Dist. 12, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/12/q/bon-sent-II-d12-a1-q2
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### QUESTION II.

#### *Whether matter was produced in perfect actuality.*

*Ad oppositum.* Secondly it is asked whether that matter was produced in perfect actuality. And that yes, it seems:

1. First by the text of Genesis 2: *These are the generations of the heavens and the earth in the day when God created the heavens and the earth and every plant of the field* etc.: therefore in the same day were produced those things which he had earlier said were distinguished through the number of six days.

2. Likewise, Ecclesiasticus 18: *He who lives forever created all things at once.* If all things were created at once, then both corporeal and spiritual and every difference of corporeal things [were so created].

3. Likewise, Job 40: *Behold Behemoth, whom I made with thee*; but Behemoth is the Angel first made, and man was made on the last day: therefore all things were made at once. — By these authorities Augustine argues for his opinion in this part.

4. Likewise, the same thing is shown by reason. From an agent of perfect potency the effect ought to come forth in such measure as is *more* manifestative of supreme potency; but it is of greater potency to be able to produce all things at once than successively: therefore the production of matter with the perfect actuality of form conferred all at once and simultaneously is more declarative of divine potency than [the production] of matter [first], from which [the forms] are afterwards successively brought forth: if therefore God works according to what most befits his potency, it seems [that he did so] etc.

5. Likewise, «*it belongs to the perfectly wise to order*»: therefore if confusion is repugnant to ordering, it seems that God produced nothing with confusion, since he is perfectly wise; therefore he produced [things] under order. But order presupposes distinction: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, the perfection of the effect attests to perfect 
goodness in the efficient [cause]: if therefore God is of most perfect goodness, it seems that immediately when he produced matter, he ought to have perfected it fully with forms, since he himself could do this, and matter also was demanding it. *If you say* that this does not conclude that he ought to have perfected [matter] immediately, but that from a reasonable cause he both could and ought to defer; *it is objected* against this: that nature and art work as quickly as they can, and it belongs to excellence of power and goodness that one's effect be completed swiftly: therefore if both nature and art are an *imitator* of divine art and power, it seems that God, since he could have completed [the work] at once, would not have allowed any delay of time or duration.

*Fundamenta.* **On the contrary:** 1. First by the text of Genesis one argues, where it is said that through the space of six days *the Lord completed the work which he had begun*: therefore it seems that matter was not produced suddenly in perfect actuality, according to the meaning of sacred Scripture. If therefore «*the authority of this Scripture is greater than all the perspicacity of human ingenuity*», as Augustine says, one must rather stand by this opinion than by every human persuasion. *If you say* that the legislator was speaking to the rude, and could not *say at once* what God could *do at once*; neither of these responses seems sufficient, since on account of the rudeness of the hearer one ought not to give him occasion of deception; but Moses well knew that they would understand his words to the letter: therefore he was knowingly teaching them that by which they could be deceived and err. Likewise, although he could not *say* all things at once and express those works, yet he could express that all things were made at once.

2. Likewise, Chrysostom, *on John,* homily twenty-two, says, «*what existed at once in the substance of matter did not at once appear through the species of form*»: therefore it seems not that [matter] was produced simul under forms. — To this point there are the authorities commonly of the Saints and doctors, such as Ambrose, Jerome, Gregory, Basil, Dionysius, and Damascene, and many others, both Greek and Latin.

3. Likewise, the same is shown by *reason.* Although God could immediately place man in beatitude and make the universe in that perfection in which it will be after the Judgment; yet he chose to preserve order not only in the world's *existence* but also in its *course,* since thus his wisdom is more efficaciously manifested. Therefore likewise it seems that in the primary going-forth of things he preserved order not only as regards their *being* but also as regards their *producing* or *making*: therefore it seems that he did not produce all things at once, but successively.

4. Likewise, the divine potency is manifested not only in the *production of form,* but also as much and more is manifested in the *bringing forth of matter*; for matter, according to its greater capacity, more declares the power of its efficient [cause]. But the capacity in matter is so much the greater as informity in it is the greater: if therefore for the manifestation of divine potency matter ought to be produced as capacious as possible, it seems that God ought to have produced it in as much informity as matter could in some way subsist in: therefore not under perfect distinction of forms.

