Dist. 1, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/1/q/bon-sent-II-d1-p2-a1-q1
----------------------------------------
### ARTICLE I. *On the distinction of things.*
### QUESTION I. *Whether from the first efficient [cause] there ought, or could, have been a multitude of things.*

It is asked therefore first, whether from the first efficient [cause] there ought, or could, have been a multitude of things. And that there could not, it seems first thus:

1. Through the Philosopher: «The same thing, behaving uniformly, is of its nature apt to produce the same effect»; but the first efficient [cause], being one, behaves altogether uniformly: therefore it seems that it could never have made many things, therefore one only.

2. Likewise, from the supremely good evils can never come; from the supremely true, falsities cannot come: therefore from the supremely one, a multitude cannot come.

3. Likewise, the sensible world is said to be likened to the archetypal world, which is in the divine mind — for it was made unto the expression of that world — but in that [world] all things are one: therefore also in this world: therefore it seems that from it there could not have been a multitude.

4. Likewise, from God there is a going-out by generation, by spiration, and by creation; but by generation only a single Person emanates, and likewise by spiration: therefore by creation only a single creature goes forth.

**On the contrary:**

1. The better a producing substance is, the more it is diffusive of itself, and the more it is diffusive of itself, the more things it is of its nature apt to communicate itself to; but the first efficient [cause] is the best among all things: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the more spiritual a substance is, the more things it is cognizant of; but the supreme substance is the most spiritual: therefore it is cognizant of many things. But it is not cognizant of many things preceding it or accompanying it: therefore of many things going out from it.

3. Likewise, the simpler a substance is, the more powerful, because «a power, the more it is united, the more it is infinite»; but the more powerful, the more it can do as to many things: therefore if the substance of the first principle is the simplest, then it can and ought, for the manifestation of itself, to produce many things, since it is itself unique.

4. Likewise, the prior a cause is, the more universal, whence the first is the most universal; and the more universal, the principle of more things: therefore since the principle productive of the universe is simply first, it ought therefore and was able to bring forth from itself a multitude of things.

> **Conclusion.** The multitude of things is from one principle, because it is a principle both first and uniquely one.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that, if it be asked concerning the intrinsic principle, whence comes the multitude of things — especially according to species — it is plain that [it comes] from form. But whence comes the multitude of forms, as from an effective principle

extrinsic [to the things], it is plain that [it comes] from the one efficient [cause]. — But how a multitude can come from a principle supremely and most perfectly one is difficult to understand. And some have erred concerning this.

For certain men said that, although the Founder of things was one, nevertheless he makes many and varied things on account of the multitude of ideal forms. — But that was disproved in the first book, where it is shown that all those [forms] are one; nor is there in God, according to reality, any number other than [that] of the Persons.

But some wished to say that this was on account of the multitude of intermediaries. For God, since he is one and supremely simple, understood himself; and understanding himself and nothing else, he produced the first Intelligence; and that Intelligence understood itself and God, and therefore produced two, namely another Intelligence and its own sphere; and so descending and multiplying. — And this opinion was disproved in the preceding lecture, where it is shown that God produces all things immediately.

A third group said that the multitude of things was from a single principle on account of the multitude and infinity of reflections by which the divine intellect reflects upon itself and understands itself, and understands itself to understand; and so on to infinity. — But that is nothing. First, because it is false that in God there is a multitude of reflections, since God is his own act of understanding. Likewise, from this there would never come anything but a diversity according to number.

And therefore the correct position is that the multitude in things is from one principle, because it is the first principle and uniquely one. For since it is the principle simply first, therefore it is fecund and powerful with an infinite and immense fecundity. For if unity, which is first in the genus of number, is a principle from which infinite numbers can go forth, and the point, from which infinite lines [go forth]; that which is simply first is so powerful that it is altogether immense. On account, therefore, of its immensity it can [do] infinite things, but on account of the manifestation of its immensity it brings forth many things from its treasures, not all, because the effect cannot be equalled to the power of the first cause itself. — But because it is uniquely one, therefore it is the simplest and most spiritual and most perfect: because the simplest, of the greatest power; because the most spiritual, of the greatest wisdom; because it is the most perfect, of the highest goodness; because of the greatest power, it can [do] many things; because of the greatest wisdom, it knows many things; because of the highest goodness, it wills to produce many things and to communicate itself. — And therefore from one principle, because first and one, a multitude goes out.

1. As to the objection that the same thing behaving in like manner etc.; it must be said that this is understood of those agents whose power is constrained and limited; and this has no place in God.

2. As to the objection that from the good there are no evils; it must be said that there is no parallel, because evils and falsities denote privations and defects, and therefore have no efficient cause, but a deficient one, such as it does not befit God to be; but a multitude is a position [a positive thing], and therefore has an effective cause.

3. As to the objection concerning the archetypal and the sensible world, it must be said that this [world] imitates that one insofar as it can, but falls short. For in that [world] there is the highest beauty through unity in every mode; here, however, if there were unity, there would not be beauty, because there would be neither order nor perfection. And therefore, that this world might imitate [it] in perfection and beauty, it was necessary that it should have a multitude, so that many things might do what one could not do by itself.

4. As to the last objection concerning generation and spiration, it is now plain: because the begotten, equal to the begetter, fulfils and imitates him in all things, and likewise the Holy Spirit; and therefore it would be superfluous to posit another Person. But it is not so in the creature, which is of finite goodness; therefore what the creature could not contain in itself, it received in a way in a fellow given to it, so that thus from many things one world-machine might be perfected.