Dist. 1, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/1/q/bon-sent-II-d1-p2-a2-q1
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### ARTICLE II. *On the order of things to their end and to one another.*

Consequently, in the second place, inquiry is made concerning produced things as regards order. And concerning this two things are asked. The first is about the order of things in comparison to their end. The second is about the order they have to one another.

### QUESTION I. *Which is the more principal end of created things, whether the divine glory or our utility.*

Concerning the first the procedure is thus: since all creatures have been created for the divine glory and for their own utility, as the Master says and as can be gathered from Scripture, and Augustine says in the book *On Christian Doctrine* that God made us and loves us not for his own utility but for his goodness and our utility; the question therefore is, which is the more principal end of the creating of things, whether the divine glory or our utility. And that it is the glory of God, it seems:

1. That is the more principal end which is more remote — for the last end is the most powerful — but the more remote end is the glory of God rather than our utility — for the glory of God is not [ordered] for the sake of utility, but utility is ordered to glory — therefore it seems that the glory of God is the more principal.

2. Again, that is the more principal end which is more perfect; but the glory of God is more perfect: therefore etc. Proof of the middle [term]: that end is more perfect which renders the operation ordered to it more perfect; but the work which one does for the glory of God is far better than [that which one does] for his own utility. Whence the Apostle, First to the Corinthians, chapter ten: *Do all things to the glory of God*: therefore etc.

3. Again, that is the more principal end which is more essential; but the glory of God is more essential to each created thing, especially to the rational [creature], than its own utility. For a thing can, on account of malice, be deprived of its utility, but it can never be deprived of being [ordered] to the glory of God.

4. Again, that is the more principal end which is more universal, because the principal end ought to embrace the whole: but the glory of God is the end which every nature attains, whether human or angelic, whether good or evil: therefore etc.

**To the contrary:**

1. That is the more principal end of a created thing which the efficient [cause] more intends; but God intends in the creating of a creature its utility more than his own glory: therefore etc. Proof of the middle [term]: as the Apostle says, First to the Corinthians, chapter thirteen: *Charity seeks not the things that are its own, but those of another*; but God does what he does out of most perfect charity: therefore he neither seeks nor intends what is his own, therefore not his own glory, but the utility of another.

2. Again, that is the more principal end of a created thing which the created thing more desires; but every thing so desires its own advantage or utility that it can in no way will the opposite; but it can will the opposite of the divine glory, as is clear in blasphemers: therefore utility etc.

3. Again, that is the more powerful end of a created thing at which the efficient [cause] does not arrive except through the effect; this is clear, because, if I were equally well protected from the rains without a house as with a house, then, if I made a house for the sake of such protection, I would make it in vain. If therefore God is not more glorious after the creating of things than before, then, if he made things principally for the sake of his own glory, he would make [them] in vain: but if he does not make [them] in vain, then he does not produce [them] principally for the sake of his own glory, but for the sake of another's utility.

4. Again, that is the more principal end which more perfects the effect when it arrives at it; but the enjoyment of God perfects the soul more than the praising of God: therefore the soul was made more principally for the sake of enjoyment than for the sake of the glory and praise of God.

> **Conclusion.** The more principal end of created things is the glory or goodness of God — not indeed to be acquired or increased, but to be manifested and communicated.

**I respond:** It must be said that the more principal end of the creating of a thing, or of created things, is the glory or goodness of God, rather than the utility of the creature. — For, as is clear from Proverbs, chapter sixteen: *The Lord has wrought all things for himself*; but not for his own utility or need, because the Psalm [says]: *I have said to the Lord: Thou art my God, for thou hast no need of my goods*: therefore for the sake of his own glory — not, I say, for glory to be increased, but for glory to be manifested and for his glory to be communicated; in the manifesting and partaking of which is regarded the highest utility of the creature, namely its glorification or beatification.

1. To what is therefore objected, that charity seeks another's advantage; it must be said that it is otherwise in us and in God. For in us the proper good differs from the common good; but in God his own good is the common good, for he himself is «the good of every good». If therefore he did not order the effect to himself, or did not make it for the sake of himself — since he himself is the good from which is every good — then the effect would not be good. Since therefore the whole utility of the creature is regarded in [its] ordering to the good, which is God; therefore the charity of God most rightly made all things and turned [them] to himself. It is not so in us.

2. To what is objected, that that is the more principal end which nature more desires; it must be said that nature can be spoken of in two ways: either of nature as deficient, or as perfect. I say therefore that a deficient nature is curved back into itself: therefore it desires its proper good, and therefore its own advantage. But a perfect nature is, by the love of charity, lifted upward, and far more disproportionately desires the glory of God than its own utility: as is clear in those who have charity. — To what is therefore said, that that is the more principal end which nature more desires; it is true of a right and perfect nature.

3. To what is objected, that that is the more principal end of a created thing at which the made thing arrives;

it can be answered in two ways. *First*, that this holds true when the agent operates on account of need for some end, at which it cannot arrive except through the work which it produces; but such an agent is not God, as is clear: and therefore it has no place here. — *Or otherwise* it must be said that things were made for the glory of God — not, I say, to be *acquired* or *enlarged*, but to be *shown* and *communicated*. And although the glory of God exists without the things made, nevertheless it is not communicated or manifested except through produced things.

4. To what is objected, that enjoyment more perfects [the soul]; it must be said that praise is twofold, namely *perfect* and *imperfect*. Imperfect praise perfects the soul less than enjoyment; but not so perfect praise, because the soul rejoices more in glory and will delight more in the glory and honor of God than in its own glorification, and will take more joy in praising than in considering its own good. And therefore it is clear that that end is more remote.