Dist. 1, Part 2, Art. 3, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/1/q/bon-sent-II-d1-p2-a3-q2
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### QUESTION II. *What the difference is by which the Angel and the soul differ.*

Secondly, concerning this it is asked, what that difference is by which the Angel and the soul differ. And that they differ essentially by that which is *unitable* [to a body], it seems, first, thus:

1. As the human body is to a body not unitable, so is the human spirit to a spirit not unitable; but the human body differs in species — indeed even in genus, as it seems — from a body not unitable, such as a stone, by this, that it is unitable to a life-giving soul: therefore etc.

2. Again, to be unitable belongs to the rational soul: either therefore *essentially* or *accidentally*; but not *accidentally*, that is settled; because then from body and soul there would not come to be one [thing] by essence: therefore this belongs to the soul *essentially*. But whatever things differ in something essential, differ in species: therefore the soul and the Angel etc.

3. Again, a part does not have its complete *being* except according as it is in the whole: therefore, since the rational soul is a part of man, it does not have its complete *being* except according as it is in its whole, namely in man, as a part. But it is not a part of man except according as it is unitable: therefore the complement of the soul consists in unitability to the body. But by that in which its complement consists, each thing essentially differs or is distinguished from something else: therefore etc.

4. Again, to give life is an act of the rational soul, which it has upon the body: either therefore an *accidental* act, or an *essential* one. If *accidental*, then life is accidental to man; which is manifestly false, because then to be an animal would be accidental to him. If it is a *substantial* or *essential* act, then it is in the soul by reason of that *by which it is*, that is, of the formal and completing [principle]. Therefore, if the formal and completing difference of each thing is taken from that which is formal and completing, then from that by which the soul is born to give life to the body that difference is taken; but by the very fact that the soul is born to be united to a body, it is born to give life to the body: therefore from unitability is taken the essential, specific difference of the soul to the Angel.

**To the contrary:**

1. Every difference is prior by nature to that of which it is the difference; but the union or unitability to the body is consequent upon the soul, because it states a relation to another, without which the soul can be and be understood: therefore unitability or the unitable is not that by which the Angel and the soul differ.

2. Again, the completing difference must be proper to that of which it is the difference; but to be unitable belongs not only to the rational soul but also to the vegetable and the sensible: therefore it is not the completing difference of the rational soul.

3. Again, the specific difference must be taken from that which is best in the thing, because each thing must be defined by that which is best in it; but to be unitable belongs to the soul on the side of its lowest [element]: therefore the completing difference cannot be taken from it.

4. Again, the completing difference so essentially adheres that its opposite cannot be present, or, if it is present in act, yet not naturally; but the rational soul is so unitable that [it is also] separable; and moreover, to be separable belongs to the soul by nature, and by this it differs from the vegetable and the sensible: therefore to be unitable to a body can in no way be the specific difference by which the Angel and the soul differ.

> **Conclusion.** The specific difference between the Angel and the human soul is rightly taken from this, that the soul is naturally unitable to a body, but the Angel not.

**I respond:** It must be said that concerning this there is a threefold manner of speaking.

For some have endeavored to assign the specific difference of the Angel and the soul by comparison to God. And the reason that moved them was this, that

the ultimately-completing difference must be taken from that which is nobler in the thing; and therefore they wished to say that the soul and the Angel differ because the Angel has a God-formed intellect, as Dionysius holds; whence it has species innate to it and sees by a simple gaze. But the soul has a potential or comparative and inquiring intellect, and this by nature, whatever be the case as to glory. — But this manner of assigning the difference does not seem to be altogether fitting. *First*, because the differences of things are taken according to the comparison which they have to *themselves*, not in relation to *God*, in respect of whom they rather agree. *Further*, the God-formedness of the intellect regards the intellective power; but we are inquiring about a difference of essences, not about a difference of powers. *Lastly*, what is obtained through grace is not against nature as instituted; but the intellect acquires God-formedness through glory: therefore this is not alien to the human intellect; therefore by this the Angel does not differ from the soul. And what is more, the separated soul has the manner of understanding which the Angel has; and the soul of Adam had innate species, as also the Angel; and all this seems to state something accidental: therefore the essential difference must not be taken from this.

