Dist. 11, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/11/q/bon-sent-II-d11-a1-q1
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### ARTICLE I.

#### *Concerning the guardianship of the Angels.*

### QUESTION I.

#### *Whether the Angels ought to have been deputed to the guardianship of fallen man.*

Concerning the first, the procedure runs thus, and it is shown that the Angels ought not to have been deputed to the guardianship of man.

1. *Ad oppositum.* And first it is shown by an argument taken from the side of man, thus. To whom no violence can be done, no one needs guardianship; but the free choice of the human will cannot be violently coerced into sin: therefore it does not need to be guarded by an Angel: in vain therefore are the Angels deputed to its guardianship. But «God does nothing in vain»: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the fewer the extrinsic helps by which one triumphs over an adversary, the more glorious the victory: therefore it would be more glorious for man to vanquish the devil by himself than by angelic support: therefore the absence of angelic guardianship augments glory. Therefore conversely, angelic guardianship diminishes our glory; but God ought to do nothing that is to the detriment of our glory: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the same is shown by reasons taken from the side of the Angel. *He is greater who reclines than he who serves*: therefore if the Angel who guards a man serves him, the wayfaring man is greater than the blessed Angel; and if this is false, then either the Angel does not serve man, and so does not guard him, or the order is inverted in the guardianship.

4. Likewise, if an Angel guards man, he has this either *from nature* or *from grace*. If *from nature*: since the nature is the same in the good and the evil [Angels], it seems that the evil [Angels] would be guardians of men. If *from grace*: then since one soul exceeds another in grace, it seems that one soul ought to be deputed to the guardianship of another.

5. Likewise, this is shown *from the side of God himself*. For God is a perfect guardian, according to what is read in the Psalm: *Behold, he shall not slumber nor sleep* etc.: therefore if the divine guardianship is sufficient, it seems that the angelic is superfluous; or if the angelic is necessary, the divine guardianship seems to be diminished.

6. Likewise, guardianship is for preserving in the good; but it is no less to preserve in the good than to deliver from evil; for «No less is the virtue to keep what is won, than to seek it.» If therefore it was not fitting that man should be delivered, nor be drawn out of the power of the devil, except by God, it seems that he ought not to be guarded; otherwise divine honour is transferred to an Angel.

**On the contrary:** 1. *Fundamenta.* Isaiah sixty-two: *Upon thy walls, O Jerusalem* etc., the Gloss: «The walls are the Apostles, the guardians are the Angels». — Likewise, Ecclesiasticus seventeen: *Over every nation he set a ruler*, the Gloss: «That is, the Angels». — Likewise, Matthew eighteen: *Their Angels always see the face of my Father*, the Gloss: «They are not to be despised, to whose guardianship Angels are sent». — From these authorities it is gathered that the Angels have been deputed to the guardianship of men.

2. Likewise, the same is shown by reason. The order of the universe requires that every evil have a good opposed to it; which is confirmed by what is said in Ecclesiasticus thirty-three: *Against evil, good*. If therefore we are tempted by evil angels, it seems that we ought to be defended by good [angels].

3. Likewise, the law of the universe requires that the middle things be brought back through the first, and the last through the middle to their first principle; and this is confirmed by what Dionysius says in the book on the Angelic Hierarchy: «The law of divinity is to neglect order in nothing, but to bring back the middle through the first, and the last through the middle»: therefore if a blessed Angel is superior to the wayfaring man, it seems that man ought to arrive at beatitude with the mediating help of an Angel; and that help is greatest in [the work of] guarding: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the law of piety requires that the needy be supported by the powerful: if therefore wayfaring man is fragile and needs one to sustain and guard him, and the blessed Angel is strong and powerful, it seems that man ought to be committed to angelic guardianship.

### CONCLUSION.

> That a guardian Angel be deputed to fallen man befits God's power, wisdom, and mercy.

**I respond:** It must be said that it is fitting that fallen man be deputed to angelic guardianship, and that an Angel be deputed to guard man — first because it befits the loftiness of the divine *power*; secondly because it befits the order of *wisdom*; thirdly also because it befits the sweetness of *mercy*.

For it befits the *loftiness* of the divine *power*, *first reason from the side of power,* for a twofold cause. The one is that God wills to be honoured not only in himself but also in his servants. Hence it does not suffice to the loftiness of the divine *power* that Angels minister to him, but he requires of them also, for the manifestation of his surpassing power, that they minister also to his creature. — The other reason is that, since God has the devil and his demons as adversaries, it is more fitting that he conquer them through his ministers, so that through this the power of the hand of God may be shown — by which he is mighty not only in himself but also in his servants — and so that he may not undeservedly be called *Lord of hosts*.

It befits the *order* of *wisdom* likewise. *Second reason from the side of wisdom.* For this is the order which the divine law in its works pursues and preserves, that it lead the lowest through the middle to the highest. Since therefore the Angel — both by reason of his immortal nature and by reason of consummate grace — holds the middle between God and fallen man, it was fitting that God should help and guard man through an Angel.

It also befits the *sweetness* of the divine *mercy*, *Reason from the side of mercy,* which has opened her bosom to fallen man and fails him in nothing that pertains to the advancement of his salvation. And therefore, since fallen man had been sold to do *evil*, she ministered to him the price of the blood of her Son, by which he is redeemed, that he might do *good*.

And because he has an adversary attacking him, she has given him a minister to guard him — or a guardian to help him — so that in no part should human misery remain without the assistance and benefit of divine mercy.

