Not three eternals»; and again against reason, because a plural number multiplies the form. Hence it is not truly said: there are three gods.

**I respond:** It must be said that a noun signifying substance in the divine is found according to a threefold mode. For one [kind] signifies substance and after the mode of substance, like a substantive noun, as *God*; and such [a noun] is in no way pluralized nor said in the plural, whether it be substantive or used as a substantive, as this noun *eternal*; thus it is taken in the Creed. Certain [nouns] signify substance after the mode of adjacency, like adjectival nouns retained adjectivally; and such [nouns], because they draw number from substantives, are said in the plural, and verbs and participles are of this kind. Other [nouns] are those which import substance in adjacency, connoting an internal mutual relation, such as *coeternal* (*coaeterni*); and such [nouns] can be said in the plural for a twofold cause, both by reason of consignification or mode of signifying, and by reason of connotation. And so it is plain that there is no contradiction.

As for what is objected, that a plural number pluralizes the form; it must be said that this is not true in adjectives.

### Dub. III.

*He who says this does not understand that to be born* etc.

Here the Master sets down four arguments demonstrating the Son to be coeternal to the Father, and thus that the argument of Arius is not valid: *The Son is born, therefore he is not eternal*.

The *first* is taken from a similitude and is such: a splendor is of the same duration as the fire — or equal — and yet is generated from the fire: therefore much more so, since the Son is the splendor of the Father, although he is generated from him, he will be coeternal to him: therefore the conclusion of the aforesaid argument is false, and that consequence is to be done away with: if he is born, there was [a time] when he was not. But on the contrary: If an emanation proceeding from God is coeternal to him, just as the emanation proceeding from a creature is coaeval to it: therefore since things have gone forth from God, it seems that [they have done so] from eternity.

**I respond:** It must be said that the going-forth of a splendor from a light or fire is a connatural going-forth; and such is the going-forth of the Son from the Father, but not the going-forth of a creature from the Creator — rather, it is voluntary; and the argument is good for the matter at hand.

Likewise, *if the Son of God*, says Augustine, *[is] virtue and wisdom*. This is the second argument of Augustine: The Son of God is virtue and wisdom: therefore if he is not eternal, at some [time] God was without virtue and wisdom; but this is impossible: therefore etc. But against this argument it is objected thus: for if it follows: if the Father does not have begotten wisdom, he is not wise, it seems that he is wise by begotten wisdom, which Augustine expressly denies in the sixth book *On the Trinity*.

**I respond:** Augustine refutes that argument in the sixth book *On the Trinity*, showing that it proceeds from a bad understanding of the word; nevertheless, because the Master adduces it, it can be said that the argument holds, not because the Father is wise by the Son, who is begotten wisdom, but because the same is begotten and unbegotten wisdom; and so, if the one begins, the other [does] also.

*To the same Arian question* [also]. This is the third argument which he adduces, and it is Ambrose's, taken from the authority of Isaiah: *Before me there is no God, and after me there will be none*: therefore neither [is] the Father before the Son, nor the Son after the Father. But on the contrary: In the divine persons there is order; but order is only of prior to posterior: therefore etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as will appear below, there is no order of duration there, by which one is prior to the other, but an order of origin, by which one is from the other.

*For mutually in himself, the Father in the Son, and the Son*

*is known in the Father.* This is the fourth argument and is such: relatives are simultaneous in nature; but Father and Son are relatives: therefore simultaneous; but the Father is eternal: therefore the Son is coeternal. *Proof* that the Father is eternal: because, if he was first God and afterwards Father, he is changed. But against this argument one can argue by parity of reasoning: he was first God and afterwards Lord: therefore he is changed.

**I respond:** Some wish to say that this argument holds, because generation is from the substance of the one generating; and therefore if he begins to generate, the substance is changed. But this does not seem [right], because generation in the divine [persons] does not signify motion. Others say that, because the begotten is consubstantial with the begetter, if the begotten is changed, the begetter is also; but the begotten is changed if he is newly generated: therefore the generator [is changed] consequently. Another way of speaking is, that paternity declares a true relation in the Father, but creation or lordship does not so; and therefore paternity supervening alters, but lordship does not.

But none of the foresaid arguments gives force to this argument against the heretics, because the heretic was saying that the Son was not coeternal, and through this neither consubstantial nor the same in substance. On account of this it should be noted that the foresaid argument is good against the heretic, given his supposition; for the heretic was saying that the Father and the Son were different in substance and nature, as in carnal generation. By parity of reasoning Ambrose says against him: since it is so that that [carnal] father is changed by the access of generation, who generates another in substance; and in the divine [persons] similarly the Father generates another in substance: therefore he is changed by the access of generation, as that one [is].

