Prologus, Commentarius
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/0/q/bon-sent-I-prol-comm
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# COMMENTARY ON THE MASTER'S PROLOGUE.

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

To the book as a whole the Master prefixes a prologue, in which he touches upon the causes of the work he has undertaken. Now it is divided into two parts. In the first part he sets down the reasons which moved him to take up the present business or work; in the second, the reasons which ought to move his disciples to hear him kindly, there near the end: *In it [you will find] the examples of our forebears* etc., where he begins to address his hearers.

The *first* part is again divided into two, because a twofold reason can move anyone to the doing of a work, namely *love of the good* and *hatred of evil*. *First*, then, he sets down the reasons taken from the side of the *love of the good*, namely of catholic truth. *Second*, from the side of the *hatred of evil*, namely of heretical depravity, there: *Although we do not doubt* etc. The first part has four particles. In the first he touches the arousing cause; and this is the desire of the reward and the hope of help, under the example of the widow and the parable of the Samaritan. In the second he sets down the withdrawing cause, which is twofold, namely the immensity of the labour and his own infirmity, there: *The truth of him who promises delights us* etc. In the third he sets down the cause driving him forward, and this is the zeal which kindles him, there: *which zeal for the house of God overcomes* etc. In the fourth he sets down the compelling and prevailing cause, there: *Not being able* etc., and this is the petition of studious brethren, whom no one can rightly resist, but to whom in a certain way one must of necessity bow the neck.

### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE FIRST PART OF THE MASTER'S PROLOGUE.

#### Dub. I.

But it is asked concerning this which he says: *We have presumed to undertake the work*; but presumption is a sin: therefore he sinned.

**I respond:** There is a presumption of *confidence* concerning the divine assistance, and a presumption of *pride*, which is concerning one's own native ability. The first is not a sin, but belongs to virtue; the second, however, is a sin; but the Master is speaking of the first.

Or otherwise: There is a presumption according to *the truth*, and there is a presumption according to *one's own estimate*.

The first is reprehensible, because it belongs to pride; the second is praiseworthy, because it belongs to humility, and it is not culpable in anything; for a humble man in all his works reckons himself unworthy and, as it were, presumptuous.

#### Dub. II.

Likewise it is asked concerning this which he says: *Two denarii having been brought out, to him who spends beyond them*; what that spending-beyond is. *If you say* that it is the superaddition of the masters and of the Saints to sacred Scripture — *on the contrary*, Damascene: «Let us venerate the things that have been handed down to us through the Law and the Prophets, seeking nothing beyond these».

Likewise, the last chapter of the Apocalypse: *If anyone shall add to these things, the Lord shall lay upon him the plagues.*

**I respond:** It must be said that there is an addition which *draws away*, and there is an addition which *completes*. He who adds in the first way does not spend beyond, but rather diminishes and subverts; and such are the heretics, to whom the curse is given. He who adds in the second way spends beyond, because, the sense of Scripture being safe, he makes it clear. By the *two denarii*, therefore, I understand the two Testaments; by the *Samaritan*, Christ; by the *half-dead man*, man despoiled of the gratuitous gifts and wounded in his natural ones; by the *spending-beyond* I understand the doctor who expounds.

Or it must be said otherwise, that there is an addition in which what is added is *contrary*, and there is one in which what is added is *diverse*, and there is one in which what is added is *consonant*. The first addition is one of error, the second of presumption; because it is presumption to say in sacred Scripture something altogether diverse from those things which are expressed in it; the third is of faithful instruction, because it makes explicit what was implicit.

#### Dub. III.

Likewise it is asked concerning this which he says: *Which the zeal of the house of God overcomes* — what that zeal is. And why is he kindled with this zeal against the *animal* and the *carnal* rather than against the proud and other sinners? And since zeal is a private love, it does not seem that he ought to be kindled with zeal.

Furthermore, since pride is the greater sin, it seems that he ought rather to be kindled against the proud.

**I respond:** To the first it must be said that zeal is a love unwilling to have a partner in the thing loved. Evil zeal shuns every partnership, but good zeal shuns only what is evil; hence the true zealots of the house of God cannot see vices in the Church without rising up against them. Hence on the second chapter of John the Gloss says: «Good zeal is that by which the mind, human fear being cast off, is kindled and is consumed by it, so that it busies itself to correct whatever perverse things it has seen, and if it cannot, bears with them and groans».

To the second it must be said that the Master was especially zealous for the faith in the Church; and therefore he was the more inflamed against the corrupters of the faith. Now a man corrupts the faith in two ways: either moved by a perversity of will and affection — and this man is called *carnal*. For flesh is here called carnal affection, according to that saying to the Galatians, chapter five: «*The works of the flesh are manifest* etc.» In the other way a man corrupts it moved by a perversity of *judgement* — and this man is called *animal*, as it were fantastic, because fantasies pervert the judgement of reason.

#### Dub. IV.

*Which two horses the charity of Christ drives in us.*

**On the contrary:** Ecclesiastes, chapter nine: *No man knows whether he is worthy of hatred or of love.*

**I respond:** It must be said that charity in one way names the gratuitous virtue, in another way it names broadly a love

greatly prizing the thing loved: whence *caritas*, *a dear love*. Charity being taken in the first way, it is true that no one knows it with certitude; yet he can conjecture it with probability by some experience of the sweetness of the divine mercy; in the second way he can know it. And if the Master speaks in the first way, he does not speak by asserting but by conjecturing; if in the second way, then it can be understood assertively; and thus that saying is clear.

