Proemium, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/0/q/bon-sent-I-proem-q2
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### QUESTION II.
#### *What is the formal cause, or the manner of proceeding, in these books of the Sentences.*

Secondly it is asked about the *formal* cause, or the manner of acting. And it has been said that it is *searching-out* and inquisitive of things hidden.

**On the contrary:** 1. Isaiah, chapter forty: *God giveth the searchers of secrets as though they were not.*

2. Likewise, Proverbs, chapter twenty-five: *He that is a searcher of majesty shall be overwhelmed by glory.*

3. Likewise, Ecclesiasticus, chapter three: *Seek not the things that are too high for thee, and search not into things above thy strength.* Therefore, if the things which the Master searches out are hidden,

are great, are high and beyond one's strength, the Master proceeds badly.

4. Likewise, it is shown *by reason* thus: the manner of proceeding in a part of a science ought to be uniform with *the manner* of the whole science; but the manner of proceeding in sacred Scripture is typical and by way of narration, not of inquiry: since therefore this book pertains to sacred Scripture, it ought not to proceed by inquiring.

5. Likewise, the manner of acting ought to be suited to *the matter* with which it deals; whence at the beginning of the old *Ethics* it is said: «Discourses are to be inquired into according to the matter»; but the matter of this doctrine is the credible; but the credible is above reason: therefore a manner of proceeding by reasons does not suit this doctrine.

6. Likewise, the manner of acting ought to be suited to *the end* to which the science is ordered; but this science, as the Master says in the text, is ordered to the promotion of faith; but reasons do not promote faith, they empty it out; whence Gregory: «Faith has no merit, where human reason supplies the proof»: therefore such a manner is contrary to the end, therefore it is not suitable. Whence also Ambrose: «Away, he says, with arguments, when the question is of faith. Credence is given to fishermen, not to dialecticians». Vain, therefore, and useless does this manner seem.

**On the contrary:** 1. First of Peter, chapter three: *Ready to render a reason to every one that asketh of the faith and hope which is in you.* Since therefore there are many who assail our faith, they do not merely ask a reason for it; it seems useful and congruous to build it up by reasons and to proceed in an inquisitive manner and by reasoning: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Richard of Saint Victor, in the book *On the Trinity*: «I believe without doubt that, for the explanation of whatever things must necessarily be, there is no lack of arguments not merely probable but even necessary, though it may happen that they escape our industry». Therefore, since our faith believes things that are necessary, and those things have reasons lying hidden, and such things need searching out in order that they may be unravelled, it is plain that the searching-out manner suits this science supremely.

3. Likewise, the truth of our faith is not of worse condition than other truths; but in other truths it stands thus, that every truth which can be assailed by reason can and ought to be defended by reason: therefore by parity of reason the truth of our faith also.

4. Likewise, our faith is not now of worse condition than in the beginning; but in the beginning, when it was assailed by the false miracles of the magicians, it was defended by the true ones of the Saints: therefore, since it is now assailed by the false arguments of heretics, it ought to be defended by the true arguments of the doctors.

### Conclusion

> *The searching-out or ratiocinative manner of proceeding suits this doctrine, since it avails for the confounding of the adversaries of faith, for the fostering of the weak in faith, for the delighting of the perfect.*

**I respond:** It must be said that the searching-out manner suits this doctrine or book. For since the end imposes necessity upon the things that are for the end — because, as the Philosopher says: «The saw is toothed, because it is for cutting» — so this book, because it is for the promotion of faith, has an inquisitive manner. For the ratiocinative or inquisitive manner avails for the promotion of faith, and this in three ways accord-

ing to three kinds of men. For some are *adversaries* of the faith, some are *weak* in faith, and some are *perfect.*

The inquisitive manner avails *first for confounding the adversaries.* Whence Augustine, in the first book *On the Trinity*: Against garrulous reasoners, more puffed up than capacious, one must make use of catholic reasons and congruous likenesses for the defence and assertion of the faith. *Secondly it avails for fostering the weak.* For just as God fosters the charity of the weak by temporal benefits, so He fosters the faith of the weak by probable arguments. For if the weak were to see that reasons for the probability of faith were lacking and abounded on the opposite side, no one would persist. *Thirdly it avails for delighting the perfect.* For in a wondrous manner the soul is delighted in understanding what it believes with a perfect faith. Whence Bernard: «There is nothing we understand more gladly than what we already believe by faith».

1. 2. 3. As to what is therefore objected on the contrary side, it must be said that all those authorities are to be understood of a *curious* searching out, not of a *studious* one. For the Lord Himself said to the Jews, John, chapter five: *Search the scriptures* etc.

4. As to what is objected, that this manner does not befit sacred Scripture; to this it must be said that this book is reduced to sacred Scripture by way of a certain subalternation, not as a principal part; and likewise the books of the doctors, which are for the defence of faith. Which is plain thus: because not every determination that draws a thing into a part makes a subalternation of science, but a determination that in some manner *draws it aside*. For the science of the straight line is not said to be subalternated to geometry, but the science of the visual line, since this determination in some manner draws it to other principles. Since therefore sacred Scripture is of the credible as credible, while this book is of the credible as made intelligible, and this determination *draws aside* — «for what we believe we owe to authority, and what we understand, to reason» — hence it is that, just as there is one manner of certitude in a higher science and another in a lower, so there is one manner of certitude in sacred Scripture and another in this book, and therefore another manner of proceeding. And just as a subalternated science, where it falls short, returns to the certitude of the subalternating science, which is greater; so also, when certitude of reason fails the Master, he has recourse to the certitude of the authority of sacred Scripture, which exceeds every certitude of reason.

5. As to what you object, that it ought to suit *the matter;* it must be said that it does suit it. And as to what is objected, that the credible is above reason; it is true, above reason as regards *acquired science*, but not above reason *elevated by faith* and by the gift of knowledge and of understanding. For faith elevates one to assent; knowledge and understanding elevate one to understand the things that are believed.

6. As to what is objected, that it does not suit *the end,* because it empties out merit; it must be said that, when assent is given to reason for its own sake, then the place of faith is taken away, because in the soul of man the violence of reason holds mastery. But when faith assents not on account of reason, but on account of love for Him to whom it assents, and desires to have reasons; then human reason does not empty out merit, but increases consolation. And it is in the first way that Jerome understands that dialectical arguments are not to be brought in, upon which a man should principally lean, because one must lean upon authority more principally than upon reason.