5. Likewise, it is impossible that material days be simul: therefore it is impossible to understand this — that God produced all things at once, and yet produced them through *six days.* It is therefore necessary, according to the position which holds that all things were produced at once, to understand that senary of days *spiritually,* and so the *spiritual light* and *spiritual night.* Therefore if all these things were produced at once, in the first instant light was divided from darkness, that is, the good Angels from the evil: therefore there was no delay between creation and the [angelic] fall, which is rejected above and shown to be against Augustine.

6. Likewise, when sacred Scripture orders the works of the six days, it either orders [them] as to the order of *duration,* or as to the order of *nature,* or as to the order of *dignity.* If as to the order of *dignity*: then since man is the most dignified of creatures, his production ought to have been assigned to the first day. If as to the order of *nature*: then the production of sun and moon [ought to be] before the production of plants and grass. It remains therefore that this was said as to the order of *time* or *duration.*

### CONCLUSION.

> *It is more probable that all corporeal things were created at once according to matter, but not at once — rather, were distinguished through six days according to form.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that concerning this question there have been diverse opinions of the Saints.

For some Saints in this question followed more the *theological* way, drawing reasoning toward those things which are of the faith. *Opinion of Augustine.* But others, among whom the principal was Augustine, followed more the *philosophical* way, which lays down those things which seem more consonant with reason: hence he also drew the meaning of Scripture toward the confirmation and attestation of reason. Therefore, since it seems more reasonable that all things be produced at once by the supreme power, and that an intervening delay of time would seem to be of no utility or necessity, he held that all things were produced at once, confirming his position through the authorities of sacred Scripture, and explaining that which seems to him to contradict it — namely, the *distinction of days* — by showing that those days were not material days but rather spiritual [days], which could all be at once. — And this position was very reasonable and very subtle.

*Not pleasing to all.* Nevertheless, because the meaning of Scripture seems to be twisted by this position, and it is safer and more meritorious to *submit* our understanding and reason wholly to Scripture rather than in any way to *twist* it: therefore commonly the other doctors, both those who preceded Augustine and those who came after, understood and held [the matter] as the text and letter of sacred Scripture of Genesis seems to sound. Hence they held that all corporeal things were created at once *Conclusion.* in *matter,* but not at once — rather, through a senary of days — were distinguished in *form.* — *Defended by reasons.* This position, even though it may seem less reasonable than the other, nevertheless is not 
unreasonable to maintain. For although reason does not perceive the fittingness of this position so far as it relies on its own consideration, yet it perceives [it] so far as it is taken captive under the light of faith. For of this successive formation and distinction there is a *fourfold reason,* namely *literal, moral, allegorical,* and *anagogical.*

*Ratio 1.* The *literal* [reason] is in this, that God intends not only to make what he *can,* but rather also to communicate to the creature what it can *receive.* Hence, since he can give beatitude without merits, yet he wills that we merit. So although he could immediately perfect matter, he preferred rather to make it under a certain informity and imperfection, so that, from its imperfection, matter as it were might cry out to God, that he might perfect it. And he willed to defer this same thing through a *senary* of days, so that in the perfection of the number the perfection of the universe might at once be shown forth. For according to the arithmetician, the *senary* is a perfect number, since it consists of all its aliquot parts, in such a way that it neither falls short nor exceeds. Now *aliquot* parts are called those which, taken some number of times, yield the whole.

*Ratio 2.* The *moral* reason is, that in this man may be instructed: that just as corporeal nature of itself exists formless, but is then formed when the divine goodness bestows form on its informity; so the soul cannot be formed of itself, unless God pour in his grace. To this the *senary* number also attests, since [our] time is for meriting through the whole time of the present life, so that afterwards rest may be given to man, since one does not attain the perfection of merit until the consummation of final grace, after which no evening follows: and therefore the seventh day has no *evening* assigned to it in Scripture.

*Ratio 3.* The *allegorical* reason is — since, as Augustine expressly shows — in that first establishment of the world, which was distinguished by the *senary,* the whole span of the course of the present world is prefigured according to six ages: such that the first day corresponds to the first age, the second to the second, and so on, according as Augustine plainly adapts in *On Genesis according to the Letter*; which would here be long to repeat.