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT OF THE SECOND PART OF THE PROLOGUE.

*Although we do not doubt* etc. Above the Master set down the reasons that move from the approval of *the good*; here he sets down the reasons that move from the hatred and detestation of *evil*; and this evil is the evil of heretical perversity. Now this part has four particles. In the *first* part he touches their perversity, which consists in calumniating the good and the true out of the blindness of error and the equal malignity of envy. In the *second* he touches the root of this perversity, which is diabolical suggestion and one's own pride, there: *Which the god of this world.* In the third he touches the diffusion of this error, which is through false superstition and mendacious and contentious speech, there: *They have an account of wisdom in superstition.* In the fourth he brings in the reason which moved him to the compiling of the present work, there: *Of these men therefore, hateful to God.* And this reason is the overturning of error.

### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE LETTER OF THE SECOND PART OF THE PROLOGUE.

#### Dub. V.

It is asked concerning this which he says: *A truth not understood.* For it seems that he speaks ill, because truth is an intelligible light, just as corporeal light is a sensible one; but an eye that has sight cannot be ignorant of sensible light: therefore by parity of reasoning neither will the intellect be ignorant of intelligible light. *If you say* that the case is not alike, it is asked why it is not alike, and why nature fails the intellect more than the sense.

**I respond:** It must be said that the case is alike, if one attends to it. For there is a threefold cause why someone does not see a visible thing: either he does not see because he is not *willing* to look; or, if he is willing, he is impeded by a *defect of the organ*; or by the *absence of light*. This is manifest. Likewise in spiritual things the intellect frequently does not understand some things because it is not *willing* to consider them; sometimes, however, it does not understand on account of an *impediment* on the part of the body, as is clear in the frenzied and in fools; sometimes on account of the *absence of light*. For although the uncreated light does not withdraw itself as regards its *essence*, or as regards any influence whatsoever, it did withdraw itself from man, when he sinned, as regards the *perfect* influence; whence it is said to have inflicted ignorance upon him. Hence, as the eye errs in darkness, so today does the wretched human intellect. But when it shall have been fully restored into the light, then, as the eye will be able to see every visible thing, so will the intellect every intelligible thing.

#### Dub. VI.

Likewise it is asked concerning this which he says: *A truth giving offence.* On the contrary: «All men by nature desire to know», just as they also desire to be blessed; but blessedness offends no one, because all desire it: therefore neither does truth offend anyone.

**I respond:** It must be said that one may speak of truth as regards its first effect, which is *to illuminate*; and as regards this no one hates it, for all naturally desire to be illumined. One may speak again as regards the consequent effect, which is *to convict*; and this it has in the wicked. For by manifesting evils it convicts the one doing them; and hence it is that the wicked hate the truth, because, as is said in the third chapter of John: *He who does evil hates the light.*

#### Dub. VII.

*Who, being zealous for contention, war against the truth without a treaty.* On the contrary: the fourth chapter of Third Esdras: *Great is truth and stronger than all things. All the earth calls upon truth, and all tremble at it.*

**I respond:** It must be said that one may speak of truth *simply*, or of truth *in this or that case*, that is, in particular. *In the first way* truth is unconquerable, and therefore prevails; and thus that saying of Esdras is understood. One may speak again of truth *in the second way*; and thus it happens that it is overshadowed by fantastic reasonings and assailed by contention. Hence Ambrose on the first chapter to the Romans: «Contention is the assailing of truth with the confidence of shouting».

#### Dub. VIII.

*Out of the testimonies of truth founded unto eternity.* On the contrary: the first to the Corinthians, chapter thirteen: *Knowledge shall be destroyed*: therefore the testimonies also.

**I respond:** That the testimonies of truth are founded unto eternity, as is said in the Psalm: *From the beginning I have known concerning thy testimonies* etc. As to what is objected, that knowledge shall be destroyed, it must be said that this is true as regards the manner of teaching and of considering, but not as regards the thing known and the account of knowing; the Psalm: *For ever, O Lord, thy word remains* etc.

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT OF THE LAST PART.

*In it [you will find] the examples of our forebears.* This is the last part, in which the Master sets down the reasons that move disciples to hear. And this part is divided into four parts according to the four things which move disciples to hear, two of which are on the side of the work, namely authority and usefulness; two, however, on the side of the teacher, namely humility and easiness. In the first he prepares docility, namely in *authority*. In the second, namely in *usefulness*, he rouses attention. In the two that follow, namely *humility and easiness*, he wins good will.

In the first part, therefore, he shows that his work is authentic; in the second, that it is compendious, there: *This labour, then, ought not*; in the third he shows that his manner of teaching is humble, in this, that he wishes to be corrected, there: *But in this treatise* etc. In the fourth he shows that it is easy for finding and for remembering, there: *And that what is sought may come to hand the more easily.*

### A DOUBT OF THE LAST PART.

#### Dub. IX.

It is asked concerning this which he says: *A free corrector*; what does he mean by this word *free*?

**I respond:** It must be said that a free corrector is so called just as a free man is, who «is his own cause only», as the Philosopher says; so a corrector is called free who corrects only for the sake of correction, not out of envy or of mockery. Such a one the Master desires, after the example of Augustine in the second book *On the Trinity*, where he says: «I shall more gladly be examined by the upright than fear to be bitten by the perverse. For a most beautiful and most modest charity gladly receives the kiss of the dove; but the tooth of the dog either a most cautious humility avoids, or a most solid truth blunts: and I shall rather choose to be reproved by anyone whatsoever than to be praised either by one who errs or by one who flatters».

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