But there were others who endeavored to find the difference according to the comparison of things to one another; and because they could not find acts differing formally, through which they might come to a knowledge of diverse differences, but found acts differing in degree and dignity; they said that the soul and the Angel differ in species on account of the greater excess in simplicity and goodness of nature. And this excess in essentials varies the species, when that excess goes beyond the limit due to the species, just as the hot in the fourth degree is of another species than the hot in the first; so they say it is in the matter at hand. — But it is very doubtful that the Angel so far exceeds the soul that from the excess itself a difference of species arises, since the best soul, namely Christ's, is the noblest creature and yet does not go beyond the human species. And *moreover*, granted that there were an excess there, the specific difference must not be taken from it, because it rather seems to follow upon the specific difference than the reverse. For rather, things of diverse goodnesses have degrees in nobility on account of the diverse natures of species, which are born to receive more and less, than the reverse. And again, this difference seems very general and transcendent, because, if it can be taken thus here, by parity of reasoning [it could be] everywhere.

And therefore the third is this manner of speaking, which I judge the more probable, which is taken by the comparison of the rational soul to the human body, on which side the soul becomes known to us not only according to accidents, but also according to *substance* and nature, and not only according to that which is of indignity, but also according to that which is of *nobility*. For this, that the soul is united to the human body or gives life to the human body, does not state an *accidental* act nor an *ignoble* act: not accidental, because by reason of it the soul is a substantial form; not ignoble, because by reason of it the soul is the noblest of all forms, and in the soul stands the appetite of the whole of nature. For the human body is organized and tempered with the noblest temperament and organization that is in nature; therefore it is not completed, nor is it born to be completed, except by the noblest form or nature. That, therefore, by which the soul is unitable to a body, states such an essential something — regarding what is noblest in the soul; and so from it is rightly taken the specific difference according to which the soul differs from the angelic nature. — Whence the reasons adduced for this are to be granted. To those things which are objected to the contrary, from the foregoing the response is clear.

1. As to what it says first, that the difference must be prior; it must be said that it is true; and that difference which is to-be-*unitable* does not state a pure relation, but a natural aptitude, which is in the soul according to intrinsic principles, which are prior to the soul by nature, just as *the rational* [is prior] in respect of man.

2. 3. To what is objected, that the completing difference must be proper; it must be said that to be united to a *body* is not proper to the rational soul; but nevertheless to be united to a *human body*, inasmuch as it states that which is essential and noble to the soul, so also imports that which is proper. — And by this is clear the other [point]. For that by mediation of which the soul perfects the human body is that by which the soul is a rational soul, and which is also the principle of the other noble operations; but

it perfects [it] by itself; for the soul by itself perfects the body, just as a form by itself is united to matter.

4. To what is objected lastly, that the difference essentially adheres; it must be said that to-be-*unitable* adheres inseparably, because the *aptitude* is always present, although the *act* is not always present, as is clear in rationality and the power to walk. And just as the able-to-walk is maimed, and the rational soul is rendered foolish — not by nature, but on account of a defect of nature; so [too] that the soul is separated, this is in punishment of sin. And therefore to-be-*separable* is not assigned as the difference of the soul in the way that to-be-*unitable* [is]. — *Further*, the rational soul, by the very fact that it is born to perfect a body so perfect and ordered by nature to immortality, is immortal; and by the very fact it is born to be *separated* from this body now dead on account of sin; and so it does not now state another difference than this, which is to-be-*unitable*, but follows upon it, because, just as there is no *separation* except of [something] previously united, so there is no *separability* in anything unless there has first been unitability by nature. And therefore, if anything can be the difference of the soul, it seems that it is this most of all, that is, that which is signified by this name. For our intellect very rarely arrives at the knowledge of a substantial form except *a posteriori*; and because as it knows, so it names, therefore it for the most part names the differences that are prior by nature *a posteriori*. And so the things sought are clear.

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