In whatever way it be said, however, there is no great danger, because not all arguments which are made for [the sake of] truth are necessary.

### Dub. IV.

Likewise there is a question about what he says: *The voice falls silent, not only mine, but also the angels'.* For it seems wrongly said *of the angels*, because there is no voice except of those having organs and respiration; but the angels do not have these. If you say that they have spiritual voices, not uttered aloud, as Damascene says, that *they communicate their intelligences to one another without an uttered voice*; I ask, what is the necessity of a spiritual voice, and what is the mode of speaking, and what is the mode of hearing?

**I respond:** Briefly it must here be said — since this is outside the principal proposition so far as this part is concerned — that there is a necessity of speech; because as to each rational nature there is given a free will, so there is a secret conscience. Hence as no one can turn the will of another to something else, but only induce [it], unless it itself inclines itself, except God alone, in whose hand are the hearts of men: so no one can know the conceptions of another, but only conjecture them, except God, unless the intelligence itself expresses [them]; and that expression is called *speech*. The reason of this is, that God alone forms the mind both as to intellect and as to affection; and the mode of speaking is similar to the mode of learning. For as we learn through sense, in such a way that the species comes through the interior sense to the intellect, so we express; because the word of inner thought is joined to the voice in cogitation, and afterwards to the sensible voice in pronunciation, and from this expression in act comes about. The angel, however, by a single power does what we [do] by many. Hence the angel, as by the application of an innate species to the very knowable thing he knows it, so by ordering the innate species to another knowing angel, he opens his concepts; similarly the other by mutual conversion receives [them]; and so the one speaks, the other hears. It is similar to two mirrors set opposite to each other, if they could voluntarily hide from others and offer [to others] what is reflected in themselves.

### Dub. V.

Likewise there is a question about what he says: *Let us therefore say more truly, ever-born; and his reason is, that he may be designated as the eternal and perfect God.* But against this it is [argued] that among all tenses the present has greater agreement with eternity; because *is* is more truly said of God than *was* and *will be*, as Augustine expounds, as was held in the preceding distinction. And the reason of this is that *present* signifies a being in act, the other tenses [do] not.

**I respond:** It must be said, as was touched on above, that verbs of various tenses said of God do not signify any temporal acts, but import the duration of the divine being without beginning, as the past; without interval, as the present; without term, as the future. And because all these things are equally truly found in God, therefore they are all equally truly said of him.

But nevertheless, because many have erred concerning generation as to its beginning, [but] few or none as to its interval or term: therefore the holy Doctors, in order to stop the mouths of the heretics, expressed it by a verb of the past tense, which always signifies as past, and thus as never having a beginning.

Another reason is, that we understand the divine generation by a certain leading-by-the-hand, through the generation that is about us; and because we see in this generation that the begotten, while he is being generated, is imperfect, lest anyone could believe that the Son of God were always imperfect, therefore they decreed to say *always begotten*.

It must therefore be said that, so far as is on the side of the thing, the one is just as truly and properly said as the other. As for what Gregory says, he says it as to a greater explanation of the faith, lest error find a place; and so the Master expounds it. Therefore it is more fitting to say *always begotten* than *always being begotten*. Nor is the case of the verb *is* and *was* similar; because the verb *is* signifies after the mode of rest, and therefore *to be*, while it is, is perfect; but the verb *to be generated* among these lower things [signifies] after the mode of *becoming*; and because in many cases it is true that something, while it is becoming, does not have perfect being, therefore the case is not similar according to the account of understanding.

### Dub. VI.

Likewise there is a question about what he says: *Today I have begotten thee*, because this can be understood of the day on which he was born of [his] mother; but this seems to be of no avail, because according to this generation he had no father, but only a mother.

**I respond:** It must be said that this word is to be understood causally; for according to the generation from the mother he is said to have begotten, because he caused [him] to be generated. Similar is the exposition upon that text of Matthew 3: *He is able from these stones to raise up sons to Abraham*; the Gloss: «In testimony of this matter God begot a son from Sara, that is, caused [him] to be generated».

### Dub. VII.

Likewise there is a question about what Origen says: *But a splendor is not born once and ceases.* On the contrary: if this similitude is correct, it seems that the Son is not born once: therefore it is asked, why is the generation of the Son rather likened to a splendor than to other things, especially since splendor is not generated from a light except in the presence of an opposing body? And besides, the Son is called *light*; therefore [he is] not the splendor of light.

