Dist. 1, Part 2, Art. 3, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/1/q/bon-sent-II-d1-p2-a3-q1
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### ARTICLE III. *On the manner of distinguishing the angelic spirit from the rational soul.*

Consequently, in the third place, inquiry is made concerning the manner of distinguishing the angelic spirit from the rational soul. And two things are asked. First it is asked whether they differ in species, or only in number. Secondly, what that difference is by which they differ.

### QUESTION I. *Whether the Angel and the soul differ in species.*

That they do differ in species, it seems:

1. Things that differ in species have diverse perfections according to species; but man and the Angel differ in species, that is settled, and the soul gives species to man and [his] specific act: therefore [so do] both the soul and the Angel.

2. Again, things that are alike in species are either produced together, or the one contributes to the production of the other, where they are produced by propagation; but souls are not produced together with Angels, nor do Angels contribute to the production of souls: therefore etc. If you say that the like could be argued about souls [too]; this is false, because the father contributes to the generation of the offspring.

3. Again, the sensible and the vegetable agree more with the sensible and the vegetable than the sensible and vegetable [agrees] with the non-sensible and non-vegetable; but the human soul is by its essence sensible and vegetable, otherwise it would not make an animal: therefore, since it differs in species from a soul [that is] merely sensible and vegetable, much more does it differ from the angelic spirit, which is neither sensible nor vegetable.

**To the contrary:**

1. Things whose perfection and ultimate completion is one in species are one; but man and the Angel are ordered to the same beatitude, which is the vision and enjoyment of God: therefore man and the Angel, that is, the soul and the Angel, are one in species.

2. Again, things whose ultimately-completing difference is one in species are one in species; but the ultimately-completing difference of the rational soul and of the Angel is that which is *rational* or *intellectual*, and in this they share, as Gregory says, that man shares «being with stones, understanding with Angels»: therefore etc.

3. Again, things whose natural best is one are one in species; but the natural best of man and of the Angel is one, as Bernard says to Eugene: «Your best, he says, and the Angel's, is reason»: therefore, since species is taken from the best, it is clear, etc.

> **Conclusion.** The rational soul differs in species from the Angel, and indeed in the genus of substance.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that concerning this there was a threefold opinion.

For some have wished to say that this question is null. For when it is asked whether some things differ in species, it is supposed that each is in a genus as a species; and since the soul is not a species, but a part of a species, nor is it in a genus along the straight line as a species or an individual, but at the side, or rather by reduction as a principle: therefore they say that this question is null, since the soul is not a species. — But this response is rather an evasion *ad hominem* than a solution *to the question*. For the question still remains: since the soul is a substance and a substantial form, or [something] having a substantial form, in which all souls agree, whether the soul and the Angel agree in the same [substance], or whether there is there only an accidental difference. *Moreover*, the separated soul is a spirit and a substance, inasmuch as it is a thing existing through itself, and standing of itself under accidents, and according to its own change capable of contraries: therefore it is properly a substance and rightly in the genus of substance like a first substance, and the Angel likewise; this is settled. If therefore concerning all first substances it is reasonable to ask whether they agree or differ in species: it is clear that the question is good and right, and the response is a flight.

But the second position is that, if the soul is considered as a spirit, it is the same in species as the Angel, but differs in this, that there is among souls, in relation to souls, a stronger likeness, as water is said to be the same as water. And the reason that moves them is on account of the agreement in their best and noblest [element], as was shown in the objecting. — But this position is not commonly held, because it is plain that man and the Angel differ not only in species but even in genus: therefore also the perfection or form giving species to man differs from the Angel; but this is the soul: therefore it differs in species from the Angel. And this will be made clearer below.

The third position is that the Angel and the soul differ in species; but what that difference is, will now be asked. But for now, according to the common position, it must be held that they differ essentially and in the genus of substance. — Whence the reasons proving that the Angel and the soul are differing in species are to be granted, in that way in which it is permitted to call the rational soul a *species*. For, properly speaking, it is rather the *form of the species* or a formal part, than a species; yet by an extended name it can be called a species.

1. To what is objected, that the perfection of the Angel and of man are the same in species; it must be said that there is a perfection in *first being*, and in *second being*; of which, [though] the perfection in *second being* is the same, they are not on that account the same — for the swan and snow are white by the same whiteness according to species — but that [objection] holds true of perfection as regards *first being*; in this way, however, glory or grace is not a perfection.

2. 3. To what is objected: things whose ultimately-completing difference is the same, etc.; it must be said that the *rational*, insofar as it is the difference of the soul and of the Angel, differs. For the *rational* of the Angel is intellectual; but the *rational* of the soul is properly rational. For the Angel is born to understand by a simple and God-formed intellect, the soul by an inquiring and possible intellect. — And by this is clear the solution to the following [objection]. For although reason is the best [element] of me and of the Angel, yet my reason and the Angel's reason are diverse, not only according to accident, but even according to species and essence, as is clear.