Dist. 1, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/1/q/bon-sent-II-d1-p1-a1-q2
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### Question II. *Whether the world was produced from eternity, or in time.*

Concerning the second matter it is asked, whether the world was produced in time or from eternity. And that it was not in time, is shown.

**I. By two arguments taken from motion.**

**1.** The first is *ostensive*, thus: before every motion and change is the motion of the first mobile; but everything that begins, begins through motion or change: therefore before everything that begins, there is that motion. But that motion could not be before itself nor before its mobile: therefore it is impossible that [the world] begins. The first proposition is presupposed, and its proof is patent thus: because it is a supposition in philosophy that «in every genus the perfect is prior to the imperfect»; but among all the genera of motions, motion with respect to place is more perfect, because it is of a complete being; and among all the genera of local motions, circular motion is both swifter and more perfect; but such is the motion of the heavens: therefore most perfect, therefore first: thus the conclusion follows.

**2.** Likewise, it is shown *per impossibile*. Everything that comes into being comes into being through motion or change: therefore if motion comes into being, it comes into being through motion or change; and the same is asked of that: therefore one must either go to infinity, or posit some motion without a beginning; if a motion: therefore a mobile, therefore also a world.

**3.** Similarly an *ostensive* argument is taken from time, thus: everything that begins, begins either in an instant or in time: therefore if the world begins, [it begins] either in an instant or in time. But before every time there is time, and before every instant there is time: therefore time is before all things that began. But it could not be before the world and motion: therefore the world did not

begin. The first proposition is self-evident. The second, namely that before every time there is time, is patent from this: that, if it runs, it would necessarily have been running before. — Similarly, that before every instant there is time, is patent thus: time is a circular measure befitting motion and the mobile; but every point that is on a circle is no less a beginning than an end: therefore every instant of time is no less a beginning of the future than a terminus of the past: therefore before every *now* there was a past: thus the conclusion follows.

**4.** Likewise, *per impossibile*. If time is produced, it is either in time or in an instant. Not in an instant, since it is not in an instant: therefore in time. But in every time one must posit a before and an after, and a past and a future: therefore if time was produced in time, before every time there was time; and this is impossible: therefore etc.

These are the arguments of the Philosopher, taken from the side of the world itself.

**5.** Likewise, other arguments of the philosophers are taken from the side of the producing cause; and generally they can be reduced to two, of which the first is *ostensive* and the second *per impossibile*. The first is this: when the cause is sufficient and actual, the effect is posited; but God was from eternity the sufficient and actual cause of the world itself: therefore etc. The major proposition is self-evident. The minor is patent — namely that God is a sufficient cause; because, since he needs nothing extrinsic for the creation of the world, but only power, wisdom and goodness, and these were most perfect in God from eternity, it is patent that he was sufficient from eternity. That he was also actual, is patent: for God is pure act and his own willing, as the Philosopher says; and the Saints say, that he is his own acting: therefore the conclusion follows.

**6.** Likewise, *per impossibile*: Everything that begins to act or to produce, when before it was not producing, passes from rest to act; if therefore God begins to produce the world, he passes from rest to act; but about every such thing fall idleness and change or mutability: therefore about God there is idleness and mutability. But this is against the highest goodness and against the highest simplicity: therefore this is impossible, and a blasphemy to say of God, and so [it is impossible] that the world began. — These are the arguments which the commentators and the more modern thinkers add to the arguments of Aristotle, or which can be reduced to those.

**But on the contrary stand arguments from propositions self-evident according to reason and philosophy.**

**1.** The first is this. It is impossible to add to the infinite: this is manifest in itself, because everything which receives addition becomes greater, «but nothing is greater than the infinite» — but if the world is without a beginning, it has lasted to infinity: therefore to its duration nothing can

be added. But it is plain that this is false, because a revolution is added to a revolution every day: therefore etc. If you say, that the infinite is so as regards the past, but as regards the present, which now is, it is finite in act, and therefore on that side, on which it is finite in act, one can find a greater; on the contrary, it is shown that in the past one can find a greater: this is an infallible truth, that, if the world is eternal, the revolutions of the sun in its orbit are infinite; again, for one revolution of the sun there must have been twelve of the moon: therefore the moon has revolved more than the sun; and the sun infinitely; therefore among infinites, on the side on which they are infinite, one can find an excess. But this is impossible: therefore etc.

