Dist. 1, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/1/q/bon-sent-II-d1-p2-a1-q2
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### QUESTION II. *Whether the universe of things is distinguished by a threefold difference, namely by spiritual substance, by corporeal, and by [that] composed of both.*

Secondly, it is asked concerning this, about the differences according to which things have been multiplied, which the Master sets down in the *littera* — namely spiritual substance, and corporeal, and [that] composed of both. It is asked therefore whether this distinction ought to be in the universe. And it seems that it ought not:

1. First, concerning the *corporeal*. For, as has been touched on, everything that God makes, he makes with order preserved, therefore on account of his goodness; but he does not make [it] in order that his goodness be increased, but [in order that it be] shared: but only the spiritual creature «is capable of God and can be a partaker of him»: therefore he ought to have made only the spiritual [creature], not the corporeal. If you say that the corporeal is a partaker in effect, although not in itself; this is nothing, because for something to partake of the divine goodness in effect is nothing other than to be — for by this very fact that it is, it partakes of the effect of [his] goodness — therefore it is the same to say that a creature was made for the partaking of the divine goodness as to say that a creature was made in order that it might be; but this is nothing: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, it seems so concerning the *composite*. For every composite that God makes, he makes with proportion preserved — for he always joins form to a matter supremely proportionable [to it] — but of the spiritual creature to the corporeal there is no proportion, or a very slight and remote one: therefore in no way ought God to unite these as a perfection to a perfectible thing. That there is no proportion is plain: for the spiritual is simple, the corporeal has an infinity of parts.

3. Likewise, the corporeal is corruptible, and so has a finite duration, but the spiritual is incorruptible, and so has an infinite duration; if therefore «of the finite to the infinite there is no proportion», it is plain etc. If you say that the body was incorruptible from its first condition: then at least, after it became corruptible, the union ought to cease.

4. Likewise, it seems so concerning the *purely spiritual*. Everything that God makes, he ought to make with the connection of natures preserved; but the nature of a genus is essentially connected to [its] difference: therefore if the animate and the sensible is connected to the rational, then it is impossible that anything be made having reason without its having vegetation and sense, that is, without its being an animal. But an animal is a substance composed of the spiritual and the corporeal: therefore etc. And the Philosopher seems to say this, «that the vegetative is in the sensitive, as the triangle in the quadrilateral», and this [holds] in the rational, as the quadrilateral in the pentagon; but God never makes a quadrilateral without a triangle, nor a pentagon without a quadrilateral and a triangle: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, God makes nothing except out of great love, therefore [he makes for] each [nature] what is better for it. Either, then, it is better for the spiritual nature to be separate, or it is better to be conjoined: on whichever supposition, the other difference is taken away.

**On the contrary:**

1. It was fitting for God so to make things that they should be unto the manifestation of his power; but power is manifested in the production of things greatly distant and in their conjunction — for a power is shown the more powerful, the more it can [reach] over things more distant — but the first and greatest distance of substances is between the corporeal and the incorporeal, because they are the primary differences of the genus: therefore, in order that the divine power be fully manifested, it was necessary to produce spiritual and corporeal substance, and again to unite the ones produced.

2. Likewise, it was fitting for God so to produce things that his wisdom might be manifested; but the wisdom of a craftsman is manifested in the perfection of order, and every order has of necessity a lowest and a highest and a middle. If, then, the lowest is the purely corporeal nature, the highest the spiritual nature, the middle [that] composed of both; unless he had made all these, the wisdom of God would not be perfectly shown: it was therefore fitting that all these be made. Whence Augustine, in the twelfth book of the *Confessions*: «Two things hast thou made, O Lord, one near to thee and the other near to nothing».

3. Likewise, it was fitting for God so to produce things that his goodness might be manifested; but goodness consists in the diffusion and communication of itself to another: if therefore his goodness consists in the communication of the noblest act, which is to live and to understand, it was fitting that he should give to another not only the power of living and understanding, but also the power of communicating to another. If

therefore the living and understanding [thing] is spiritual substance, and that which is vivified and perfected through intellect is body: therefore for the perfect manifestation of goodness it was necessary that spiritual and corporeal substance be made. But these would not manifest [it] perfectly, unless the one communicated to the other, and this cannot be except through union: therefore it was necessary to make [a substance] composed of both.

4. Likewise, this seems [so] not only by a theological reason, but also by a philosophical one: because if one is to posit one difference of contrariety, [one must posit] also the other: if therefore the corporeal, then also the spiritual; and if the extremes that can be composed are to be posited, then also the middle: therefore etc.

