Dist. 1, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/1/q/bon-sent-II-d1-p1-a2-q2
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### Question II. *Whether the first principle produced all things by itself, or by means of another.*

Second, granted that all things are from one principle, the question is whether it produced all things by itself, or by means of another.

**1.** That it should be by means of another seems fitting. It belongs to the liberality of an agent not only to communicate an act to another, but also the power of multiplying and spreading; but God is the most liberal of agents: therefore it seems that to the first creature he made he gave the power of making another, and that one gives it to another, and so proceeding on to the last. If you say that the creature is not capable of so great a power, the contrary: it is greater to make something where there is resistance than where there is none; but the creature in making out of a contrary has resistance, in making out of nothing has none: therefore if it is capable of the first power, it is also capable of the second.

**2.** Likewise, it belongs to the nobility of an agent to do the nobler works by itself and the less noble through a servant, as is plain — for it befits a king to judge, but it does not befit him to do the cooking — therefore if the first king is the most noble and produces things in a manner befitting his nobility, it seems that he himself ought to produce one [creature], and through that [produce] the less noble ones, and so proceeding on to the last. If you say that it is not the same with God as with some created agent, because God is not perfected by any work, the objection is that the work of governing, propagating, and ruling is divine, and yet God rules and governs one creature through another; and this is to display his nobility: why does he not similarly create?

**3.** Likewise, it is shown that it is necessarily so, thus: every effect which proceeds from a universal cause proceeds from it either through another proper cause or through itself as appropriated; but God is the most universal cause, who cannot be narrowed or appropriated, since no addition can be made to him: therefore when he produces many things, he produces through another proper cause.

**4.** Likewise, I see that the power of unity reaches to infinite numbers; yet unity produces no number except that it be produced equally by the number which immediately follows it, namely duality — whence unity in no way would make the number three except through duality, and so proceeding in the rest — therefore similarly it seems that the multitude of things does not proceed from God, since he is supremely one, except through the things themselves.

**On the contrary:**

**1.** That this should not be fitting, it seems. As much as a man receives from another, so much is he bound to him; but the creature is bound wholly to God alone — for man ought to love God alone with his whole heart, and nothing else equally — therefore God alone gives the whole. But creation is an action in which the whole is produced: therefore etc.

**2.** Likewise, it is greater to produce a thing from non-being into being than to preserve and perfect it: therefore if God produced things by means of another, it seems that he would also preserve and perfect them by means of another: therefore things would in no way need God, therefore would not tend toward God. But all things are good because they tend toward him and are ordered: therefore nothing would be good or ordered; for in that in which the account of end principally lies, in the same lies the account of good.

**3.** Likewise, that it is impossible, it seems. It is impossible for a creature to act with its whole self, since none is wholly simple: therefore it is impossible that it act as a whole, therefore only as to a part.

**4.** Likewise, it is impossible for a creature to act through an infinite power; but between utter nothing and something there is an infinite distance: therefore it cannot be brought about except by an agent of infinite power; and such is God alone: therefore etc.

### *Conclusion.*

> God produced all things immediately.

**I respond:** It must be said that to posit that God produced things through another agent is against the truth and against the faith — except through his Son: *For he spoke, and they were made*; nor only against faith but also against reason.

And for one who posits that all things have been produced from nothing, it is altogether against reason — so much so that it cannot be conceived how an agent of finite power could produce anything from nothing. Nor do I believe any philosopher posited this.

But on the supposition of a potential or material principle, there were several philosophers who posited an order of production descending step by step in this way: God, since he is altogether simple, whose act is to understand, produced only one and unique first intelligence. That intelligence, on account of standing apart from the First, understood itself and the First, and thus was in some way composite, and so produced its own sphere and the intelligence of the second sphere; and so on down to the sphere of the moon and the tenth intelligence, which irradiates upon rational souls; and as the order is in producing, so it is in irradiating.

— But this error has a false foundation, namely that the material principle is not produced, as has been proved above. Likewise, it has a false reasoning. For it says that, because God is most simple, he produces only one; but this rather tells against [their position], since the simpler something is, the more powerful it is, and the more powerful, the more it can do: therefore if God is most simple, by that very fact he can do everything without an intermediary.

Again, this reasoning is repugnant to them. For if on account of simplicity he produces only one, since the second intelligence is the simplest among them all, whence comes in its sphere a greater variety of stars than in any of the lower spheres? For by their own reasoning it seems that they should be uniform; and so the reasoning of the position contradicts the position itself.

On account of this it must be said, as our faith says, that all things in the first foundation were produced immediately by God. For since creation is of the whole substance as to its whole, it was therefore fitting that it belong to God alone, nor could it belong to another or be through another — as the reasons brought forward on this side prove.

**To the arguments.**

*To 1, 2.* What is objected concerning liberality and nobility, it must be said that both liberality and nobility presuppose order and possibility in act. But in the act of creation no order is regarded; for it is of equal power and dignity to produce an ass from nothing and an Angel, since either is [the work] of infinite power. Nor is there in this act any possibility on the part of the creature, as has been seen, because of the infinity. It is not so with the act of governing and propagating; therefore it is plain that the cases are not alike.

What is objected, that the creature is capable [of creating], because it has no resistance; it must be said that in contrary things resistance contributes to operation. Besides, granted that it impedes, nonetheless one has helps, namely the foundation and the appetite of matter; but in creation there is no help; therefore it is more difficult: therefore there is no argument from the lesser, as is plain.

*To 3.* What is objected, that a universal cause cannot reach to its proper effects; it must be said that a universal cause which is not pure act needs the actuality of a particular cause; but that which is altogether act has in itself at once the account of universal cause and particular cause, because it has at once priority and actuality: therefore it can reach to many things, and reach to them as to the whole.

*To 4.* What is finally objected, that unity cannot reach to later numbers without the prior ones; it must be said that neither in the point is there an altogether active and sufficient power for the line, nor in unity for the number. For unity itself is the power of every number, not a power sufficient by itself, and therefore not altogether actual but in some way also passive, since it is part of the number.

But God reaches to all things by an altogether active power, and therefore can create all things without any intermediary.