Dist. 11, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/11/q/bon-sent-II-d11-a1-q2
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### Question II.

### *Whether it was fitting that an Angel be assigned to the custody of man as created before the fall.*

Second, it is asked whether it was fitting that an Angel be assigned to the custody of man *as created*. And that it was not, seems [the case].

*To the contrary [arguments].* 1. An Angel is assigned to the custody of man on account of supplying his defects; but in man according to the state of nature as instituted there were no defects: therefore no Angel ought to have been assigned to his custody.

2. Likewise, man according to the state of nature as instituted was not more prone to evil than a single Angel constituted in his natural powers: therefore if a created Angel was committed to no custody save the divine alone, it seems likewise that neither was man constituted in the state of innocence.

3. Likewise, custody implies a certain presidency in the custodian with respect to the one guarded; but only God is greater than the human soul, unless it be depraved by fault: therefore if man in the state of innocence was depraved by no fault, no Angel ought to have presided over him through the office of custody.

4. Likewise, if an angelic spirit is assigned to the custody of man as instituted: therefore since the strength of man is now in many ways cast down through sin, it seems that the custody of one Angel does not suffice for one man: therefore if now one Angel suffices for one fallen man, it seems that then he did not need anyone's custody.

**On the contrary:** *Foundations.* 1. On that text of Matthew chapter eighteen: *Their Angels* etc., the Gloss of Jerome: «It is a great dignity of souls, that each one from the rising of her nativity should have an Angel assigned to her custody». If, therefore, the assignment of angelic custody pertains to the dignity of the soul, since the soul according to the state of nature as instituted was more worthy than according to the state of nature as fallen: it seems that if she now has an Angel assigned to her custody, much more so then.

2. Likewise, God is more prone to having mercy than to condemning: therefore if man in the state of nature as instituted had an evil angel tempting [him], much more strongly ought the divine mercy to have given him a guarding Angel.

3. Likewise, the Angels have been assigned to us as guardians, so that through their operation we might be drawn back from evil; but man in the state of innocence needed to be drawn back from evil, since he was able to sin: therefore he ought to have been guarded by an Angel.

4. Likewise, man as wayfarer is committed to angelic custody, so that through angelic sustenance and aid and through the support of [the Angel's] operation he might be able to ascend from good to better; but man in the state of innocence was able to make progress: therefore it seems that an Angel ought to have been assigned to his custody.

### Conclusion.

> Not only in the state of fallen nature, but even in the instituted [state], it was fitting that angelic custody be given to man.

**I respond:** It must be said that although an Angel is assigned to the custody of man in order to profit him and come to his aid in many ways, yet he is assigned especially for this, *The principal end of angelic custody.* that he might defend [man] from the invisible adversary. For since man does not have *a wrestling against flesh and blood, but against the rulers of the world and against the spiritual hosts of wickedness in the heavenly places*, who are invisible enemies; he ought, conversely, to have invisible helpers for his own defense. And because the adversary attacks us on every side — for he seduces *reason* by cunning, allures *the will* by flatteries, oppresses *the virtues* by violence — therefore the good Angel is especially given to us for this: that he may *defend* man from oppression against violence, that he may *instruct* and direct man against deception, that he may *exhort* and incite man to good against flatteries. — Since therefore our adversary the devil was, even in instituted man['s case], stronger and more cunning and more obstinate in his purpose of malice; therefore it was fitting that angelic custody be given to man, which would suppress the adversary's power not only according to the state of fallen nature, but even of the instituted; though he has greater need now than then. Whence the reasons adduced for this [position] are to be granted.

*Solution of the opposed [arguments].* 1. To that which is objected first, that an Angel is given to man for custody on account of supplying defects; it must be said that this is not the whole cause, unless *supplying of defect* be taken broadly, whether with respect to a defect that *is present*, or also with respect to a defect that *can be present*, so that it may not be present. And although in the first man there was no *actual defect*, yet there was in him *defectibility*; and although of himself he had no defect, nevertheless he could be cast down into defect by his adversary.

2. To that which is objected, that an Angel is not assigned to the custody of another Angel; it must be said, *To be noted.* that although an Angel can *preside over* another Angel, nevertheless he is not properly said to *guard* him. For only he needs *custody* who can be attacked and through custody overcome [his attacker] or without custody be lost; and only he ought to *guard* who can neither be vanquished nor lost. And hence it is that an Angel can be assigned to the custody of man as instituted, and not of another Angel: for the Angels were created at the same time, and likewise those who are beatified were beatified at the same time, and likewise those who sinned fell irrecoverably at the same time. And therefore an Angel cannot be assigned to the custody of another Angel, because the good [Angel] after confirmation does not need [custody], to the evil [Angel] after obstinacy [custody] is of no avail; and before confirmation and obstinacy there was neither one who could defend, nor one who could attack, since all were equally changeable. But it is otherwise with man as wayfarer. For while man exists in the state of changeability and combat, in which he was able to lose or to gain, the Angel was in the state of beatitude, from which he could not be moved.

3. To that which is objected, that to the human mind, which is not corrupted by sin, God alone ought to be set in command; it must be said that this is true of that pre-eminence which has *opposed servitude* [as its correlate]; *In what way pre-eminence belongs to God alone.* for thus man as created was said to be *subject* to God alone, and to be *servant* of God alone, of no other. But of that pre-eminence which is regarded according to *excellence of status* and according to presidency with respect to some *act*, it does not hold; for thus Angel presides over Angel, in whom sin never was.

4. To that which is objected, that if man had an Angel assigned to his custody, then now one man ought to have many; it must be said that the argument does not compel; for the effect of angelic custody can grow in two ways: *Distinction.* either by the multiplication of custodians, or by the greater succor of the custodian. And therefore although fallen man needs a greater office of custody than [man] as instituted, nevertheless, because the same Angel according to diverse opportunities can succor more and more and relieve the [man's] needs; therefore it is not necessary, in proportion to the increase of need in the one guarded, to multiply the number of guardians.

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