> **Conclusion.** That threefold kind of substance is required on account of the threefold perfection of the universe.

**I respond:** It must be said that for the perfection of the universe this threefold kind of substance is required: and this on account of the threefold perfection of the universe, which is regarded in the amplitude of its compass, the sufficiency of its order, the inflowing of [its] goodness — in which three it expresses in [its] cause a threefold perfection, namely of power, of wisdom, and of goodness. Whence the reasons adduced to this [conclusion] are to be conceded.

1. To the opposing [arguments] it must be replied. As to the objection that in [God's] works order ought to be preserved, so that all things come to be for the divine goodness to be shared; it must be said that to be made for the divine goodness is twofold: either [for it] to be *shown*, and in this way all things were made; for all things express the divine goodness; or [for it] to be *shared*, and this in two ways: either because they are of a nature to partake, or because they serve those that partake. In the first way the spiritual creatures were founded, in the second way the corporeal; yet these too partake in some way; but in their partaking there is no [final] stopping-point, but they are ordered toward a further one.

2, 3. As to the objection that in every conjunction proportion ought to be preserved; it must be said that in the conjunction of the soul to the body proportion is preserved, both absolutely and in relation to the end: absolutely; for although the highest of the spirit and the lowest of the body have a great separation, nevertheless the highest of the body and the lowest of the spirit have the greatest nearness. For the animal or rational spirit has the power of vivifying, the power of vegetating and of sensing; and the human body has equality of complexion, has multiplicity of organs, has further subtlety of [its] spirits, and [this] according to a threefold difference: for it has a vital spirit, a natural spirit, and an animal spirit. Comparing, then, the equal complexion to the vivifying power through the medium and bond of the vital spirit, the bond is best. Likewise, comparing not only the equality of complexion, but also the organization and the perfection of organization, to the power of vegetating and sensing by means of the natural and animal spirit, the proportion is excellent and the bond marvellous. Whence, just as earth and fire, which are greatly distant, are bound by a double medium — one which communicates more with earth, and the other which [communicates] more with fire — so it is in the matter at hand.

A perfect proportion is also regarded in relation to the end. For since to the human soul has been given freedom of choice, turnable and re-turnable — that is, able to stand and to fall and to rise again — there has been given to it a body able to die, and able not to die, and thereafter able to be vivified everlastingly. Again, since the created soul is «as it were a blank tablet», there has been given to it a body having manifold organs, so that in it [the soul] might be perfected by the sciences. — Likewise, on the part of the body there is an excellent proportion in relation to the end. For since there is order in corporeal forms — which is plain, because the form of the element [is ordered] to the form of the mixed, and the form of mixture to the form of complexion, and again the vegetable to the sensible — and since there is no [stopping-point] in the corporeal and imperfect thing; there is no stopping-point there, but ultimately forms of this kind dispose [matter] toward the rational soul, through which also the body and corporeal nature is made a partaker of eternal beatitude. Either, then, every intention of corporeal nature is dissolved, or it is necessary to arrive, by means of the rational soul, at the ultimate end.

4. As to the objection that in the work of God the binding-together of natures ought to be preserved; it must be said that it is true

[that it ought]: but the sensible and the vegetable are not of the necessity of the rational, except [in] that which is rational through union. For the soul, as was touched on before, since it is a simple and pure spirit, cannot be united to the flesh except by a double medium on its own side; likewise neither [can] the complexioned body. And therefore it is necessary that there intervene a nature of vivifying or vegetating, and a nature further of sensing; and therefore in every man these occur. But because the Angel is a pure spirit, therefore it does not need these. — It is plain therefore that against truth and faith the Sadducees err, who deny that there is a spirit. It is plain nonetheless that the Manichaeans err, who deny that the soul is united to the body as to a perfectible thing, [holding rather that it is united] as to a prison.

5. As to the objection lastly made, that God gives to each what is better; it must be said that God does not give to each what is *absolutely* better, because then he would not make things ordered, but equally perfect; and this would be repugnant to perfection, «because, if they were equal, they would not be all [things]», as Augustine says. When therefore it is said that God gives to each what is better for it, this is understood according to the *requirement of order and of nature*. Now it befits the nature of the soul to be united to a body, but the nature of the angelic [creature] to be separate from a body. And therefore that reasoning is not valid, because the love of God does not exclude order.