*Ratio 4.* The *anagogical* reason is, that in that distinction of days the perfection of cognition in the beatified angelic nature may be understood, according as Augustine plainly shows in *On Genesis according to the Letter* almost throughout; which he therefore calls *to the letter* because he said that the legislator intended *to the letter* this exposition which others reputed anagogical. *Note.* Yet he says nothing there by way of assertion, but himself protests that he there proceeds in an *inquisitive* manner. And, as is evident from his intention in the same place, he wished rather to elicit from Scripture a meaning according to which Scripture could not be ridiculed by philosophical men, nor on this account anyone, imbued with natural philosophy, be deterred from the truth of the faith, as he himself had once been deterred — [he wished], I say, rather [this] than to set forth the principal meaning which the legislator had there; and he intends rather to show what *fitting* there may have been or could then have been, than what *was done.* *Note.* And in the twelfth [book] of the *Confessions* he shows that one and the same Scripture can be understood in many ways, and in all senses truly, none of which was hidden from the Holy Spirit, by whose inspiration Scripture was put forth. And in this he manifestly shows that he does not contradict the others. — Therefore, maintaining this position, the objections to the contrary must be answered.

*Solution of the contrary [arguments].* **To 1.** To that which is first objected from the text of *Genesis,* it must be said that this is said by way of *recapitulation,* and the term *day* there is used confusedly, so that it is taken for diverse days, or it is taken *zeugmatically*, so that it is rendered for the individual members of that recapitulation.

**To 2.** To that which is objected from Ecclesiasticus 18: *He who lives forever* etc.; it must be said that Scripture makes a distinction between *creating* and *making.* For it calls *creation* the production from nothing, but *making* the very distinction; and this is well signified in Genesis 2, where it is said that *he rested from every work which he created, that he might make.* All the Saints therefore concord in this — that all things are produced at once in matter; and they therefore concede that all things were *created* at once, but not yet *made* at once.

**To 3.** To that which is objected from Job 40, it must be said that Gregory explains that *cum* there indicates not simultaneity of time, but a likeness of reason — as if to say, *Behold Behemoth, whom I made with thee,* that is, like to thee in the capacity of reason.

**To 4. 5. 6.** To that which is objected, that it is more declarative of greater potency to produce many things at once, it must be said that God intended to manifest his potency more in the production from *non-being* to *being* than afterwards in *formation*; for there he more manifests *wisdom* and *goodness.* And so that individually and distinctly and appropriately in the production of effects the perfection of *potency, wisdom* and *goodness* might be manifested, it pleased the divine Author to send forth first the work of *creation,* then to add the work of *distinction,* finally the work of *adornment* and *decoration.* And in the first *potency* is manifested, in the second *wisdom,* in the third perfect *goodness,* though all may be manifested in any of these. *Note.* And therefore those three are well manifested after the consummate being of things, just as if matter had been produced and distinguished and adorned immediately at the beginning. — And by this the two following [arguments] are evident, which proceed by a like way, namely concerning the perfection of *goodness* and *wisdom.* For those reasons do not conclude anything except that God ought not to have left matter in informity, since this would be against order and perfection; but in making it formless that he might form it, and imperfect that he might perfect it, he showed that both perfection and order are given to matter from himself. *And if you object* that to the perfection of all these belongs swiftly to perfect and order and distinguish the effect, it must be said that this is true where an agent acts according to its whole *power*; but where it condescends to the possibility and infirmity and utility of another, it does not hold; and so it is in the present case. *Note.* For just as God handed down sacred Scripture to us as it were in a rude and unrefined manner, so that anyone might be able to grasp and understand, even though in Christ are the *infinite treasures of wisdom and knowledge*; so also in the formation of things, as far as was fitting, he condescended to the manner of nature and also to the instruction of the rational creature. And since by that delay man was instructed, as has been seen above, therefore it pleased the divine potency, goodness and wisdom to distinguish the forms of things under the succession of days, even though he could have suddenly distinguished and adorned matter for them.