**2.** The second proposition is this. It is impossible that infinites be ordered. For every order flows from a principle through a middle; if therefore there is no first, there is no order: but the duration of the world or the revolutions of the heavens, if they are infinite, have no first: therefore they have no order, therefore one is not before another. But this is false: it remains, therefore, that they have a first. If you say that the standing of order does not have to be posited except in those things which are ordered according to the order of causality, because in causes there must necessarily be a standing; I ask, why not in other [orders] also? Besides, you do not escape on this account: for there has never been a revolution of the heavens without a generation of an animal from an animal; but it is plain that an animal is ordered to an animal, from which it is generated, according to the order of cause: therefore if, according to the Philosopher and reason, one must posit a standing in those things which are ordered according to the order of cause, therefore in the generation of animals one must posit a first animal. And the world was not without animals: therefore etc.

**3.** The third proposition is this. «It is impossible that infinites be traversed»; but if the world did not begin, infinite revolutions have been: therefore it is impossible to traverse them: therefore it was impossible to come down to this [present] one. If you say, that they have not been traversed, because none was first, or that they can well be traversed in an infinite time; by this you do not escape. For I will ask you, whether some revolution preceded today's by an infinity, or none? If none: then all finite ones are distant from this one, then all are finite, then they have a beginning. If some is distant by an infinity, I ask of the revolution which immediately follows that one, whether it is distant by an infinity. If not: then neither does that one [the prior one] stand at an infinite distance, since the distance between the two is finite. If indeed it is distant by an infinity, similarly I ask of the third and of the fourth, and so on to infinity: therefore [the one prior] is no more distant from this one than from another: therefore one is not before another: therefore all are simultaneous.

**4.** The fourth proposition is this. It is impossible that infinites be comprehended by a finite power; but if the world did not begin, infinites are comprehended by a finite power: therefore etc. The proof of the major is patent in itself. The minor is shown thus. I suppose that God alone is of actually infinite power, and that all other things have finitude. Again I suppose, that the motion of the heavens was never without a created spiritual substance, which either was making it, or at least cognized it. Again, I also suppose this, that a spiritual substance forgets nothing. — If therefore some spiritual substance of finite power was simultaneous with the heaven, no revolution of the heaven was, which it would not cognize: and it has not forgotten: therefore it cognizes all in act; and they were infinite: therefore some spiritual substance of finite power simultaneously comprehends infinites. If you say, that it is not incongruous, that by a single similitude it cognizes all revolutions, which are of the same species and altogether alike; the objection is, that it would have cognized not only the revolutions, but also their effects; and the effects are varied and diverse and infinite: thus the conclusion follows.

**5.** The fifth is this. It is impossible that infinites be simultaneously; but if the world is eternal without a beginning, since it is not without man — for on man's account all things in a certain manner are — and man endures for a finite time: therefore infinite men have been. But as many men as there have been, so many rational souls: therefore there have been infinite souls. But as many souls as there have been, so many there are, because they are incorruptible forms: therefore there are infinite souls. If you say on this account, that there is a circulation in souls, or that one soul is in

all men; the first is an error in philosophy, because, as the Philosopher wills, «the proper act is in proper matter»: therefore the soul, which was the perfection of one, cannot be the perfection of another, even according to the Philosopher. The second is even more erroneous, because much less is one soul of all.

