Dist. 1, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/1/q/bon-sent-II-d1-p1-a2-q1
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### Article II. *On the unity of the principle.*

Next, the question is about the unity of the principle. Concerning which two things are asked. First, whether things were produced in being from several principles. Second, granted that from one principle, the question is whether it produced all things from itself, or by means of another.

### Question I. *Whether things were produced in being from several principles.*

That things were produced from several principles is what the Manichaeans say, who posit one principle of spiritual and incorporeal or invisible things, and another of corporeal and corruptible or visible things; and the first they call the *God of light*, the second they call the *God of darkness*. And that their position is true and catholic, it seems:

**1.** From sacred Scripture. John 18: *My kingdom is not of this world*, says the King of glory and the God of light himself: therefore this visible world does not belong to the God of light: therefore it was not founded by him.

**2.** Likewise, John 14: *The prince of this world is coming*. Again, John 12 calls the devil *the prince of this world*; and that one is the God of darkness: therefore it seems etc.

**3.** Likewise, the Apostle in 2 Corinthians 4 and in Ephesians 2 calls the devil *the God of this age*; but no one merits being called the God of something unless of that which he founded: therefore etc. They adduce many other authorities from Scripture; but when these are solved, the others are solved too.

**4.** Likewise, they prove the same thing by reasons in this way: «the causes of opposites are opposed»; but spiritual and corporeal things have a mutual repugnance. Hence Romans 7: *I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind*; and Galatians 5: *The flesh lusts against the spirit* etc. Likewise, the New and Old Testaments are opposed, as is plain from Matthew 5, because there directly contrary things are commanded — like to swear and not to swear, to kill and not to kill. Therefore one must posit two first principles: one of spiritual things, the other of corporeal; one of the Old Testament, the other of the New.

**5.** Likewise, «what remains the same in the same way is naturally fitted always to do the same»: therefore since the good God remains uniformly, he likewise always does the same. Therefore, since he is the cause of founding, he is the cause of destroying nothing; and since he is the cause of production, he will not be the cause of destruction or of corruption: therefore corruptible things are from another principle.

**6.** The third reason is: everything which the good God makes is good; everything which is good is to be loved, and nothing at all that he made is to be hated; but this world is to be hated and spurned; likewise also the carnal life, as 1 John 2: *Do not love the world*; and again John 12: *He who loves his soul will lose it*: therefore etc.

But on the contrary side there are reasons and authorities.

**1.** John 1 says of the Word: *All things were made through him*; but the Word is the good God: therefore etc. If you say that *all* does not distribute over visible things, the contrary: immediately afterwards follows: *the world was made through him, and the world knew him not*. It is clear that he is speaking of this world etc.

**2.** Likewise, the last chapter of Matthew: *All power has been given to me in heaven and on earth*, says the good God: therefore either it was given justly or unjustly. If justly, then heaven and earth are his, and he made them. If unjustly, then it seems that the good God himself unjustly usurped what belonged to another, and so was unjust.

**3.** Likewise, he was the founder of visible things who gave the Old Testament. Proof: Acts 13 Paul says: *Brothers, men, the God of our people chose our fathers*. And afterwards: *The dwellers in Jerusalem, and their princes, in ignorance and by judging him fulfilled [the prophecies]*. But that one was the God of light: therefore etc.

**4.** Likewise, it is shown by reasons: Everything good and beautiful is from the good God; but all visible things are good and beautiful: therefore etc. Proof: they are either good or bad. If good, I have my point; if bad, then their corruption is good; therefore the corruption is from the good God, since every good is from him: therefore etc.

**5.** Likewise, whatever things are joined to one another, must necessarily be joined through something in which they communicate; but things which differ in their first principles communicate in nothing: therefore if soul and body are joined, it is necessary that they be produced by the same God; but the soul is from the God of light: therefore etc.

**6.** Likewise, I ask concerning these two principles, how they stand toward one another: for either they have peace or war — for otherwise I do not see how it can be — but the God of light cannot wage war, since in him is the highest peace and rest; the God of darkness, since in him is total malice, cannot rest: therefore it seems that they neither wage war nor rest.

### *Conclusion.*

> The error of the Manichaeans, that there are two first principles of things, is rejected by both faith and reason.

**I respond:** It must be said that the question of the plurality of principles can be understood in three ways, and accordingly is to be treated in different places. For it can be asked whether there are several principles, each of which is good; and that is to be determined in the first book, where the question is asked about the unity of the divine essence. It can also be asked whether there are several principles, such that one is supremely good and the other supremely bad, so that from the one is every good, from the other every bad; and that is to be determined in the treatise on evil; for this question cannot be known unless one first knows what evil is. It can also be asked whether there are several principles, of which one is the principle of incorruptible and spiritual things, the other the principle of corruptible and visible things: and this is to be determined now, where the question is asked about the procession of things into being.

