Dist. 1, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/1/q/bon-sent-II-d1-p1-a1-q1
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### ARTICLE I.
*On the entity of the principle.*

### QUESTION I.
*Whether things have a causal principle.*

Concerning the first [question], the procedure is as follows.

Since it is established according to the Saints and the philosophers that all worldly things have had a productive principle — whether on account of the variety of things, or on account of the mutability of things, or on account of the order of things, or also on account of imperfection — for multitude has its origin from unity, and motion or the mutable from the immutable, and order [reduces] to a first, and the imperfect to the perfect, are originally reduced — therefore, this being supposed, namely that things have a causal principle in some way, the question is whether things have been produced wholly, that is, both according to the material and the formal principle, or only according to one of the two principles. And [the position] that [they are produced] according to both seems [to follow]:

1. *First, from the side of the producer*, thus. The more prior and more perfect a producer is, the more it flows into the thing: therefore the first and most perfect [producer] flows totally and into the whole; and if so, then it produces the whole. But the first agent is of this kind: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, an agent is nobler and more perfect insofar as it needs fewer things in order to act: therefore the most noble agent needs nothing outside itself: therefore if it alone existed, it would still produce things: but not from itself, since it is part of nothing: therefore from nothing: it is plain therefore that God has [causal power] over the whole substance of the creature.

3. Likewise, an agent according to form can produce form: therefore by parity of reasoning an agent [acting] according to its whole self can produce the whole; but God acts by his whole self, since he is entirely simple: therefore he produces the whole.

4. Likewise, this same point is shown from the side of the conditioned thing thus: that which is not from another is from itself: but nothing of that kind which is from itself needs another in order to be; but every intrinsic principle of a thing needs another in order to be — for form needs matter, and conversely: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, efficient and final [causes] are correlative causes: therefore what is not from another is not for another; but all things are for another according to all that they are, because according to all that they are, they desire the good; and there is no rest except in the highest good. And that this reasoning is sound, is shown [thus]. For if the good and being are convertible, then what is being by itself is by itself good; but what is by itself good is not on account of something else: therefore what is not from another is not on account of another. If, therefore, all worldly things, as to their whole selves, are on account of another, therefore they are from another.

6. Likewise, if a thing is not totally from another, it is so either by reason of form or by reason of matter. It is established that it is not [by reason] of *form*, because we see forms produced, and if forms were not produced, nothing at all would be produced. If [it is] by reason of *matter*; but to the contrary: as the Philosopher says in the *First Philosophy*, "act is prior to potency"; it is plain that he is speaking not of active potency but of passive [potency]: therefore since the act of a thing is from another, so likewise is its matter. If you say that this is understood not of *act*, which is *form*, but of *the efficient*; the same is concluded. — And again, I ask why matter should not be from another. If [you say] it is because matter is the principle out of which the others come to be, and has nothing from which it itself could come to be; then I ask of form, whether it comes to be from something, or from nothing. If from nothing, then by parity of reasoning matter also [comes] from nothing. If from something, I ask what that is. Not from the essence of matter: it is established [that it is not], because form is simple: therefore form does not come to be from matter in such a way that matter is its constitutive principle. Nor does it come to be from matter in such a way that matter becomes form; but it comes to be from something which is in matter. Then I ask: from what is that? And it is plain that it is not from matter, by parity of reasoning: therefore either there will be an infinite regress in causing, or it is necessary to posit that the essences of forms have been produced from nothing by the first Maker: therefore by parity of reasoning matter also [has been produced from nothing].

1. *To the contrary* there are reasons, first *from the side of the efficient*. The first is this: every effect is in some way assimilated to its cause; but the first principle is pure act, having nothing of the possible, while the matter of things is pure possibility through its own essence, having nothing of act: therefore since matter is in no way assimilated to its maker, it is not from him.

2. Likewise, from a most beautiful and most luminous agent there does not proceed [anything] base and dark; but God is beauty itself and light itself, [whereas] the material principle is base and dark: therefore etc.

3. *From the side of things* it is shown concerning *the formal principle*: "For everything that is produced and comes to be, comes to be from something similar to itself in name and species, as man from man," according to what the Philosopher says in book seven of the *First Philosophy*. If therefore the forms of things are principles of producing, and the principle of producing precedes the production of things: therefore things are not produced as to their formal principle.

4. Likewise, the craftsman cannot produce unless he foreknows; he cannot foreknow except through forms; he cannot know through forms which in no way are: therefore it was impossible that the supreme Craftsman should form the world, unless forms first were, through which he might know; and those forms could not similarly be produced except through forms: therefore if one is not to go to infinity, one must posit that the forms of things have not been produced.

5. Likewise, the same point is shown as to the *material principle*. "Everything that is produced is produced either from something or from nothing; but from nothing, nothing [comes]: therefore all things [come] from something"; but that [something] is matter: therefore if there is a stopping-point and one is not to go to infinity, that [matter] is not produced. That from nothing nothing comes to be, [moreover] seems [to be the case]. For the production of a thing is an action; but every action requires something into which to act: therefore so does every production: therefore for every production something is subjected; and [that can be] nothing but matter: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, I ask concerning passive production or creation: whether it is substance or accident; not substance, therefore accident. But every accident is founded in something; but this [something] cannot be created, since [creation] follows naturally from creation itself: therefore it is necessary that it be uncreated and other than God, since [creation] as passion is in another: therefore it is necessary that everything which is produced be produced from something; and therefore the Philosopher says in the first [book] of the *Physics* that matter is unbegotten.

