Dist. 12, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/12/q/bon-sent-II-d12-a1-q1
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### ARTICLE I.

#### *Concerning the informity of matter.*

### QUESTION I.

#### *Whether the matter of corporeal things was created in complete possibility.*

*Ad oppositum.* Concerning the first [question] one proceeds thus, and it is shown that matter was created in complete possibility, in such a way that it had no form at all:

1. First by Augustine in the book *On the Creed*, who says thus: «*First, the capacity of all forms was made, that by the most well-ordered gift of God the other things might be formed, which have been formed*»: therefore it seems that in matter, according to what was first established, there was only the *capacity* of forms and no *form.*

2. Likewise, Augustine in the twelfth book of the *Confessions*: «*Have you not, O Lord, taught me that, before you formed and distinguished this formless matter, there was not anything — not color, not figure, not body, not spirit; yet [there] was not altogether nothing, [but] a formlessness without any species*»? And after: «*That whole was nearly nothing, since it was still altogether formless; yet there already was that which could be formed*». — From these two passages it is expressly gathered that the matter of bodies was produced under complete informity and possibility.

3. Likewise, that this is *possible* is shown thus. The *prior* can be without the *posterior*; but matter is prior to every form: therefore it was possible that it become without any form.

4. Likewise, for the establishment of things there concur two potencies, namely *active* potency and *passive* potency, as the potency *of the agent* and the potency *of matter*; but it is possible that the potency *of the agent* precede the effect both by nature and by duration: therefore it is possible that the possibility or capacity of matter pre-exist every form both by nature and by duration.

5. Likewise, that this is *fitting* is shown thus. If some one thing is found in the universe which is constituted out of several natures, and one of those [natures] is to be found *per se,* it likewise occurs that the other is found *per se,* with the result that the totality is complete. But mundane things are composed of matter and form, and it is possible to find *pure form,* in which there is nothing of the possibility of matter — namely God: therefore it will be possible to find *pure matter,* in which there will be nothing of the actuality of form. But this was not [the case] except in the world's beginning: therefore it seems that matter was produced without any form.

6. Likewise, God is the most well-ordered agent, therefore he passes from extreme to extreme through a middle; but the middle between altogether non-being and being in act is being altogether in potency: therefore it seems that God in the production of things first made being in potency from non-being, before he produced any form.

*Fundamenta.* *On the contrary:* 1. Hugh in the book *On the Sacraments*: «*I believe that first matter was not called formless on the ground that it had no form at all, since no such corporeal thing can exist*»; and the Master says this same thing in the text.

2. Likewise, Boethius: «*All being is from form*»; but everything that is created, immediately after creation, is: therefore either it *is* form, or it *has* form. If therefore prime matter was created, either it was form, or it had form in the principle of its production; but it was *not* form: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the Philosopher: «*It is impossible for matter to be separated from morphē*»; but if matter were to pre-exist every form in time, it could be separated from it: therefore it was not created in the lack of every form.

4. Likewise, unity, truth, goodness — that is, mode, species and order — are in things from the side of the formal principle: but it is impossible that anything be or be produced in which there is not the vestige of the Creator: therefore it is impossible that anything be brought forth lacking every form.

5. Likewise, if that matter were to lack every form: therefore [it would lack] every accident also: therefore it would not have being extended 
nor being located nor being in motion nor in rest; but nothing such can exist in the nature of things: therefore matter could not, in its condition [of being established], lack every form.

6. Likewise, matter [taken as] this very thing which *is* takes its name from form; therefore it has an essential dependence on form: if therefore it is impossible that anything be separated from that which essentially inheres in it, it is impossible that matter exist apart from every form.

### CONCLUSION.

> *Matter can be considered by the soul according to its essence and as wholly formless; but according to being it cannot exist without every form, nor was it created formless.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said it must be *Matter is considered in two ways.* noted that there are two ways of speaking of matter: either according to its *existence* in nature, or according to its being *considered* by the soul. *Conclusion 1.* If according to its being *considered* by the soul, then it can be considered formless, either by the privation of *distinct* form, or by the privation even of *every* form; and thus Augustine in the twelfth [book] of the *Confessions* teaches that the essence of matter is to be understood. For matter according to its *Note.* essence is formless through complete possibility; and while it is so considered, the very *capacity* or *possibility* of forms stands to it in place of form. — There is again [a way] of speaking of matter according as it has *Conclusion 2. being* in nature; and so it is never apart from place and time, or apart from rest and motion; and in this way it is not only unfitting but indeed impossible that matter exist as formless through the privation of every form.

And this is what the Master and Hugh of St. Victor say, and all who treat of this matter have agreed, *Conclusion 3.* that the matter which was first produced by creation was not in complete possibility, that is, in the lack of every form. — Hence the reasons brought forward for this part [of the question] are to be conceded.

*Solution of the contrary [arguments].* **To 1, 2.** To that which is objected — that the *capacity* of all things was first made, and likewise to what is said in the twelfth [book] of the *Confessions* — it must be said that Augustine speaks of priority of *nature,* not of priority of *duration*. For according to the order of nature matter is first in complete potency before *Note.* it is under any form, and so wholly formless before formed in any way, since it has formation from elsewhere, but it has informity and possibility from its own nature; yet it cannot be prior in *duration.* For there is never *informity* except through some form, nor *possibility* except through some act.

**To 3.** To that which is objected, that the prior can be without the posterior, it must be said that this does not hold when the *prior* depends on the *posterior,* or when it has a necessary ordering to it, or also when that which is *prior* in one consideration is *posterior* in another: for all these reasons the aforesaid reasoning fails in the present case. For matter *Note.* depends on form and has a necessary ordering to it; and although it is prior in *production* or *generation,* it is nevertheless posterior in *completion.*

**To 4.** To that which is objected concerning the potency of the agent and of matter, it must be said that there is no parallel, since the potency of the agent does not depend on and reach completion through its *effect* in the way that the potency of matter depends on and reaches completion through its *act.*

**To 5.** To that which is objected — that one can find form *per se,* therefore also matter [*per se*] — it must be said that that proposition does not have *necessity* but only *fittingness.* There is also a fault in the *minor premise*, since the form which with matter makes a composite is never found without matter. For when it is said: *Note.* God is purely form, the term *form* is used equivocally, since *form* there is not said as it is the *perfection of matter*; rather *form* there names the *essence,* which has being in complete actuality and completion, and can in no way come to the composition of another.

**To 6.** To that which is objected concerning order in producing, it must be said that for order to be preserved in production it is not necessary that whatever things have an order *of nature* have an order *of successive duration.* For there are innumerable instances against this; and therefore, although being in potency simply is the middle between non-being and being-in-act, it is not necessary that it follow the one and precede the other in duration.