**6.** The final argument for this is: it is impossible that what has being after non-being should have being eternal, since this is an implication of contradiction; but the world has being after non-being: therefore it is impossible that it be eternal. That it has being after non-being is proved thus: everything which totally has its being from another is produced by that one from nothing: but the world totally has being from God: therefore the world [is] from nothing; but not from nothing materially: therefore originally. That, however, everything which is totally produced by another differing in essence has its being from nothing, is patent. For what is totally produced is produced according to matter and form: but matter has nothing from which it would be produced, because not from God: it is therefore manifest that [it is] from nothing. The minor, namely that the world is totally produced by God, is patent from another problem.

### *Conclusion.*

> *If it is posited that all things have been produced from nothing, it is implied [as a contradiction] to say, that the world is eternal or was produced from eternity.*

**I respond:** It must be said that to posit that the world is eternal or was eternally produced, while positing that all things were produced from nothing, is altogether against truth and reason, as the last argument proves: and so against reason, that I would not believe any philosopher of however small intellect to have posited this. For this implies in itself a manifest contradiction. — But to posit the world eternal, presupposing the eternity of matter, seems reasonable and intelligible, and this by a twofold example. For the egress of mundane things from God is by way of vestige. Hence if the foot were eternal, and the dust in which the vestige is formed were eternal, nothing would prevent one's understanding the vestige to be coeternal with the foot, and yet the vestige would be from the foot. By this manner, if matter or the potential principle were coeternal with the author, what prevents the vestige itself being eternal? Indeed it seems congruous. — Again, another reasonable example. For the creature proceeds from God as a shadow, the Son proceeds as a splendor; but as soon as there is light, immediately there is splendor, and immediately there is shadow, if there is an opaque body set against it. If therefore matter is coeternal with the author as the opaque [body]; just as it is reasonable to posit that the Son, who is the splendor of the Father, is coeternal: so it seems reasonable that creatures or the world, which is the shadow of the highest light, are eternal. And it is more reasonable than its opposite, namely that matter was eternally imperfect, without form or divine influence, as some of the philosophers posited; and so much the more reasonable, that even that more excellent one among the philosophers, Aristotle, according to what the Saints impute, and the commentators expound, and his words pretend, fell into this error.

Certain moderns however say, that the Philosopher

in no way held that, nor intended to prove, that the world altogether did not begin, but that it did not begin by a natural motion. — Which of these is more true, I do not know; this one thing I know: that if he held that it did not begin according to nature, he held truly, and his arguments taken from motion and time are effective. But if he held this, that it began in no manner at all, he manifestly erred, as has been shown above by many arguments. And he had necessarily, to avoid contradiction, to posit either that the world was not made, or that it was not made from nothing. And to avoid an actual infinity, he had necessarily to posit either a corruption of the rational soul, or its unity, or its transmigration; and thus take away beatitude. Hence this error and evil has a beginning, and has a most evil end.

**1.** As to the first objection from motion, that it is first among all motions and changes because most perfect; it must be said, that speaking of natural motions and changes, he speaks truly and there is no instance against him; but speaking of the supernatural change, by which the mobile itself proceeded into being, he has no truth. For that change precedes every created thing, and so the first mobile, and through this its motion.

**2.** As to the objection: every motion comes into being through motion; it must be said, that motion does not come into being through itself, nor in itself, but with another and in another. And because God in the same instant made the mobile and as mover influenced the mobile; therefore he con-created motion with the mobile. — But if you ask about that creation, it must be said, that there one must stop as in first things. And this will be made clearer below.

**3.** As to the third objection concerning the *now* of time, etc., it must be said, that, just as in a circle one assigns a point in two ways, either while it *is being made*, or after it *has been made*; and just as, while it is being made, one can posit and assign a first point, but when it now is, one cannot posit a first; so the *now* in time is to be taken in two ways: and in the very production of time there was a first *now*, before which there was no other, which was the beginning of time, in which all things are said to have been produced. But if of time after it has been made, it is true that it is the terminus of the past and behaves after the manner of a circle; but in this manner the things were not produced in already-completed time. And so it is patent that the arguments of the Philosopher are worth nothing whatever for this conclusion. — And as to what is said, that before every time there is time; this is true taking [it] by dividing within, not by proceeding outside earlier.