It was fitting therefore that angelic guardianship be given to fallen man from this threefold reason. There are also other reasons, which have been touched on in the objections. The reasons therefore brought forward on this side are to be granted.

1. *Solution of the objections.* To what is objected first, that no violence can be done to man; it must be said that, even though no violence can be done as regards free choice, it could still be done as regards his body. And again, although an angel cannot sufficiently coerce free choice, yet unless he had a contrary power to restrain [the devil], he could so induce and circumvent that very few would there be whom he would not cast down; and therefore angelic guardianship — which represses the diabolical power — is utterly necessary.

2. To what is objected, that the absence of angelic support augments glory and triumph; it must be said that this would be true if man triumphed as well without an Angel as with angelic help. But now it is not so. For if angelic assistance were lacking to him, he would be conquered far more often than he conquered; and it is much better to conquer with angelic guardianship than to perish without guardianship. And again, the guardianship of the Angel does not exclude the freedom of choice nor diminish the dignity of the grace of God, and therefore it diminishes nothing of the substance of merit or of reward or of the nobility of triumph, as regards what is substantial.

3. To what is objected, that it does not befit the side of the Angel, since *he is greater who reclines than he who serves*; it must be said that this is true when the minister serves the one reclining on the latter's own account — as a servant of the king serves the king for the sake of the king's own dignity and rule; but it does not hold when someone serves another with respect to a third, as when sometimes a great soldier renders service not only to the king but also to the whole household, nor does he reject or despise anyone, refusing to serve him on account of the lowliness of the person; for he considers not who the person is, but whose servant he is. So is it to be understood in the matter at hand. For the Angel does not serve man on man's own account, but on God's account, whose image man bears. — *Another solution.* Or it may be put otherwise: that the word is to be understood of the ministry of subjection, not of presidency; and to guard a man, although it is spoken of as a ministry, more truly implies that the Angel presides over the man than that he is subject to him.

4. To what is asked, whether he has it from grace or from nature; it must be said that he has it from both. For since from his nature he is stronger than man and more powerful, and likewise in grace he is more excellent and more stable — to such a degree that he exceeds man more than a tutor exceeds a small child — therefore it belongs to the Angel both from nature and from grace that man be committed to his guardianship and tutelage.

5. *Note.* To what is objected from the side of God, that the Lord is a perfect guardian; it must be said that the perfection of the divine guardianship does not exclude the usefulness of the angelic. For just as God works in all things, and yet his operation does not exclude the operations of creatures but preserves and aids them — yet neither is his operation imperfect, nor is the creature's operation superfluous — so is it to be understood of guardianship. For just as God, for the manifestation of his goodness and for the showing forth of the order of wisdom, communicated to creatures the power to operate and to imprint their own effect upon other creatures (yet he himself not abandoning [them] but cooperating with [them]), so he has given to the Angels the power to guard man — although he himself never desists from the guardianship of his servants — because such *power* belonged to the angelic nature and grace. And the one of these guardianships does not prejudice the other, but rather the divine [guardianship] contributes to the perfection of the angelic, and the angelic to the manifestation of the perfection of the divine guardianship.

6. To what is objected, that God ought to have redeemed by himself, therefore he ought to guard by himself; it must be said that the cases are not alike. For to redeem is as great a thing as to create; and therefore, just as none ought to have been creator save God alone, so no other ought to have been redeemer; but to guard speaks of some effect of *beneficence*, which is more outward than inward, and therefore is not so great. — Nor does the objection avail that no less is the virtue to safeguard goods than to acquire them; for it must be said that this is true only when preservation and acquisition are in the power of the same virtue.

### SCHOLION

**I.** From Sacred Scripture (especially Heb. 1:14 and Matt. 18:10) and from the manifest magisterium of the Church, it is clear that Angels are deputed to the guardianship of men. This guardianship comprehends more than the three hierarchical acts treated above at d. 10, a. 2, qq. 1–2 (cf. here, q. 2). Why God has ordained this guardianship of the Angels is here explained with optimal reasons of fittingness. — When this guardianship begins is set forth here in dub. 1: namely, from birth in the womb, or from the very instant of the infusion of the soul. So consent Alexander of Hales (loc. cit., m. 4, a. 3), Peter of Tarentaise (here, q. 1, a. 3, quaestiuncula 2), and St. Thomas (here, q. 1, a. 3) — who however in the *Summa* (I, q. 113, a. 5, ad 3) teaches that it can probably be said that the mother's Angel guards the offspring existing in the mother's womb.

**II.** Concerning the following question of this article, explicitly only the following treat: Alexander of Hales, *S.* p. II, q. 41, m. 4, a. 1; Bl. Albert, here a. 6; *S.* p. II, tr. 9, q. 36, m. 4; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 3, quaestiuncula 1; and Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1, a. 2, ad 1. — What is said there about the end and effects of angelic guardianship is more fully determined below at a. 2, q. 1, where twelve effects from Sacred Scripture are recounted, which there at q. 3 are reduced to four principal effects. — In the solution ad 2 it is taught that such guardianship is not to be admitted with respect to one Angel toward another — on which Alexander of Hales explicitly treats, loc. cit., m. 3.

**III.** On the first question: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit., m. 1–2. — Scotus, here q. unica; *Reportatio* here q. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, aa. 1 and 3; *Summa* I, q. 113, aa. 1–2. — Bl. Albert, here aa. 1–2; *Summa* loc. cit., m. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, aa. 1–2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1, aa. 1–2. — Durand, here q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1. — Biel, on this and the following questions, here q. unica.

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