Dist. 1, Part 1, Art. 3, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/1/q/bon-sent-II-d1-p1-a3-q1
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### Article III. *On the production or creation itself.*

Having seen [these things] about the entity and quiddity of the producing principle, the question is asked here, thirdly, concerning the production itself, which is called *creation*. Concerning which two things are asked. The first is whether it implies any mutation. The second is whether it implies anything as a medium between Creator and creature.

### Question I. *Whether creation implies a mutation.*

That it does imply a mutation, it seems:

**1.** First, by the authority of Augustine, *On the City of God* XII: «All things that have been created are mutable, because they have been made from nothing»; if therefore what is creatable is mutable, then what is created has been changed, and creation is a mutation. If you say that it is mutable because it can return into nothing, and not because it has been produced, the contrary: as *to be destroyed* implies the way of coming-to-be into non-being, so *to be created* implies it into being: therefore if destruction posits a mutation, so equally does production.

**2.** Likewise, creation is an action; but «every action is in motion, and every motion in action»: therefore he who creates truly acts: therefore truly moves. If you say that divine action is more a substance than an action, and such is creation, the objection is from the passive side: for *to be created* belongs to the creature itself. If therefore the creature is truly susceptible of a passion and a mutation, then creation-as-passion is a mutation.

**3.** Likewise, by Damascene, who is both philosopher and theologian: «Everything that begins from a turning, tends toward a turning» — he is speaking of creation — therefore according to him creation is a turning; but every turning is a mutation, as the same one himself says that created things are mutable because they are *turnable*: therefore creation is a mutation.

**4.** Likewise, the more distant things are, the greater the mutation and variation in coming from one to the other; but being and non-being are most distant: therefore since by creation a being comes from non-being, creation is most truly a mutation.

**5.** Likewise, a thing is changed more when it takes on a new form than when it acquires a new place; and still more when it acquires a substantial form than when it acquires an accidental disposition: therefore when [a thing] receives and takes on the whole anew, then it is changed most. But this is what happens in creation: therefore there truly is mutation there.

**6.** Likewise, if creation implies an action without any mutation, then [it implies an action] without any time; and such things can belong to God, and do belong to him, from eternity: therefore it seems that God produced things from eternity.

**On the contrary:**

**1.** The Master says, and it is contained in the *littera*: «When we say that God makes something, we do not understand any motion to be present in him as he operates». If you say that creation-as-action does not imply motion, but only creation-as-passion, the contrary: the same significate remains in active and passive, as the grammarian says, like nominative and oblique [cases]: therefore if it does not imply motion in the action, then neither in the passion.

**2.** Likewise, *to be changed is to be otherwise now than before*; but what is created is not otherwise now and before, because it never was otherwise than as it is in creation — for it never in any way was nor was it in any state, nor therefore otherwise than now — therefore it is not changed in being created: therefore creation is not a mutation.

**3.** Likewise, *the immutable is what remains in the same way now and before*: therefore the *mutable* is what is otherwise, since it is its opposite; but what is created is not otherwise now than before, because in no way was it before: therefore it has not been changed: therefore creation is not a mutation.

**4.** Likewise, «every motion and mutation is the perfection of what is in potency»; but creation is in no way of what is [already in potency]: therefore creation is neither motion nor mutation. The first is plain from the Philosopher; the second from the Master.

**5.** Likewise, every mutation is founded upon some movable; but creation does not presuppose any movable, because every movable is brought into being by creation: therefore creation is not a mutation.

**6.** Likewise, if creation is a mutation, then either according to an accident or according to substance. Not according to an accident, because then only accidents would be created; but neither according to substance, because then it would be generation or corruption. If you say that it is contained under none of these species, the objection is that not only according to the Philosopher but also according to Augustine «every motion is either toward place or toward form»; but creation is toward matter properly and strictly: therefore it seems that it is not a mutation.