**4.** As to the objection concerning time, when it began; it must be said, that it began in its own beginning; but the beginning of time is the instant or *now*; and so it began in an instant. And that argument is invalid: it was not in an instant, therefore it did not begin in an instant; because successive things are not in their own initial moment. — One can however also say otherwise, that to speak of time is twofold: either according to essence, or according to being. If according to essence, then *now* is the whole essence of time, and that began with the mobile thing, not in another *now*, but in itself, because there is a standing at first things, whence it had no other measure. If according to being, then it began with the motion of variation, namely it did not begin through creation, but rather through the change of the mutable things themselves, and especially of the first mobile.

**5.** As to the objection about the sufficiency and actuality of the cause, it must be said, that a sufficient cause for something is so in two ways: either as operating by nature, or by will and reason. If operating by nature, then as soon as it is, it produces. If however operating by will, although it be sufficient, it is not necessary that as soon as it is it should operate; for it operates according to wisdom and discretion, and so considers congruity. Since therefore eternity did not befit the nature of the creature itself, nor was it fitting that God should give to anyone this most noble condition: therefore the divine will, which operates according to wisdom, produced not from eternity, but in time; because as he produced, so he disposed and so he willed. For from eternity he willed to produce then, when he produced; just as I now will to hear mass tomorrow. And so it is patent that sufficiency does not compel.

Similarly concerning actuality, it must be said, that a cause can be in act in two ways: either in itself, as if I say: the sun shines; or in its effect, as if I say: the sun

illuminates. In the first way God was always in act, since he himself is pure act, having nothing of the possible admixed; in the other way not always in act; for he was not always producing.

**6.** As to the second objection: if from non-producing he became producing, he was changed from rest to act; it must be said, that there is a certain agent in which action and production adds something above the agent and the producer. Such an agent, when from a non-agent it becomes an agent, is varied in some manner; and in such a one, before the operation rest falls, and in the operation completion is added. There is another agent which is its own action; and to such a one nothing whatever accrues when it produces, nor does anything come to be in it which was not there before; and such an agent neither in operating receives completion, nor in not-operating is idle, nor, when from a non-producer it becomes a producer, is it changed from rest to act. Such, however, is God, even according to the philosophers, who posited God most simple. — It is patent therefore that their argument is foolish. For if to avoid idleness he had produced things from eternity, without things he would not have been a perfect good, and through this nor with things, because the most perfect is perfect through itself. Again, if on account of immutability things would have to be from eternity, he could now produce nothing anew. What kind of God would he be, who could now do nothing through himself? All these things indicate madness rather than philosophy or any reasoning. — If you should ask, how it can be grasped that God acts through himself, and yet does not begin to act; it must be said, that, although this cannot be fully grasped on account of the conjoined imagination, it can however be convinced of by necessary reason; and if anyone withdraws himself from the senses to looking at intelligibles, in some manner he will perceive [it]. For if anyone should ask, whether an Angel can make a *potum* of a potter, since he has not hands, or throw a stone; the response is that he can; because he can by his power alone, without an instrument, what the soul can do with its body and member. If therefore the Angel, on account of his simplicity and perfection, so exceeds man that he can do without a mediating instrument that for which man necessarily needs an instrument; and can do through one [act] what man can do through many: how much more God, who is at the end of all simplicity and perfection, without any medium, by the command of his will, which is nothing other than himself, can produce all things, and through this remain immutable in producing! Thus a man can be led by hand to this understanding. — But he will grasp it more perfectly, if anyone can contemplate these two in his Maker, namely that he is most perfect and most simple. Because most perfect, all things which are of perfection are attributed to him; because most simple, they place no diversity in him, and through this no variety nor mutability; therefore «remaining stable, he gives all things to be moved».