Dist. 1, Part 2, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/1/q/bon-sent-II-d1-p2-dubia
----------------------------------------
### Doubts on the text of the Master.

### Dub. I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and it is asked, first, about that which Augustine says and which is contained in the *littera*: *Because God is good, we are*. For it seems *false to say [this]*. For if the consequence is valid: then, if we were not, God would not be good. If you say that it is not a necessary consequence, and that it does not there state a *consequence* but a *cause*; it is objected against this, that the goodness of God either is a *sufficient* cause, or *not*. If *sufficient*, then it posits the effect in the manner in which it is present [in the cause]; but it is necessary that God be good: therefore it was necessary that creatures go forth into being, therefore not voluntary; the opposite of which was demonstrated in the first book, in the treatise on the will. — Likewise, it seems to *appropriate badly*. For in a vestige there is a correspondence of the cause to the effect, so that the essence of the creature represents the essence of the Creator, power [represents] power, truth truth, and goodness goodness: therefore he ought to say: *because God is, we are*. On account of this there is a question: since to our being there concur power, wisdom, [and] goodness, why is the causality of our being attributed rather to goodness than to the others?

**I respond:** It must be said that the cause in act is from the concurrence of the efficient [cause] and the end, because the end moves the efficient [cause] in these lower things. And since *will* states that by which the efficient [cause] is joined to the end in [beings] having intellect, hence it is that the will is the immediate cause; and so it has been said and shown in the first book. Since therefore *the good* states the account of a twofold cause, namely of the efficient and of the end, hence it is that the good is the reason why the will is in act, and so the most powerful reason of the production of effects. And therefore our *being* is attributed to goodness, not by way of representing, or of *appropriation* in representing, but of [its] account in causing. Whence the first consequence includes this, namely: because God is good, he wills to diffuse himself; and because he wills to diffuse himself, he wills to produce a creature; and because God wills to produce a creature, he wills the creature to be; and so, *because he is good, we are*.

### Dub. II.

Likewise it is asked concerning this proposition: *Inasmuch as we are, we are good*. Therefore it seems that we are good *by essence*, which is against Boethius in the book *On the Hebdomads*, who says that we are good *by participation*. — Likewise, if inasmuch as we are, we are good: then it is not [possible] to understand *being* with goodness abstracted [from it]; which is false, since truth is understood with goodness abstracted.

**I respond:** It must be said that goodness is twofold in a creature: one which is from the form giving *being*, another which is from the form giving *well-being*. The first is substantial goodness, which does not add a new essence over the form, but only a relation to the final

cause, by which comparison everything other than God has being good. And because that comparison to the essential or final cause is essential, and never relinquishes being nor can relinquish [it]; hence it is that Augustine says: «Inasmuch as we are, we are good». — To that, then, which is objected concerning Boethius, it must be said that he calls good *by essence* that good which is absolutely good, not from dependence on another. But in this way no creature is good — rather [it is good] from comparison, and therefore by *participation*. Nor does it follow that [it is good] *accidentally*; because participation is not accidental in respect of the first goodness, which is from the form giving *being*, although it is accidental according as it is from the form giving *well-being*.

To that which is objected, that it is not [possible] to understand *being* etc.; it must be said that what is attributed to something *according to itself* can be attributed in two ways: for it either *follows* or *precedes*. If it *precedes*, then it is so essential that without it [the thing] neither is nor can be understood. But if in some way it *follows*, yet does not fall into another genus, it can indeed be understood by an apprehending intellect and by an intellect resolving half-fully; but by an intellect *fully* comparing [things] to their causes it cannot be understood, that [other] not being understood — especially since it states a necessary relation and a reference to the cause, like *the true* and *the good*.

### Dub. III.

Likewise it is asked concerning those causes which the Master assigns regarding the union of the rational soul. For he says, first, that the cause is the will of God; secondly, that the cause is our instruction. And it seems that each is unskillful [as an answer]. For the first response can be given to everything; in the second the question seems to be begged, because, if [the soul] were not united, it would see God clearly and would not need an exemplar: therefore, if it needed an exemplar, it was only on account of the diminishing of its knowledge.

**I respond:** It must be said that the Master responds *sufficiently* and *well*. *Sufficiently* indeed, because, since there is a twofold way of knowing the works of God, namely by *faith* and by *understanding*, for the firmness of *faith* it suffices to know that God willed [it], whom [the faithful one] believes to will nothing except what is reasonable; whence in the first response he satisfies faith, and this response, for everyone faithful, inasmuch as he is faithful, fully suffices. — For the firmness of *understanding* a reason is rendered; and since a reason or cause cannot be rendered on the part of God, it is rendered on the part of the creature. And this is the manifestation of the divine goodness in its work, in which [God] ought to manifest himself not only on account of our need, but also for his own glory; and so the objections are clear. There is also answered here the efficient and final cause, and so [it is answered] sufficiently and fully.

---