To this question it must be said that this error of positing two principles is not only against the faith but is so much against reason that I can scarcely believe that any man who knew anything of philosophy posited or defended this error. — Nevertheless, this error is the worst, because it puts forward some appearance of piety. For it seems to attribute to the good God the good, beautiful, and noble things, and to the other principle the rest. For that reason it crept in further and defiled the Church of God more deeply, and also because it can more easily be grasped and pictured by simple folk through false imagination. — And from this worst error about a multitude of principles innumerable and most empty errors follow, as is known to those who are acquainted with the sect of the Manichaeans — about oaths, marriage, homicide, and many other things, all of which have their refutations from Scripture.

But all philosophy condemns the head and source of the error, namely that there are two first principles of things: both because the order of the universe is destroyed on this supposition, and also because divine power is limited by this — so that it cannot produce corporeal things — and also because by this the divine essence is rendered circumscribable, so as to be only in the region of light; and if these things are true, then God is not God, and nothing is good.

**To the arguments.**

*To 1, 2, 3.* To the authorities they adduce, it must be said that *world* is taken in Scripture in two ways, namely for *worldly conduct*, which is vain and unclean, and for the *worldly creation*. In the first way it is condemned in the Scriptures, and is not said to be from God as evil, because sin is not from God, as will be made plain elsewhere; in the second way it is commended as good and beautiful, as it is said in Genesis 1: *God saw all the things which he had made, and they were very good*, and in this way it is from God. According to this distinction the objections are solved. For when it is said that Christ's kingdom is not of this world, it is understood of *worldly conduct*, because he does not reign in the wicked, but in the good, *whose conversation is in the heavens*. Likewise, when the devil is called *prince of the world* and *God*, it is understood of those who live in a worldly and secular manner. — It is plain therefore that the foolish and impious Manichaean is deceived, because he knew not how to distinguish. And again, he sinned in the inference; for it does not follow: he is prince, therefore founder; since if it followed, then since the king of France is prince of France, therefore he made it. He who argued so would be judged a fool; but much more foolishly does the Manichaean argue. Again, it does not follow: he is god, therefore founder. For if so, since it is said to the Philippians 3: *Their god is the belly*, therefore the belly created them. Foolish therefore is this reasoning, and so are the Manichaeans.

*To 4.* What is objected, that the causes of opposites are opposed; that is understood of proximate intrinsic causes — for it does not hold of the extrinsic cause — and therefore, because he knew not how to distinguish, the worst Manichaean was deceived. And that it is so is plain. For if the causes of opposites were opposed first producing causes, there would be as many principles as there are kinds of contraries: therefore one God would have made the hot, another the cold, and so for the other contraries. If anyone argued thus he would be derided by all; how much more the most foolish Manichaean.

But what is said, that the flesh is contrary to the spirit, it must be said that the name *flesh* is sometimes taken for nature, as Ephesians 5: *No one ever hated his own flesh*; and so it is not contrary, but on the contrary they are bound by wondrous love. It is also taken for the vice and corruption that is in the flesh: and by reason of this it is contrary; yet it has no contrary cause, because it has no efficient cause, but a deficient one.

*To 5.* What is objected, that what remains the same in the same way etc.; it must be said that there is one kind of agent which acts by itself, and it is impossible for this one to be diversified by producing diverse things; rather, by one and the same it produces many. There is another kind of agent which acts through something other than itself, and this one is varied in doing diverse things. Now God is an agent of the first kind, and not of the second. And because the Manichaean did not understand this, he posited diverse principles and diverse lawgivers, since he saw diversity in laws and in things. — And that he was foolishly moved is plain to the senses. For we see that the same craftsman by the same art of building makes hall and sewer; was it necessary to find two craftsmen to make these? Again, the same physician by the same art of medicine applies diverse medicines to the same sick person according to his diverse states, and gives diverse and contrary precepts according to the diversities of the sick; rather, a physician who always gave the same medicines and commands would be a fool. If, therefore, the state of men in their beginnings was different — like the Jews and the men of the Gospel — what prevents one and the same [God] from prescribing diverse and contrary things? And yet they are not contrary, spiritually understood.

*To 6.* What is finally objected has already been solved, because the viciousness of worldly things is to be despised, but the creature to be loved, and God in it to be praised; and all creatures praise God and are good. And let these things suffice.