Proemium, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/0/q/bon-sent-I-proem-q1
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### QUESTION I.
#### *What is the matter or subject of this book or of theology.*

And that *God* is the subject, it seems.

1. For that is the subject in a science, concerning which and concerning whose properties the whole science is; but this whole book is concerning God and his works, namely creation and restoration: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, it seems that the subject of this book is *things and signs.* For that is the subject in a science according to whose division that science is divided, since «the sciences are cut into things», that is, they are divided according to the division of their subjects; but this is thing and sign, as is manifest: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, it seems that *the credible* is the subject of this book. For that is the subject in a book about which the author's intention and treatment turn; but the credible is of this sort. Hence the Master says in the Prologue that his purpose is «to fortify our faith with the shields of the tower of David», that is, to bring forward reasons for proving the faith — not, I say, *faith-as-habit,* but *the thing believed*: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. The subject in a science ought to embrace everything that is determined in it; but in this book not only is there a determination concerning God, but also concerning creatures: therefore God is not the subject of this whole book generally, but only of the first book.

2. Likewise, the same thing is shown otherwise thus. Although three causes coincide in one, the matter nevertheless does not coincide together with the end; because the matter states something incomplete, whereas the end states the completion of the whole work; but God is the end of this whole work, since he is the end of all theology: therefore he is not the subject or the matter.

3. Likewise, it seems that *things and signs* are not the subject. For every science is concerning things or concerning signs: therefore if things and signs are the subject of this book, this book is general to them all. But if a special science and doctrine is handed on in this book, it is plain that things and signs ought not to be assigned in it as the subject.

4. Likewise, it is agreed that the science of things is one and that of signs another, as is plain; for the science of discourse differs from the natural science: therefore the science handed on in this book either is not of one genus, or is not at once concerning things and concerning signs; but it is of one genus: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, it seems that *the credible* is not the subject, because science and virtue are diverse habits: therefore they have diverse objects; therefore since the credible, insofar as it is such, is the object of a virtue, it will not be the object of a science insofar as it is such: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, just as the consideration of this book turns

about faith, so also about hope and charity: therefore if what is to be hoped for, or what is to be loved, or the lovable, is not the subject of this book, by parity of reasoning neither is the credible the subject in it.

### Conclusion

> *God is the radical subject of theology, Christ is the integral subject, things and signs are the universal subject — or also the credible, insofar as it passes over into the character of the intelligible.*

**I respond:** It must be said that the subject in any science or doctrine can be taken in three ways. In one way that is called the subject in a science to which all things are reduced as to a *radical principle;* in another way, that to which all things are reduced as to an *integral whole;* in a third way, that to which all things are reduced as to a *universal whole.*

An example of this appears manifestly in *grammar.* For the subject in the first way, to which all things are reduced as to an elementary or radical principle, is the letter, which for that reason Priscian calls the *element,* because it is the least thing at which the grammarian's resolution comes to a stand. The subject to which all things are reduced as to an integral whole is congruous and complete speech. But the subject to which all things are reduced as to a universal whole is the lettered, articulate utterance capable of being ordered to signify something either in itself or in another.

In this same way a distinction is to be made in *the quadrivial arts.* For the subject in geometry, to which all things are resolved as to a principle, is the point. The subject to which all things are reduced as to an integral whole is body, which contains in itself every genus of dimension. The subject to which all things are reduced as to a universal whole is continuous, immobile quantity.

In this same way the subject is to be assigned in this book too, according to a threefold difference.

For the subject to which all things are reduced as to a *principle* is *God* himself.

The subject also to which all the things determined in this book are reduced as to an *integral whole* is *Christ,* inasmuch as he comprehends the divine and the human nature, that is, the created and the uncreated, of which the first two books treat; and the head and the members, of which the two following treat. And I take *integral whole* broadly, as embracing many things not only by composition, but by union and by order.

The subject also to which all things are reduced as to a *universal whole* we can name by a circumlocution or under a disjunction; and thus it is thing or sign — and the *sign* is here called a Sacrament. We can also name it by a single word; and thus it is *the credible,* provided, however, that the credible passes over into the character of the *intelligible,* and this by the addition of a rational ground; and in this way, properly speaking, it is the subject in this book.

The reasons proving it are therefore to be granted, namely that *God* is the subject, and *things* and *signs,* and *the credible,* in diverse ways, as has been said.

1. As to what is objected on the contrary, that it is not only concerning God that this book treats; it must be said

that, although it is not concerning God as to his substance only that it treats, it nevertheless treats of God as to his substance, or as to his works; and therefore he is not the subject as a whole, but as a principle.

2. As to what is objected, that the matter does not coincide into one with the end; it must be said that matter is spoken of in three ways: namely the matter *out of which,* the matter *in which,* and the matter *about which;* and this last matter is called an object rather than a matter. When therefore it is said that the matter does not coincide with the end, this is true of the matter *out of which,* which is properly matter, but not of the matter *about which,* which is properly the object; for the same thing can be the object of a habit and its end; and it is in this manner that matter is taken in a science for the object of the knowing power.

3. 4. As to what is objected concerning *things* and *signs,* that they are the subjects of all the sciences; it must be said that thing and sign can be taken *in their generality;* and thus they do not pertain to a special science, nor to a book, nor to one and the same science. They can also be taken according as they put on the character of *the credible,* and thus, just as there is one *virtue* and one habit concerning all credible things, whether they be things or signs — namely faith — so there is one special *science* concerning them all, insofar as they put on this character, whether they be things or signs.

It can also be said otherwise, that there are two ways of speaking of things and signs: either *absolutely,* or in *relation* to fruition, that is, to that which is to be enjoyed. In the first way indeed they belong to the special and diverse sciences; in the second way to one science or doctrine. Hence, just as concerning all beings, insofar as they are reduced to one first being, there is one science and one book, so concerning all things and signs, insofar as they are reduced to one, who is alpha and omega, there is one science.

5. 6. As to what is objected, that *the credible* is the object of a virtue etc.; it must be said that the credible is the object of a virtue in one way, and of a science in another. For the credible, according as it has in itself the character of *the first truth,* to which faith assents for its own sake and above all things, pertains to the habit of faith; according as, over and above the character of truth, it adds the character of *authority,* it pertains to the doctrine of sacred Scripture, of which Augustine says, on Genesis according to the letter, that «its authority is greater than the perspicacity of human wit»; but according as, over and above the character of truth and of authority, it adds the character of *probability,* it pertains to the consideration of the present book, in which are set down the reasons proving our faith. And thus it is plain in what different ways *faith* is concerned with the credible, and *the books* of the canon of sacred Scripture, and *the present writing.* And therefore that objection is of no force, since this book is not for the defence of hope and charity in the way that it is for the defence of faith; and therefore the case is not alike.