**7.** Likewise, God creates from as great a power as he generates, since he does both by an infinite power; but God can generate without a mutation either of himself or of the begotten Person: therefore by equal reason he can create without a mutation either of himself or of the creature; and if not, I ask why not?

### *Conclusion.*

> Creation is a mutation, but a mutation distinct from natural mutation.

**I respond:** It must be said that one kind of production is that in which the product is otherwise now than before, because according to something of itself it was earlier under one disposition and now is under another; and such is the production which is from a material principle, namely natural generation. Another kind of production is that in which the product in every way is now and in no way was before; and such is the production which is from nothing. The third kind is the production in which the product is equally entirely [the same] now and before, if indeed it is meaningful to speak of *before* there; and such is the generation of the Son from eternity. For from eternity he so proceeded as now.

— The first has the account of motion, of mutation, and of production: of motion, by reason of the preparation of matter, which happens through accidental dispositions, and this needs succession and time; of mutation, by reason of the going-out into being or the reception of the substantial form, which happens in an instant; of production, by reason of the fact that it does not have that form from itself but from another effective [cause]. — The second lacks the account of motion, but has the account of mutation and of production. It lacks the account of motion, because since it has no matter, no disposition can precede it; but it has the account of mutation, because there is a sudden and new bringing-in of form; it has the account of production, because it has this from another effective principle. — The third lacks the account of motion and of mutation, but has the account of production. It lacks the account of motion and of mutation because it is neither from a material principle nor from nothing; yet it is from someone, and is so from him from all eternity.

Therefore it must be granted that the production of the creature is a mutation; and the reasons for this are to be granted, although some seem sophistical.

**To the arguments.**

*To 1.* What is then objected, that it is without motion; it must be said that this is understood as without a motion of the *agent*, not however that it is without a mutation of the *product*. For if, as the Philosopher says, the soul, while it moves the body, remains immovable, how much more God, while he creates and changes all things, «himself remaining stable, gives all things to be changed». — If then it be objected that the verb in active and passive signify the same; it must be said that this is false, because *action* and *passion* belong to different categories; nevertheless in the conjugation [of the verb] the one is placed alongside the other, because according to the formation of the word one comes from the other.

*To 2.* What is objected, that *to be changed is to be otherwise now and before*; it must be said that this is not the general account of *to be changed* or of *mutation*, but only of natural mutation.

*To 3.* What is then objected: *the immutable is what remains in the same way, and the mutable is what is otherwise*; it must be said that here the fallacy of the consequent occurs, because if *mutable* and *immutable* are opposed as privation and habit, and the immutable is what remains in the same way, then the mutable or the changed is what does not remain in the same way. But this may be true for three reasons: either because it is in no way before and after; or in no way before and in some way after — and so not in the same way; or because it is simply otherwise before and otherwise after; and so, when one proceeds from many causes-of-truth to one, one commits the fallacy of the consequent.

*To 4, 5, 6.* To the three following reasons the answer is plain, because all of them proceed concerning natural mutation — which presupposes matter and a being in potency, and which is generation; but in that way creation is not a mutation, but [is] above this kind of mutation; whence it can be called a *supernatural* mutation. And if you ask whether it is a mutation toward form or toward place, I say that it is toward the whole substance of the thing and so toward form, and through this it can be included under mutation-toward-form.

*To 7.* What is asked about the generation of the Son, it must be said that the cases are not alike: for although each is from an equal power, nevertheless creation is *from nothing*. But *from* cannot imply identity nor causality, therefore [implies] order: therefore to come-to-be *from nothing* has being *after nothing*, and so *after non-being*: therefore in some way it is now in a way it was not before; and therefore a mutation is necessarily posited by production from nothing, or a beginning. But the Son is from the substance of the Father by identity, nor need it be that he have an ordering toward nothing or toward non-being: therefore he can always be, and so be produced without a beginning or a mutation. Whence the production of a thing does not necessarily posit the inchoation of the thing, but production from nothing necessarily does; and therefore creation includes a mutation, but the generation of the Son does not at all.