### CONCLUSION.

> *The world has been produced from nothing both according to its whole self and according to its intrinsic principles.*

**I respond:** It must be said that this is the truth: the world has been produced into being, and not only according to its whole self, but also according to its intrinsic principles, which have been produced not from other [things] but from nothing. — Now this truth, although it is now open and luminous to every believer, was nevertheless hidden from philosophical prudence, which in the inquiry of this question for a long time walked through deviations.

For there were certain *ancient philosophers* who said that the world was made by God and *from his own essence*, because they did not see how anything could come to be from nothing; and God alone was in the beginning, and therefore they said that he made all things from himself. — But this position seemed improbable not only to the faithful but also to subsequent philosophers, [namely] that the essence of God — wholly invariable and most noble — should become the matter of corporeal and variable [things], which of itself is imperfect unless it be perfected through form.

There were *others* who said that the world was made from pre-existing principles, namely from matter and form; but [that] the forms lay hidden in the matter before the intellect distinguished them. And this Anaxagoras posited. — But because right reason does not grasp [the claim] that all forms are simultaneously in matter, this position too was rejected by subsequent philosophers.

There were *a third [group]* who posited that the world was made from pre-existing principles, namely matter and form; but they posited matter by itself, [and] the forms separate, and afterward in time conjoined to [matter] by the supreme craftsman. And these were the Platonists. — But because it seems irrational that matter should have been imperfect from eternity, and that the same form should be both separate and conjoined; and absurd to posit a threefold man — namely natural, mathematical, and divine: therefore also this position was reproved by subsequent philosophers.

There were also *a fourth [group]*, namely the Peripatetics, whose prince and leader was Aristotle, who, drawing nearer to the truth, said that the world was made — as one reads in the second [book of] *Meteorologica*: "I say therefore that the sea has been made," and at the beginning of *On the Heavens and the World*; and from many other places it can be elicited. But they said it was not made from pre-existing principles. For just as [Aristotle] holds in the first [book] of *On Plants*, the world was always full of plants and animals, where he speaks against Abrucalis. But whether he posited matter and form as made from nothing, this I do not know; I believe, however, that he did not arrive at this, as will be seen better in problem 2: therefore he too fell short, although less than the others.

But where the skill of the philosophers fails, sacred Scripture comes to our aid, which says that all things have been created and produced into being according to all that they are. And reason also is not at variance with faith, as has been shown above in the objections.

1. To what is objected concerning likeness, that matter is wholly being in potency; it must be said that matter was not made on its own account, but for the sake of sustaining form, which is its act; therefore although matter is not actually similar to God, it is nevertheless able-to-be-assimilated through form. Hence Augustine says that matter, even though it does not have in itself and of itself the act of form, yet its very capacity for form is to it as form. Therefore this is clear.

2. To what is objected, that [matter is] *base* etc.; it must be said that it is called neither base nor dark except comparatively. For matter is not pure privation; rather, by reason of its essence it has something of beauty and something of light. Hence Augustine says that it has *mode*, *species*, and *order*, even if imperfectly. It is not, moreover, necessary that God produce all things equally similar to himself; rather, [he produces them] according to degree. And therefore, in order that the degrees be perfect, it is necessary to posit something close to God, and most similar [to him]; and something close to nothing, [yet] in some way similar, though not entirely nor perfectly — which, although in itself it has the least of good, is nevertheless most well ordered.

3. 4. To what is objected, that everything which is produced, is produced through something similar in form, and is similarly known; it must be said that there is an agent *according to nature*, and [an agent] *according to intellect*. The agent according to nature produces through forms which are truly natures, as man [produces] man, and ass [produces] ass; the agent through intellect produces through forms which are not anything of a thing, but ideas in the mind, as the craftsman produces a chest; and thus have things been produced, and in this way the forms of things are eternal, because they are God. And if Plato so posited, he is to be commended, and so Augustine imputes [the view] to him. But if he went further, as Aristotle imputes to him, without doubt he erred, and his reasoning, which has been mentioned, in no way compels [the conclusion]. For as the Philosopher shows, the forms of things outside God, separated from singulars, do absolutely nothing — neither toward operation nor toward cognition.

5. To what is finally objected concerning matter: matter cannot come to be, because [it must come to be] either from something or from nothing; it must be said that [it comes] from nothing, and this through creation. — To what is objected, that action is *toward what*; it must be said that *to create* is not *to act* but *to make*, and this is the difference between *agere* and *facere*; for to-act demands [an object] *into which*, not *what may act*; but to-make [demands] the converse.

6. As to what is further asked, in what [creation-as-passion] inheres: there is a twofold answer. Some say that it is neither substance nor accident, but a *way to both*: and such [a way] precedes that to which it [is ordered] naturally, although it has being in it. — Others say differently, that to be created is nothing other than *now first to be*; nor does creation signify any nature intermediate between God and creature, but only signifies the being of the thing, connoting an order to the first efficient *from which* it [comes], and to non-being, yet in such a way that that order is wholly in the created thing, and not in the nothing. Hence when it is said that *something comes to be from nothing*, it can be understood threefold: either *materially*, as a knife from iron; or *causally*, as a son from a father; or *ordinally*, as noon comes from morning. In the first two modes it is true that from nothing nothing comes; in the third mode it is true according to nature, but false above nature. For by an infinite power, which does not need the support of matter, something can be produced from nothing just as easily as from something; otherwise the power of the first principle would not be infinite, but would need the foundation of matter; and therefore this must necessarily be attributed to that power alone, although nothing similar can be found in any created [being]. For this is proper to it, just as omnipotence itself.

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