**I respond:** It must be said that the generation of the Son has in itself perfect *conformity*, *coeternity* and *equality*; and because in a creature we cannot find these together in one, therefore we take from many, and so we liken him to many. As to *conformity* therefore he is similar to the generation of a word, which is an offspring perfectly representing the one from whom it is. As to *coeternity* he is similar to the going-forth of a splendor from a light, in which there is coaeval, on account of the actuality of the light. As to *equality* he is similar to the generation of a living from a living, who generates one altogether equal to himself; and thus in diverse ways he is compared by the Saints. Therefore Origen compares [it] to the going-forth of a splendor, not as to a likeness of iteration, but as to the privation of intermission or interruption.

And note that *splendor*, *ray*, and *light* differ, since all signify an influence from the luminous: because a *ray* signifies emission according to diametrical distance; *light* (*lumen*), according to the circumference, both however into the depth of the transparent; *splendor* signifies the reflection back to a non-transparent, clean, and limited body. But nevertheless here Origen calls the light proceeding from the light a *splendor*.

To that, then, which is objected, that the Son is *light*; it must be said that light has in itself the nature of manifesting; and so it regards cognition and is appropriated to the Son; it has in itself the power of multiplying or generating splendor; and so it is appropriated to the Father.

### Dub. VIII.

Likewise there is a question about what Hilary says, that *with the sacrament of his knowledge he is born from him*. For it seems according to this that the Father generates the Son according to the sacrament of knowledge: therefore knowledge is the ground of generating.

**I respond:** It must be said that Hilary here calls *sacrament* a sacred secret; and he says that the Son is born with the sacrament of knowledge, because the generation of the Son is not only sacred but also secret — not, I say, secret to God, but to us, because we do not comprehend it; but he himself perfectly knows it. Therefore he says *with the sacrament* etc.

### Dub. IX.

Likewise there is a question about what he says: *That which is born living from a living thing has the perfection of birth without newness of nature.* For it seems false, because a child is born from a living father and a living mother, and yet both have, namely, imperfection and newness.

**I respond:** The argument of Hilary, as appears through the following text, is to be understood of the living by essence; for where there is a living [thing] by essence, the living does not come about from a non-living, as it comes about in a living [thing] by participation, where the living is not generated from the living except through the non-living, as is plain, because a man is not generated from a man except by means of seed.

### Dub. X.

Likewise there is a question about what he says: *Nativity is not from derivation but from power.* The contrary seems [to be the case], because according to Dionysius and Anselm the Father stands to the Son and the Holy Spirit as a fount, and they to him as rivers; but a river is from the fount by derivation.

**I respond:** It must be said that nativity which is by derivation is regarded as to some change concerning that which is changed, and so signifies a certain passion, and through this an infirmity; but the living, which is life, is pure act, and thus pure life, in which there is no infirmity but pure actuality; and therefore Hilary wishes to say that the Father, in generating, is wholly life, and what he generates is not through change or transmutation, which is regarded in derivation, but through omnimodal power: therefore the begotten Son is power, born not through change.

### Dub. XI.

Likewise there is a question about what he says: *Where the Father is author, there also is nativity.* It seems he speaks improperly, because authority signifies causality; but this is not received in the divine [persons]: therefore etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that authority signifies a certain principality or authority in a person which has nothing from another, but from itself all [others have]; and that authority in the Father is innascibility; hence it does not signify causality, but the privation of a principle, and through this the highest principality.

### Dub. XII.

Likewise there is a question about what he says: *But that which has been born from eternity, if it has not been born eternal* etc.; and Hilary here implies such an argument: if the Son is not generated or born from eternity, his generation is not eternal; and if this, the Father does not generate from eternity: therefore the Father is not eternal: therefore he who detracts from the eternity of the Son detracts from the eternity of the Father. But this argument does not seem to hold, because similarly I will argue on the part of the Creator and the creature: if the creature is not eternal, God did not create from eternity, and so the Creator is not eternal.

**I respond:** It must be said that the case is not similar, as is plain from the consequence of what Hilary supposes, that to be Father is properly proper to that person: therefore since such [an attribute] always belongs [to him], or otherwise the thing does not have perfect being, it follows of necessity: either the Son is eternal, or the Father from eternity does not have perfect being. But to create, even though it belong to God alone, nevertheless by reason of the connoted has an imperfection joined with it, according to which it is not only impossible, but also not intelligible, that anything be created from eternity.

### Dub. XIII.

Likewise there is a question about what he says: *But to alter himself by being born*; because according to this, since the Son of God existed before and afterwards was born of the Virgin: therefore he would be changed.

**I respond:** It must be said that Hilary himself understands [this] according to the same nature according to which he existed before. For if according to the same nature he existed before and afterwards was born, it is necessary that he be changed according to that nature; but if according to another [nature], the change must come to be in that nature, but not in the person, since that nature does not say something in the person, but rather something with the person. Hence no change comes about in the other nature.

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